U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/3-hl
A4-3
Ser 0102
15 Nov 1950

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Prev. rec'd on RS# 09769

Subj: Action Report for the period 14 September through 5 October 1950

Ref: (a) CNO restricted ltr Op-345/ae ser 1197P34 dtd 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-2 conf ltr ser 014 dtd 10 October 1950; Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (15 September 1950 - 2 October 1950) with enclosures thereto. P. 79-125

1. In compliance with reference (a), the action report for the period 14 September through 5 October 1950 is hereby submitted.

Part I: Composition of Own Forces and Mission.

A. In accordance with dispatch orders from Commander Seventh Fleet the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked, departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, 14 September 1950 in company with the U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83), U.S.S. RADFORD (DDE-446), and the U.S.S. JAMES E. KYES (DD-787). Capt. L.S. Parks, USN, commanding the U.S.S. MANCHESTER, was OTC. This group of four ships proceeded to the Yellow Sea where it rendezvoused with Task Force 77 on 15 September, reporting for duty to Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen, USN, CTF77 who was also CTG77.4 and ComCarDiv ONE. Rear Admiral J.M. HOSKINS, Commander Carrier Division THREE, in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), was second in command. The Task Force was operating in accordance with ComCarDiv ONE Operation Order 1-50. Task Force 77 consisted of three carriers, two cruisers, and three divisions of destroyers as follows:

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
U.S.S. WORCESTER (CL-144)
U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83)
Destroyer Divisions 31, 111, and 112

B. The mission of the Task Force was to conduct air operations in the North Korean area in order to: (a) maintain air supremacy, (b) isolate the

[redacted]

60

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

objective area, and (c) provide air cover and support for operations of the Attack Force in its amphibious assault on INCHON scheduled to commence the evening of 15 September 1950.

Part II: Chronological Order of Events.

A. Operations were conducted approximately sixty miles west of Inchon, Korea in the Yellow Sea with replenishment being accomplished in an area immediately to the south-southwest of the scene of operations. For replenishment purposes the Task Force was divided into three groups, with two groups carrying out flight operations while the third replenished. Thus each group in turn had flight operations for two successive days and replenished on the third.

B. Air operations during the period of this report consisted of the following types of missions: Deep support, close support, targets of opportunity sweeps, combat air patrols, target combat air patrols, anti-submarine patrols, naval gun fire spotting, and photo reconnaissance.

C. Enemy opposition was spotty. His ground forces appeared to have little in the way of heavy equipment or armament and his land transport facilities and rolling stock were rapidly reduced to ineffectiveness; the only vehicles observed moving in the later stages of the operation were primitive hand carts and ox carts. Few, if any, enemy planes were seen in the air, and flak was meager to moderate in volume. Mines posed the most serious enemy threat to our operations.

D. The following is an outline of the BOXER's employment during the period covered by this action report:

14 September - Departed Sasebo at 1826I for Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN off the west coast of Korea.

15 September - At 1238I, the BOXER suffered a failure of the number four main reduction gear, necessitating the securing of the number four main engine and locking the propeller shaft. It was determined that the maximum possible sustained speed was 26 knots with a maximum emergency speed of 28 knots for short periods. The number four main engine remained inoperative for the rest of this operation.

At 1415I, the BOXER reported to Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and took station in formation. At 1432, planes were launched to conduct strikes against shore defenses in the Inchon area in order to prepare the beach for amphibious assault. All planes were recovered at 1820I. Pilots reported no enemy air opposition and, although some flak was encountered, no damage to aircraft was sustained.

16 September - Air operations against Korean targets were continued. During the launch, an F4U, piloted by Ensign J. BROGAN, USN, crashed into the sea and burned when the engine failed. The pilot, who was rescued by

helicopter, received burns about the face and hands. Lt Comdr. D.C. TAYLOR, USN, in another F4U, made a forced water landing in Inchon Harbor and he, too, was rescued by a helicopter.

17 September - Air strikes against North Korean targets were continued. Two more BOXER pilots were rescued uninjured by helicopters. Lt(jg) E.R. PAINTER, USN, was rescued when his F4U crashed into the sea during take-off, and Ensign R.R. SANDERS, USN, was rescued after making a forced landing in enemy territory southeast of Seoul, where his AD-4 had been damaged by enemy flak and subsequently destroyed by gunfire of accompanying planes.

18 September - Received fuel oil, aviation gasoline, and ammunition from the replenishment group.

19 September - While our aircraft resumed their strikes against Korean targets, the BOXER lost her first pilot. An F4U piloted by Lt(jg) FRANKLIN SMITH, JR., USN, scraped its wing along the flight deck and struck the barrier during a landing attempt causing the plane to crash into the sea in an inverted position. The pilot, who apparently cut his gun before executing a wave-off, was not recovered.

20 September - Deep support missions were predominate in the BOXER's air operations on the 20th. One AD-4 was lost due to enemy ground fire when the plane, piloted by Lt(jg) C.E. SEEMAN, USN, crashed in enemy territory north of Seoul. Lt(jg) SEEMAN was not seen to leave the plane, which exploded and burned; he is considered missing in action.

21 September - Received fuel oil and aviation gasoline from ships in the replenishment group.

22 and 23 September - Air strikes, consisting principally of deep support missions, were continued.

24 September - Fresh and frozen provisions, as well as fuel oil and aviation gasoline, were received from the replenishment group.

25 and 26 September - BOXER aircraft continued to search for, and hit, rapidly diminishing targets in deep support missions. An F4U was lost on 26 September when it plunged into the sea during landing operations. The pilot, Lt(jg) E.F. BASS, USN, was rescued by helicopter.

27 September - In the forenoon BOXER planes conducted an air bombardment of the Fankochi Point area which was coordinated with a surface bombardment. The purpose was to create an illusion of invasion preparations and thus decoy the enemy into diverting troops to the area. At noon the BOXER retired to the replenishment area where fuel oil, aviation gasoline, and ammunition were received.

[redacted]

28 and 29 September - While air strikes continued against rapidly dwindling targets, the ship suffered her third and last pilot casualty of this operation when an F4U, flown by Ensign C.C. HOWELL, USN, was shot down near Uijongbu. Although Ensign HOWELL was seen to parachute clear of the plane and apparently land safely, it was subsequently learned that he died later after having been captured, severely beaten, and shot in the back by the enemy.

30 September - Received fuel oil, aviation gasoline, and ammunition from ships of the replenishment group.

1.October - BOXER aircraft blasted and destroyed a large power plant located just east of Pyongyang. The bombing and rocket attacks were exceptionally accurate. When the planes departed from the area the power plant was in flames with columns of smoke billowing several thousand feet in the air. This choice target was located by ship photo interpreters from photographs taken by BOXER planes.

An F4U, which was hit by AA during the attack, made a forced landing a few miles south of Pyongyang. While awaiting the arrival of a helicopter from Kimpo Airfield, BOXER F4U's and Marine F7F's covered the downed pilot, Ensign C.E. DORRIS, USN. He was recovered in a daring rescue under fire by an Air Force helicopter and returned to Kimpo.

2 October - Upon completion of air operations the BOXER departed from the formation at about 1830I, for Yokosuka, Japan, via Van Dieman Straits, for the purpose of drydocking, inspection of the damage to the number four reduction gear, and removal of the propeller if necessary repairs could not be effected. The destroyers U.S.S. HENDERSON (DD-785) and U.S.S. GURKE (DD-783) accompanied the BOXER as far as Van Dieman Straits at which point they were released and the BOXER proceeded on to Yokosuka alone, anchoring outside the breakwater at 1030I on 5 October 1950, due to heavy weather prevailing.

Part III: Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment.

See enclosure (1).

Part IV: Resume of battle damage - own and enemy.

The ship sustained no battle damage. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

Part V: Personnel Performance and Casualties.

A. In spite of the fact that more than 50 percent of the ship's personnel had but recently reported aboard with practically no prior operational experience, their performance was most gratifying. This group of relatively inexperienced men evolved into a smooth running organization during the first few days of this combat period. The improvement between the first and

[redacted]

63

[redacted]

fourth day's operations was remarkable.

B. No personnel casualties were suffered by the ship; see enclosure (1) for air group casualties.

Part VI: Special Comments.

A. Operational Readiness.

1. Upon returning to San Diego on 16 June 1950 from a five-month cruise to the Far East, the BOXER was granted a 30-day period for leave, liberty, and upkeep plus tender availability from 26 June until 15 July. The ship was scheduled to enter the San Francisco Naval Shipyard on 30 August for a much needed four-month overhaul period.

2. The Korean incident, however, quickly changed all plans, and, on 27 June 1950, the BOXER received orders to proceed to sea to qualify Air Group ELEVEN, scheduled to sail in the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA. Personnel were recalled from leave and air operations were conducted in the San Diego area until returning to port on 2 July. On 8 July, the ship proceeded to Alameda where she embarked 145 P-51 and 6 L-6 Air Force aircraft, 19 naval carrier aircraft, 1012 passengers, and approximately 2,000 tons of cargo, all destined for the Far East Korean theatre. Upon returning to San Francisco after an ordered speedy round trip to Yokosuka, Japan, the BOXER was granted a ten day availability for urgent repairs at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard. Upon termination of this yard period she proceeded to Alameda for loading and embarkation of Carrier Air Group TWO.

3. On 24 August, upon completion of embarking the air group, the ship proceeded to Pearl Harbor where gunnery, carquals, and refresher operations were conducted during the four and one-half days allowed.

4. The ship departed Pearl Harbor on 4 September for Yokosuka with orders to arrive on 13 September. In addition to a full air group of 96 aircraft, 14 spare aircraft for the FasRon ELEVEN pool were carried which immobilized the flight deck to the extent that not even respotting exercises for the flight deck crew could be conducted.

5. Between having the destination but not the ETA changed from Yokosuka to Sasebo, playing tag with typhoon KEZIA, and attempting to launch the spare aircraft for Kisarazu Air Force Base as ordered or find an alternate destination, the BOXER was delayed in arriving at Sasebo until 14 September. When Kisarazu set Typhoon Condition II, course was radically altered to the south to circle typhoon KEZIA clockwise. The ship then attempted to enter Sasebo the evening of 13 September but found KEZIA in the Sasebo landing circle ahead of her and had to retire for the night after encountering wind gusts as high as 80 knots. KEZIA gave the ship's company a fatiguing time again that night, but early morning of 14 September, the spare aircraft were launched for Naha AFB, Okinawa, instead of for Kisarazu,

[redacted]

and the ship proceeded up the mine-swept channel entering Sasebo during the forenoon.

6. During the few hours the ship was in Sasebo, personnel were engaged in loading cargo and ammunition as well as in preparations for getting underway prior to darkness. Officers from the Staff of Commander Carrier Division THREE reported aboard with the many effective Operation Orders and the perterient operating instructions. With the limited time available after sortie from Sasebo the evening of 14 September, a choice had to be made as to whether the Operation Orders should be read first or Carrier Division THREE Officers conduct their briefing. The latter was decided upon and the services performed by these briefing officers were of inestimable value in preparing the ship for immediate combat operations upon rendezvous with Task Force 77 off Korea on 15 September. Study of the Operation Orders and Instructions three days later during replenishment disclosed many details which had unknowingly been overlooked.

B. Air Department.

1. Aircraft Complement.

a. The BOXER reported to Task Force 77 on 15 September "loaded for bear". Instead of the 87 plane normal complement, 96 aircraft were aboard as follows: 64 F4U-4, 18 AD-4, 1 AD-4Q, 3 AD-4N, 3 AD-4W, 3 F4U-5P, and 1 helicopter. The decision to carry additional aircraft was based on:

(a) The desire to augment the strike and ground support effort to the maximum.

(b) The reported unavailability of replacement aircraft in the theatre of operations.

(c) The expected low average availability of F4U-4 aircraft assigned, due to age (majority on third service tour).

b. Although respotting for initial launches and accommodating last minute changes in launch composition were difficult, that all scheduled events were launched without one abort is considered to justify the decision to carry extra aircraft.

2. Flight Deck Operations.

a. Three-fourths of the flight deck crew, including the Flight Deck Officer, reported aboard just prior to the ship's departure from Conlus. This group, with little or no previous carrier experience, had only the 4½ day training period off Pearl Harbor before the ship joined Task Force 77 for these operations.

b. The first combat launch, made 16 minutes after rendezvous with the Task Force, was an experience from which many lessons were learned in a hurry. The 47-minute launch for 24VF and 14 VA, brought about by a last minute ordered change in composition and the necessity of breaking the tight spot, snaking assigned aircraft through the maze of other planes on the flight deck, and catapult launch for all except a few VF, and aggrovated by an abnormal number of duds due to inability to turn up during the preceding bout with typhoon KEZIA, was probably one of the longest in history; but led to immediate corrective measures and the achievement of standard performance in a remarkably short time.

3. Wheel Chocks.

Universal airplane wheel chocks of laminated wood construction are considered unsatisfactory and insufficiently durable for normal flight deck usage.

4. Airborne Early Warning (AEW) equipment.

Because of the fact that all AEW racks, test equipment, etc., were removed from this vessel in 1948 and 1949 and were never replaced, the AEW team that came aboard in July 1950 had serious difficulties in servicing their equipment. The Electronics Officers of Fleet Air Alameda and ComAirPac eased the situation somewhat by furnishing all the equipment they had available; but they could supply only a portion of what was required. The remainder, ordered from ASO, Philadelphia, Pa. and given a deadline delivery date of 28 July at Alameda, has not yet been received. Despite the above, due to the ingenious work of the AEW crew, AD-4W aircraft were seldom in an AOG status.

5. Material Damage and Casualties.

a. During the period of this action report, the ship experienced three barrier crashes by F4U-4 aircraft and none by the AD's. One of the F4U-4's sustained but minor damage to its propeller, another required a propeller change, while the third barrier crash required changing the propeller, the engine, and one wing.

b. In addition to the above barrier crashes, two F4U-5Ns engaged late wires slightly off center to starboard, and struck the after 5" turret. The first one, landing after a dawn patrol, sustained damage to its right wing. The second one, a night landing, struck the propeller cone, resulting in engine and propeller changes.

c. The port catapult threw a rim-liner out of the tow cable fairlead sheave beneath the flight deck and was out of commission for eleven hours. The starboard catapult experienced a failure of the rivets in the rim-liner on the retrieving cable fairlead sheave in the machine room and was out for eight hours.

d. Number two elevator suffered the only other material casualty worthy of note. The interlock switch on the deck-edge elevator platform locks failed to close, thus rendering the elevator inoperative electrically for three hours.

C. Air Intelligence.

1. Readiness.

a. During the BOXER's stay in the Hawaiian area the Air Intelligence Officer, the Photographic Officer and three enlisted photographers were issued temporary additional duty orders to Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet Staff for intelligence briefing and photo interpretation instruction, respectively, which greatly assisted in preparing the ship for combat operations.

b. It is understood that steps are being taken to furnish ships bound for forward areas with essential intelligence material prior to departure from the United States. When this is accomplished, many of the difficulties experienced in this operation will have been eliminated. Greater intelligence liaison between rear areas and forces operating in the forward areas is considered essential.

2. Material.

a. Some initial difficulty was experienced with charts. Some were in short supply; others within the same set had the transverse mercator grid on some sheets and world polyconic on others. Even when charts with proper grids were in use, an appreciable amount of training was necessary before pilots could be depended upon to arrive at the same grid coordinates when using charts of different scales.

b. Determination of proper charts to be carried in single seat aircraft was arrived at after considerable trial and error. The chart packet most favored was one consisting of appropriate coverage with the following:

(a) Several sheets of USAF World Aeronautical Chart (1/1,000,000) or USAF Pilotage Chart (1/500,000) were joined together to form a large chart for use in navigating. This chart was divided into sections marked to indicate the chart or map providing larger scale coverage of any section.

(b) AMS L-551 (1/250,000) provided fairly large scale gridded coverage of all of Korea.

(c) AMS L-751 (1/50,000) is essential for NGF spot aircraft and any aircraft that may be called upon to provide close support, including photo planes and night intruders. Coverage with this map north of 38°-20' was not available. Preparation of gridded charts in booklet form would greatly facilitate handling in aircraft and would permit use of 1/25,000 scale chart for close support work.

3. Personnel.

a. This command concurs with the comment made in previous action reports concerning the need for non-flying air intelligence officers.

b. It is felt that the peacetime CV air intelligence organization consisting of an Air Intelligence School graduate (a pilot who has had 3 weeks special training) in each squadron and on each CV with only collateral duty as AI officer is entirely inadequate for wartime operations. It is realized that peacetime operations would probably not warrant the assignment of officers to these billets as primary duty nor would the maintenance of all air intelligence material including target dossiers and chart folders on board aircraft carriers be justified. Therefor is is recommended that a pool of Air Intelligence officers familier with close support and carrier task force strike procedures and requirements be maintained at a central intelligence activity. From such a pool an Air Intelligence officer, in the event of a crisis or mobilization, could be ordered to an air group or aircraft carrier bringing with him, or ensuring earliest delivery of, all necessary information, publications and equipment.

c. The same recommendations are made in regard to maintaining a pool of trained Photo Interpreters. In the interest of reducing to a minimum the number of officers tied up in such a program, which in peacetime must necessarily be kept at a minimum, it is recommended that Air Intelligence officers receive thorough training as Photo Interpreters.

D. Engineering.

1. At about 1238I, 15 September, while proceeding at 31 knots, 252 RPM, to join up with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, a loud rumbling noise was heard in the reduction gear to No. 4 main engine. The engine was stopped immediately and locked approximately three minutes later. No. 4 main engine remained inoperative for the rest of the period.

2. The gears were damaged as follows: Sections of ten adjacent teeth, about 7" long, were broken from the forward helix of the lower low-pressure, slow-speed pinion. About fifty teeth from this pinion were pulled loose. The forward helixes of the main gear and all four slow-speed pinions were crushed in a circumferential area about 7" wide.

3. No foreign matter, other than pieces of broken teeth, were discovered in the gears. It was positively established that the inspection plates had not been opened. From the appearance of the broken teeth it is believed that the failure was due to metal fatigue.

4. Numerous derangements were experienced in boilers and associated machinery which necessitated minor repairs. These repairs were made more difficult and embarrassing in view of the fact that No. 4 main engine was out of commission and the remainder of the main propulsion plant had to be operated at or near full power for all flight operations. It is considered that the number of derangements experienced was not excessive in view of the

fact that the BOXER had steamed 62,400 miles since 10 January 1950 with no actual upkeep period in port.

E. Ship Handling.

1. Good station keeping, maneuvering on three engines while dragging an unfeatherable outboard screw through the water, presented a challenge. New rudder angles, varying between port and starboard turns as well as for speed, had to be determined; but slowed acceleration, particularly when approaching the maximum sustainable speed of 26 knots, was the greater problem.

2. With 10 or more knots of wind for flight operations, acceptable station keeping could be achieved by anticipating execution of speed increases and adding speed for turns. With less than 10 knots of wind, even when other ships operated at top speeds for jet operations, BOXER was able to maintain approximate station by lagging behind down wind or gaining position up wind prior to scheduled flight operations.

3. Other simultaneous course and speed changes, executed with little or no delay and unanticipatable, left BOXER hopelessly behind.

F. Communications.

Communications as a whole were considered good, particularly in view of the very large volume of traffic handled. Comments regarding specific communication matters follow:

1. CW.

a. The task force common, 464KC CW, was successfully used when radio silence conditions permitted. Discipline was good. It was particularly effective for delivery of traffic to the Task Force Commander when this vessel was in the replenishment area. It was found that this circuit was not satisfactory when this vessel was on detached duty proceeding to Yokosuka. A continuous guard is not recommended under those conditions.

2. RATT Circuits.

a. The Commander Naval Forces Far East RATT broadcast handled a very large volume of traffic successfully. The paralleling over Guam George Fox of operational immediate and higher precedence messages was helpful. When a message was missed and other heavy ships also did not receive it, there were times when a considerable delay resulted in servicing the message to Radio Tokyo.

b. Recommendations: (1) that adequate maintenance personnel be assigned to guardships in order to insure proper operating conditions of the equipment. None are currently assigned, (2) that more personnel trained in the operation of teletype equipment be assigned guardships. Approximately 4 should be considered as minimun for combat and 3 for normal operations.

3. UHF RATT.

a. The Ultra High Frequency RATT Circuit among the heavy ships was employed quite successfully. When circuit conditions were good this proved to be a most expeditious means for delivery of traffic.

b. There were times when fading and poor circuit conditions resulted in unsatisfactory communications. Since the MANCHESTER (CL-83) continually had better results, it is believed that this condition was due to antennae problems peculiar to the CV type.

4. UHF Voice.

UHF voice communications employing TDZ/RDZ equipment were considered excellent. It was particularly effective for CIC communications and for use on the bridge during General Quarters. It was found that constant attention to the equipment helped greatly in the proper performance of the equipment. Some trouble with the auto-tune feature of the TDZ/RDZ was experienced.

5. VHF Voice.

a. VHF communications, particularly on the TBS, were generally considered excellent.

b. A need for constant training in voice procedure and individual training in articulation was indicated.

c. On a few occasions names of ships were heard to be given in the clear over VHF circuits. Security indoctrination is always mandatory.

6. CIC and Aircraft Control Circuits.

a. Several frequencies of the AN/ARC-1 crystalization were in close proximity. This interfered on aircraft control circuits. For example channel #7 (142.02 MC), channel #2 (142.74 MC), channel #5 (143.28 MC), channel #6 (143.64 MC), were less than 1 MC apart. Similarly, channel #9 (140.94 MC) and the Guard channel (140.58 MC) were very close together.

b. Recommendation: That a wider spread on AN/ARC-1 frequencies be used, preferably at least 3 megacycles apart.

7. Cryptoboard.

a. A large number of message were addressed or readdressed to this vessel in cryptochannels not held. This continued during the operation in spite of services which stated the particular cryptochannel was not held and reencypherment was required.

c. A considerable delay was experienced at times in obtaining answers to services on the above messages.

d. Recommendations: Maintaining an adequately staffed and trained coding board is mandatory. The large number of crypto errors is indicative of unseasoned personnel in this vital phase of communications.

8. Visual.

a. A very large volume of traffic was handled. Flag hoist was employed extensively for tactical signals during daylight. Nancy was used successfully with the heavy ships; some difficulty was experienced with destroyers.

b. This carrier operated with a peacetime complement of 21 signalmen which is far below the war time complement. This placed a more than considerable strain on signalmen to maintain visual guards.

c. Recommendations: The assignment of additional personnel, at least up the wartime complement, is considered mandatory for successful combat operations.

9. Personnel.

a. A need for more trained signalmen and radiomen was apparent. Operating under war conditions without a wartime complement of trained personnel handicaps the execution of reliable, secure, and speedy communications

G. CIC.

1. Doctrine.

a. CTF-77 Operation Order 1-50 was the most complete and concise operation order this CIC has had to work with. It was excellent for a new ship coming into the operation after the operation was underway. The radar guard layout was excellent as to clarity.

b. Duty Carrier and Standby Carrier set-up was not too definitely stated in the operation order and tended to confuse a newly reporting carrier. This was cleared up later in the operation.

c. The method of utilizing individual ships daily to control CAP, strikes and ASP was outstanding. The employment of this method keeps each ship in the Task Force from becoming too burdened with each day's phases of operations.

2. Operating Procedures.

a. When more than one AEW aircraft is airborne they should be separated by 30 to 50 miles to insure proper presentation on their radar.

b. Before designating raids reported by other ships the Task Force CICO should make a quick evaluation to determine whether this is land, friendly CAP, ASP, etc., and make this immediately known to the Force in order

to clear the circuit. Too many known friendly contacts were continued to be reported as raids when there was no necessity for it.

c. Returning Strike Groups were picked up and designated as raids and, after it was determined they were using proper IFF, were continued to be reported as raids. Some ships, not notified of proper IFF, were unduly alerted. It is recommended that a system of "Red" plus raid number be used upon initial pick up and for all contacts not showing IFF. When it is determined a raid is showing proper IFF change "Red" to "Green" plus raid number. This would aid in clarifying the picture for ships that occasionally miss transmissions.

d. Measures should be taken to insure that Air Force and Navy land based aircraft and seaplanes use proper IFF. Many unnecessary intercepts were made due to lack of IFF or improper code.

e. It is recommended that the practice of using TOMCATS (either aircraft pickets for homing or DD's) be revived in order to bring all returning planes up one approach lane. This would insure early identification and reduce the number of unnecessary intercepts.

f. It is recommended that the CVE Force not be placed directly between the CV Force and land targets. Many duplicate intercepts were made, particularly when the CVE Force was only 25 or 30 miles from the CV Force. A common Force CI Net is recommended when Task Forces are less than 50 miles apart in order to keep each Force aware of returning strikes, raids, and intercepts being made.

g. It is recommended that the Force CIC Officer pass formation information and station assignments to the rejoining Carrier Group, coming from replenishment area, as soon as it can be obtained. CIC does much of the conning at night and requires this information to expedite rejoining the Force. The Task Force CIC Officer should make certain that "Heavies" are informed of screen assignments.

h. It is believed that in operations of this type a LOCAP should be employed to avoid bringing HICAP down to look over low groups. This could be accomplished by splitting one division and keeping a section at 2,000 or 3,000 feet to investigate low groups approaching the force.

i. In order to maintain an effective CAP at all times, it is suggested that Force CIC Officers hold CAP on station or at least at altitude over base until the relieving CAP is on the CAP Controllers channel.

j. It is suggested that more than one FAD frequency be assigned. Having two or more CAP's on one VHF FAD causes considerable difficulty on some intercepts. Also VHF frequencies assigned should be at least three megacycles apart.

1. During the past operation many ships having communications failure on CI Net Primary switched to Screen Common rather than CI Net Secondary. A radio check at the beginning of each sea watch should be conducted on CI Net Secondary.

H. Gunnery Department.

1. Trash Disposal.

a. Trash disposal was a major problem. With the incinerator burning around the clock, it was barely possible to keep up with the ship's normal production of trash. No time was available for periodic cooling down of the firebox, with resultant deterioration. The great amount of wooden boxes and pressed paper connected with current packaging of belly tanks, rockets, and other ammunition presented an additional load with which it was impossible to cope by burning.

b. After the first day's operations during which numerous floating crates and boxes were dodged, orders were issued to break up all crates and boxes into flat surfaces, flatten and puncture all cans, and to stow same until appropriate disposal could be effected.

c. Throughout the period the ship was plagued with countless false reports of mines, periscopes, and just plain "small unidentified floating objects", which could not be ignored in view of the floating enemy mines reported.

2. Ammunition Allowances and Stowages.

a. The ship was constantly under great pressure in loading for this latest trip to NavFE. During the time in which the ammunition was being procured and shipped, several changes in allowance were made. Due to the rather hectic circumstances of trying to completely load the ship in record time, it was not feasible to make an orderly adjustment of the ammunition actually loaded, to that of the new changing allowance. Several boxcars of rockets had to be returned to the Ammunition Depot simply because there was not time to sit down and figure out how to juggle the various magazines to take more of a load.

b. In addition, in an obvious effort to keep us abreast of a rapidly changing forward area situation, verbal instructions were given by ComAirPac staff officers to load to capacity on certain types of bombs when at Pearl Harbor enroute. Additional 100-lb GP bombs, and Tiny Tim rockets were loaded. By the time the ship reached the operating area, the picture had changed and we found ourselves choked with 100-lb bombs which had to be shuffled many times in order to get at the sorely-needed and much used 500-lb GPs. The crowning touch to this situation lay in the fact that extra 500-pounders were available at Sasebo enroute but could not be loaded because there was not time to break out and off-load the 100-lb GPs.

c. The moral to this tale seems to be that ships being deployed to forward areas should be loaded with the standard BuOrd allowance, giving due consideration to limiting overall weight. Then there will be leeway available to the forward area commanders to make any special additional l ading required for prospective operations. These operations are often so classified that the rear echelons could not possibly anticipate them in individual ship loading. Furthermore, if a Task Force Commander knows that ships reporting to him have a certain standard ammunition loading he is enabled to plan his strikes and resupply more effectively than if he has to determine individual ship loadings.

d. Stowage of 5" HVAR's presented a serious problem. The magazine stowage plan provides a total racked stowage of 3,290 rocket motors; 3.25" and 5.0". With an allowance of 5000 5.0" motors and 900 3.25" motors, this leaves 2,610 motors to be stored in boxes, in magazines normally assigned to 40MM or 100-lb bombs. Such stowage presents not only an "unboxing" problem, involving multiple handling of the motors and boxes; but an additional fire hazard both in the magazine and in the empty box stowage topside. The difficulties of disposing of this large amount of lumber have been previously mentioned. Some program to increase the proper stowage facilities for rocket motors should be initiated at the earliest possible time, and a serious effort made to bring about an agreement between allowance and stowage facilities.

3. Ammunition Handling.

Compartment No. C-301-L, frame 150 to 159, was isolated and used as a ready service room for assembling rockets. Fire hoses were kept connected and a minimum of ammunition broken out consistent with the strikes being prepared.

4. Ammunition Replenishment.

a. During this period, the BOXER rearmed at sea from U.S.S. MT. MATMAI (AE-16) three times. Rapid and efficient service was rendered and the personnel of the MT. KATMAI were most cooperative in fulfilling our needs to the best of their ability. The only suggestion for improving this procedure would be to provide the AE's with a wider assortment of fuzes which are not normally stocked in ships' allowance.

b. Belted .50 Cal. ammunition supplied took a great load off the shoulders of the aviation ordnance crews. This service should be expanded to include 20MM, belted with M8 links.*

*See enclosure (1), paragraph 3.(h) 2(e) for additional comments on M8 links.

I. Supply Department.

1. Loading.

a. Despite the brief loading period, a 180-day stock level in nearly all classes was achieved prior to departure from the United States on 24 August. Aviation supplies placed on board averaged nearly 90%. Topping off and the filling of some shortages were accomplished during the approximately 48 hours available at Pearl Harbor in early September.

2. Operating.

a. Since leaving Pearl on 4 September, few major supply problems have been encountered. A current problem was the near-exhaustion of Mark 12 drop tanks due to heavy expenditure for napalm use. 200 stock spares (in addition to 1 per aircraft) were on board upon entering the action zone. The full allowance of some aviation items, such as tail hooks and tail wheel locking pins for F4U-4 aircraft was issued almost at once because of the heavy operating schedule. Replacements in large quantities have been ordered. Initial shortages of certain items, such as cowlflap motors and fuel transfer pumps have been felt sharply, but the problem has been met by temporizing methods such as exchange between carriers of the Task Force or between planes on board. The actual number of operational AOG has averaged about one.

3. Replenishment.

a. Replenishment has consisted entirely of fuel, aviation gasoline, ammunition, fresh provisions and a few items of GSK. All replenishment except the GSK and some provisioning at Sasebo has been accomplished at sea, and has proven quite satisfactory. Exchange of various types of material among many ships of the Task Force on a "when-available" basis, though small in quantity, has produced a heartening effect on all concerned.

J. Recapitulation of Recommendations.

1. Air Operations.

(1) That effective Operation Orders and pertinent Operating Instructions be made available to ships ordered forward earliest practicable, and, not less than one (1) full day prior to involvement in actual operations.

2. Air Department.

(2) That in similar circumstances carriers going into combat should carry approximate 5-10 percent more aircraft than the normal complement. (5% is the optimum for operations, let the availability of replacement aircraft aboard be the deciding factor)

(3) That the laminated wood construction of universal airplane wheel chocks be improved to prevent parting of the glued joints.

[redacted]

(4) That action be initiated to bring all CV's up to their full allowance of AEW racks, test equipment, etc.

3. Air Intelligence.

(5) That the supply of maps and charts available to CV's be increased and that the use of one type of grid be standardized, at least within sets.

(6) That gridded charts for close support work be issued in booklet form using a scale of 1/25,000.

(7) That emphasis be placed on pilot training in the use of maps and charts, particularly with reference to grid coordinates.

(8) That AI and PI personnel be issued TAD orders to CinCPacFleet's staff for briefing in advance of departure for combat.

(9) That all possible intelligence material be furnished ships prior to arrival in the forward areas.

(10) That a pool of non-flying AI Officers be established at a central [illegible] activity so that they can be supplied to the fleet as needed.

(11) That non-flying AI Officers be supplied to carriers going into action in the following quantities: 3 for the ship, one for the Air Group Commander, and one for each squadron aboard.

(12) That AI Officers receive thorough training as Photo Interpreters during peacetime.

4. Communications.

(13) That the TF common CW circuit be not continuously guarded when the ship is proceeding on detached duty beyond effective operating range.

(14) That the communications personnel assigned be brought up to the full wartime complement for CV's going into combat operations, and that this measure be given the highest priority. Special consideration should be given in this regard to assigning trained coding officers as the disparity between peacetime and combat operations is greater in this section than in any other.

(15) That steps be taken to improve the UHF antennae features on a CV.

(16) That personnel be continuously trained in (a) voice procedure and articulation, and (b) security over voice circuits.

(17) That channels on AN/ARC-1 frequencies be spread at least 3 MC apart.

[redacted]

6. CIC.

(18) That AEW aircraft should be separated from each other by 30 to 50 miles.

(19) That the method of utilizing individual ships daily to control CAP, strikes, and ASP be made standard doctrine.

(20) That the Task Force CIC Officer evaluate raids reported by other ships before designating them as such, and if subsequently discovered to be friendly that they henceforth be referred to as "Green" instead of "Red", using the same number originally assigned.

(21) That steps be taken to insure proper use of IFF by all friendly planes in the area of operations.

(22) That the practice of using TOMCATS be revived.

(23) That Task Forces be separated by more than 50 miles; or one overall Force CIC Controller be established.

(24) That the Force CICO pass formation information and station assignments immediately to a Carrier Group joining or rejoining the force.

(25) That for operations of this type a LOCAP as well as a HICAP be employed.

(26) That the CAP be held on station until relieving CAP is on CAP Controller's channel.

(27) That more than one FAD frequency be assigned.

(28) That the CI Net Secondary be used as such.

7. Gunnery.

(29) That better trash disposal facilities be provided.

(30) That ships be loaded with standard ammunition loading.

(31) That proper assigned stowage be provided for all ammunition on war allowance list, especially rockets.

(32) That belted .50 Cal. and 20MM aircraft machine gun ammunition be provided for supply to ships and squadrons.

CAMERON BRIGGS

Copy to:
CNO (advance-2)
CinCPacFlt

77

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/A4-h1
M-3
Ser 0105
24 NOV 1950

DECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

RS 010112
previously rec'd & routed

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 11 Oct through 25 Oct 1950

Ref: (a) CNO restr ltr Op-345 Ser 1196P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-2 conf ltr ser 015 dtd 1 Nov 1950: Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (15 October 1950 - 22 October 1950) with enclosures thereto. P.134

1. In compliance with reference (a), the action report for the period 11 October through 25 October 1950 is hereby submitted.

PART I (Composition of Own Forces and Missions)

A. U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked, departed YOKOSUKA, Japan, 11 October 1950 in company with the U.S.S. HANK (DD-702) and the U.S.S. BORIE (DD-704) in accordance with dispatch orders from Commander Naval Forces Far East and Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. OTC was the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER. This group of three vessels proceeded to the Sea of Japan where it rendezvoused with Task Force 77 on 14 October, reporting for duty to Commander Task Force 77, who was ComCarDiv ONE, Rear Admiral E. C. ELLEN in the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). Rear Admiral J. H. HOSKINS, ComCarDiv THREE in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), was second in command. Task Force 77 consisted of four aircraft carriers, one cruiser and twenty-eight destroyers.

The Task Force was operating in accordance with ComCarDiv ONE Operation Order 3-50.

B. The missions of the Task Force were: (1) To conduct countermining operations, reconnaissance, gunfire spotting, and air bombardment of shore defense in the Wonsan area of Korea in order to prepare that area for an amphibious assault scheduled to commence on 20 October and (2) To conduct air operations in support of the above landing.

[redacted]

PART II Chronological Order of Events

A. This operation was noteworthy in that as the plan was being put in effect the ground situation improved so rapidly that an appreciable part of the original mission became unnecessary. The scheduled amphibious assault was changed by dispatch to an administrative landing. Moreover, the bomb line moved so rapidly northward that the area where targets could be attacked was so small in relation to the number of aircraft involved that carrier-based aircraft in some instances were assigned the same targets as the Air Force.

B. The following is an outline of the BOXER's employment during the period of this action report:

1. Period 11 October to 14 October - At 1330I the BOXER, accompanied by the USS HANK (DD-702) and USS BORIE (DD-704), sorticd from Yokosuka to join Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN off the east coast of Korea. On 12 October the BOXER conducted a speed run of approximately one and one-half hours duration to obtain new data on the high speed capabilities of the ship resulting from the recent removal of the number four propeller. Additional tactical data, including acceleration and turning charactistics, were obtained in the course of the subsequent operation. On 13 October, off the northwest coast of Kyushu, the BOXER fired its first gunnery practice since 1 September. Results were quite gratifying in that two sleeves were shot down and the practice as a whole disclosed an effective gunnery organization. Other drills and exercises were conducted throughout the day and the USS HANK was refueled. At dawn on 14 October the BOXER rendezvoused with the replenishment group, the USS VALLEY FORGE, and screening destroyers. The day was spent in receiving ammunition, fuel oil, and freight from the replenishment group. At 1825I the BOXER reported to Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

2. Period 15 October to 22 October - At 0800I on 15 October aircraft were launched to conduct strikes against North Korean targets in the Wonsan area. One mission attacked defense positions on Sin Do Island in Wonsan Harbor. Others searched for lines of communication and military targets. All aircraft were recovered at 1724I. Pilots reported no enemy air opposition and virtually no flak. Targets were even fewer than in the previous operation and were more difficult to find. An F4U was damaged by small arms fire and made a deferred emergency landing at Wonsan airfield, thus making this operation probably the first instance in an amphibious assault in which the attacking force had utilized air facilities located within the objective area five days prior to scheduled D-Day. On 16 October air operations against Korean targets were attempted but poor flying conditions resulted in cancellation or abortion of all strikes. Lt(jg) H.R. MEAGHERTY, USN, made a forced water landing when the engine of his F4U lost power during the landing approach; he was recovered by the USS HIGBEE (DDR-806). 17 October was spent in replenishing and conducting anti-aircraft gunnery practice. On 18 October air operations against Korean targets were continued and the 19th was again devoted to replenishment and anti-aircraft gunnery practice. On 20 and 21 October adverse weather conditions and the presence of extensive minefields in the Wonsan area caused postponement of D-Day.

Air operations consisted of defensive, reconnaissance and courier sorties. On 22 October the first scheduled flight of the day was launched against North Korean targets. The completion of this flight marked the end of the BOXER's offensive action against Korean Communist forces. At 1341I the PHILIPPINE SEA, BOXER, and escorting destroyers were detached from Task Force 77 and proceeded to Japanese ports. As the BOXER was scheduled to return to the United States for overhaul, twelve BOXER aircraft were transferred to the remaining three carriers in order to fulfill their requirements.

3. Period 23 October to 25 October - During this period the BOXER was enroute to Yokosuka where she arrived at 0810I on the 25th. Prior to arrival, an additional 38 aircraft were launched for transfer to Fasron ELEVEN, Kisarazu AFB, Japan.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See enclosure (1).

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

A. Casualties.

1. There were no personnel casualties during this operation.

B. Performance.

1. By the time this operation commenced the large number of new men received on board prior to our departure from the United States had developed into integrated teams which were operating smoothly. Composition of these teams was not destroyed by the few personnel transfers that took place, although the filling of quotas for the enlisted photo interpretation school did add to the difficulty of photo laboratory operations.

PART VI Comments

A. Operations.

1. Air Operations and CIC.

a. CIC was able to track jet aircraft out to sixty or seventy miles on the SX radar when the jets were below 15,000 feet. This was accomplished on many occasions using a rotation rate of one, two or three RPM. No evaluation has been made on the effectiveness of the SPS-6B because no jets were flown in the area at altitudes over 30,000 feet.

b. In several instances aircraft were not assigned proper calls as generated in section 733.5 of Janap 119(A). This was particularly true of [redacted] calls. Many unnecessary transmissions are required to clarify the misunderstanding caused, for example, when a V[redacted]N was assigned an [redacted] call.

c. It is felt that greater stress could have been placed upon aircraft anti-submarine defense. Even though all bogies turned out to be friendly it was possible to maintain a reasonable amount of interest in defense against an air attack simply by carrying intercepts to completion. Lack of adequate equipment for anti-submarine warfare made it difficult for the [redacted]SP to perform in a similar manner. Lack of sonobuoys made it impossible for aircraft to verify a submarine contact by that means, while lack of searchlights deprived the night [redacted]SP of means of visual identification. In short, suitably equipped anti-submarine aircraft were not embarked. This fact made it impossible to prevent a feeling of laxity toward the submarine threat and, at best, led to the feeling that aircraft anti-submarine measures were inadequate during the day and practically futile at night.

d. There was insufficient information available on shore-based [redacted]SP. Calls and control channels were obtained from these [redacted]SP aircraft upon request after the aircraft were in the area. No information was made available to us on shore-based [redacted]SP flights with the result that either the C[redacted] was kept busy making intercepts on the [redacted]SP or CIC had a tendency to follow the dangerous practice of considering an unidentified aircraft as "just another [redacted]SP".

e. The VHF homing device paid its way in each of the last two operations. Several aircraft were probably saved and many additional jet aircraft were assisted by this equipment.

f. It is recommended that the "ready deck", rather than being a function of the duty carrier, be coordinated with the flight schedule to provide maximum ready deck coverage and ease in respotting.

g. The change of control from an objective area controller to a Task Group controller was poor. Intercepts on returning strikes which did not call in to the ship occurred in such numbers that a simultaneously converging air attack could have come in virtually unopposed.

2. Communications.

a. More care should be exercised in sending traffic over designated circuits. Messages of an information nature, administrative traffic, and tactical messages were at times sent indiscriminately over various circuits. It is felt that if traffic could be transmitted over assigned circuits it would result in more effective use of the circuits as well as improved communications generally.

b. It is recommended that consideration be given to establishing a VHF administrative circuit separate from any other assigned frequency.

[redacted]

3. Navigation.

a. The use of night adaptation glasses by the officer-of-the-deck is to be recommended. Carried about the neck for ready availability, these glasses were useful in permitting the ODD to enter the chart house without loss of night vision.

b. The removal of the number four propeller just prior to this operation renewed the tactical problems almost solved in the preceding operation during which the number four propeller was locked. Wind and sea conditions affected the turning circle in a manner that was noticeably different from that when the number four propeller was dragging. Acceleration characteristics were also appreciably changed.

c. The use of flight deck aircraft in a "pinwheel" spot was of inestimable value in docking and undocking operation particularly as adequate tugs could not be made available.

4. Air Intelligence.

a. The Naval Air Combat Reporting System covered by OpNav P55-100 was put into use for the first time during this operation. It is felt that these reports, if the mailing list is kept to a reasonable figure, will require a minimum of effort to obtain a maximum of information. While it is realized that the primary function of these reports is to provide data for statistical studies, they have also proven useful as a source of information at ship level. Effort expended in making these reports is considerably less than is required for the usual narrative report, such as the daily preliminary action report previously required.

b. Since the ship's Action Report and War Diary are parallel reports which overlap and duplicate each other on the majority of information contained in each, it is recommended that they be combined. It is felt that an appreciable saving of man-hours can thus be effected and that the quality of each report would be improved. For the same reasons it is recommended that submission of the ship's Historical Report not be required for any period covered by the above report(s).

B. Air

1. While at Yokosuka, 5-11 October, dud aircraft were offloaded and 12 replacement aircraft were received from FasRon 11. Eight aircraft in excess of the determined optimum number for sustained anticipated operations were accepted for the previously stated reasons of (1) desired maximum fire power, (2) anticipated low availability of F4U-4 type due service age, (3) replacement difficulties, and (4) reported shortages existing in VALLEY FORGE and PHILIPPINE SEA coupled with delivery replacement difficulties.

2. Commencing 20 October, in accordance desires of CTF77 to reduce formation time on wind line, BOXER scheduled smaller launches with ninety-minute instead of previously established three-hour intervals. This interval appeared feasible although it involved both less flexibility until two launches were off the deck and considerable additional respotting, which limited available time for reservicing and rearming. Unfavorable weather on 20 and 21 October and departure of the BOXER from the operating area on 22 October after launching only one strike precluded an evaluation of this plan.

3. On 22 October, prior to departing, BOXER transferred 12 replacement aircraft to remaining carriers, receiving 2 high service age planes for transport to overland base.

C. Gunnery

1. Training, non-firing.

a. Gun crews were exercised during condition watches and dawn general quarters in tracking aircraft in the vicinity of the formation. Loading drill was stressed for men off watch. Even though no actual firing was done from 1 September until mid-October, it was noted that gun and tracking crews were able to maintain proficiency. This fact emphasizes the benefits gained from having targets available for deliberate tracking drill in maintaining and improving the crews' manual proficiency.

2. Firing exercises.

Actual firing was made available to ships enroute to and from operating areas and while in the replenishment area. This served to tie together all the loading and tracking drill and to get the entire team working smoothly and effectively. It is considered that the ammunition used was well expended; effectiveness of gunfire was materially improved. It is believed that the practice of conducting AA sleeve firing when in the replenishment area is excellent.

D. Supply

1. Upon leaving Yokosuka stock levels were in some cases below the 180 day limit due to the limited replenishment facilities at Yokosuka. Aviation Supplies were still about 90% complete and G.S.K. 95%. Ship's Store Stock, howeve was completely depleted in some items and there was little available to substitute. In provisions the situation was generally good, especially in fresh frozen, but a few items such as eggs and fresh milk were in short supply.

2. The shortage of Mark 12 drop tanks experienced during the last operation was temporarily met by loading eighty-two of these tanks during the first replenishment at sea. This would have been insufficient, however, if full operations had continued.

E. Engineering

1. The removal of number four propeller increased the maximum speed of the ship on three engines from 28 to 29½ knots. Before removal of the propeller, maximum power output was reached at about 28 knots at which point the after four boilers began to be overloaded. The drag of the locked propeller caused excessive vibration which introduced the continuing possibility of crystallization and fatigue failure of machinery located in the after part of the ship where vibration was most noticeable. After removal of the propeller sufficient power was available to permit completely opening number two and number three main engine throttles without putting undue strain on the after four boilers. The maximum speed attained with three throttles open wide was approximately 29½ knots. At this speed vibration was no more than normal.

F. Recapitulation of recommendations

1. Personnel.

a. That mandatory quotas for training schools be kept to a minimum while a ship is in the forward area.

b. That every effort be made to permit personnel to serve out a full rotational tour of duty on one vessel.

2. Air Operations and CIC.

a. That aircraft be assigned calls in accordance with section 733.5 of Janap 119(A).

b. That carriers operating in possible submarine waters be provided with suitably equipped anti-submarine aircraft.

c. That ships of the Task Force be kept fully advised of all aircraft operating in the area.

d. That the "ready deck", rather than being a function of the duty carrier, be coordinated with the flight schedule to provide maximum ready deck coverage and ease in respotting.

e. That returning strikes keep the Task Group controller fully advised of their positions.

3. Communications.

a. That more care be exercised in sending traffic over prescribed circuits.

b. That consideration be given to establishing a VHF administrative circuit separate from any other assigned frequency.

4. Air Intelligence.

a. That the Action Report and War Diary be combined to form one report.

b. That the submission of the ship's Historical Report not be required for the period covered by the above report(s).

5. Gunnery.

That the practice of conducting anti-aircraft sleeve firing when in the replenishment area be continued.

CAMERON BRIGGS

Copy to:
CNO (advance - 2)
CinCPacFlt
ComAirPac
ComFairAlameda
ComCarDiv ONE
ComCarDiv THREE
ComCarDiv FIVE
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE
CO, USS PRINCETON
CO, USS LEYTE
CAG 2

Extra

AR231/CV

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/3-ces
A4-3
Ser 032
9 May 1951

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 17 March through 21 April 1951

Ref: (a) CNO restr ltr Op-345 ser 1196P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-101 conf ltr ser 06 dtd 27 Apr 1951: Action Report of Carrier Air Group 101 (17 Mar 1951 - 21 Apr 1951) p. 11

1. In compliance with reference (a), the action report for the period 17 March through 21 April 1951 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Missions

a. Composition

In accordance with CinCPacFlt Movement Order 1-51 and ComCarDiv THREE confidential dispatch 162328Z, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Commander Carrier Division THREE and Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE embarked, departed Pearl Harbor, T.H., 17 March 1951. OTC was Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, USN. The ship proceeded to Van Dieman Straits where, on 25 March, a rendezvous was made with the U.S.S. RUSH (DD-714) and the U.S.S. THOMASON (DD-760). The ship then proceeded into the Sea of Japan, where on 26 March, a rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and the replenishment group was effected. With the departure of the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) on 26 March, TF-77 consisted of two carriers, one cruiser, and 13 destroyers. OTC was RADM R. A. OFSTIE, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37). RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, was second in command.

b. Missions

(1) The Task Force was operating in accordance with CTF-77's Operation Order 1-51.

[redacted]

03819

[redacted]

(2) The missions of the Task Force were to provide close and deep air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, and air bombardment in order to destroy enemy forces, communications, and installations in support of United Nations Forces, and to protect the force against enemy air, surface and subsurface attacks.

PART II Chronological Order of Events

a. The following is an outline of the BOXER's employment during the period of this action report:

(1) Period 17 through 26 March: At 1005 on 17 March the BOXER sortied from Pearl Harbor. On 25 March, while proceeding through Van Dieman Straits, a rendezvous was made with the U.S.S. RUSH (DD-714) and the U.S.S. THOMASON (DD-760) who acted as a screen for the BOXER as she proceeded on to the rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. On the afternoon of 25 March a briefing team composed of officers from the Staff of Commander Carrier Division ONE, and the acting Commander of Carrier Air Group TWO, along with pertinent operation orders and briefing materials were received aboard from the U.S.S. RUSH. On 26 March, Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was joined while replenishing at sea, at which time the BOXER, too, was replenished. The briefing team was returned to the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE at the same time via helicopter. That night the Task Force steamed North in anticipation of the strikes scheduled for the following day.

(2) Period 27 March to 8 April: Because the weather was unfavorable on the 27th, only two missions of eight planes each were sent off, both for close air support, and on the 28th and 29th no missions at all were flown. On the 30th, however, the weather lifted and the BOXER then commenced flying the type of missions which filled her schedules during this period. These were composed of: (1) Close Air Support missions in which two VA and two VF were usually combined as a unit and reported for control to a TACP; (2) Armed Reconnaissance, which were jet or VF missions designed to sweep roads, observe movements of personnel and vehicles and attack worthwhile targets of opportunity; (3) Bridge Strikes, both rail and highway key bridges; (4) "Railroad Breakers" and "Railroad Seeders", designed to break the lines several miles apart and discourage repairs, (the "seeds" being delayed action bombs); (5) Naval Gunfire Spotting, for the bombardment ships off Wonsan and Songjin; (6) Hecklers, to disrupt the enemy by attacking during darkness and to spot targets for succeeding early morning strikes; (7) RESCAPS; (8) TARCAPS; (9) Photo Missions; and (10) Strikes against cities or other specific targets. In addition, the usual defensive missions were flown. On the 31st of March, and on the 1st and 2nd of April offensive operations continued. On the 3rd the ship replenished and

2

[redacted]

the PRINCETON, with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, departed for Yokosuka. On the 4th, with RADM TOMLINSON, USN, OTC and CTF-77, operations were resumed. On the 5th a total of 81 offensive missions were conducted. On one of the close air support missions an attempt was apparently made by the enemy to simulate a friendly TACP. This bogus attempted to direct BOXER planes to bomb a position where friendly troops were located, but the pilots recognized the fact that they were being misdirected and requested authentication, whereupon the enemy went off the air. Offensive missions were continued on the 6th. On the 7th a heavy day was also scheduled to provide air support for an amphibious landing south of Songjin of HMS Royal Commandos, who landed and blew up a section of rail tracks near the beach; however, fog forced cancellations for all but 40 offensive sorties. It was on one of these that the BOXER lost her first pilot. LTJG H. T. WALKER, USNR, flying an F4U, experienced engine failure as a result of enemy aircraft fire. He glided into a fog bank in an attempt to make a forced landing near shore in the vicinity of Tanch-on. Fog prevented an aerial search; a surface search yielded negative results. On 8 April the ship replenished and then continued steaming South. At 1600 a new phase of operations was commenced.

(3) Period of 8 April through 15 April: During this period the BOXER was operating in the Formosa Straits area as part of Task Force 77 under Com7thFlt's Secret Operation Order 75-51. Enroute to and from this area training flights were conducted. On completion of these operations, the Task Force returned to the East Coast of Korea where it replenished on 15 April.

(4) Period 16 April through 19 April: This period commenced with 112 offensive and defensive missions on 16 April. Jamming of the VHF channels by the enemy was encountered by aircraft sent out for close air support. On the 17th, operations continued. On the 18th, deck load strikes, coordinated with those of the PHILIPPINE SEA and the PRINCETON (which arrived late in the day), were launched against the road junction city of Hamhung. Of the BOXER's 95 offensive missions, 71 were against Hamhung and 24 were regular armed recco and photo hops. As a result of these concentrated strikes on this important key communication center, it is estimated that the primary targets in the city will be more or less useless to the enemy for some time. LT A. W. C. THOMAS, USNR, lost his life in this attack when his F4U was seen to explode while in

[redacted]

3

[redacted]

a strafing run. It is believed that the aircraft hit a high tension wire or a wire trap, as the pilot broadcast," Lookout for the wires!" shortly before his plane exploded and disintegrated. On the 19th another heavy day of deck load strikes was scheduled, this time against the city of Wonsan; however, because of adverse weather, only 16 offensive sorties were launched. This day completed the subject tour of combat operations during which a total of 571 offensive sorties had been flown plus 261 sorties classified as defensive or otherwise, not including helicopter flights.

(5) Period 19 through 21 April: On the afternoon of the 19th, the ship replenished. The remainder of the period was spent enroute to Yokosuka for limited availability, arriving Yokosuka at 1400 on 21 April 1951.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See enclosure (1).

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties:

(1) There were no combat personnel casualties during this period except those of the Air Group (see enclosure (1).

b. Performance:

(1) A large number of personnel transfers and receipts had been effected while the ship was in the shipyard at San Francisco. By the time this operation commenced the new men had been welded into a smooth running team and personnel performance presented no problem.

PART VI Comments

a. Operations

(1) Although one copy of CTF-77's Operation Order 1-51 was available prior to departure Pearl Harbor, current air plans and other necessary briefing material were not re-

[redacted]

4

4

[redacted]

ceived until the arrival of the ComCarDivONE briefing team late in the evening on 25 March, the BOXER's first air operation being scheduled for the morning of 27 March. Although this briefing interval was greater than that experienced by the BOXER in September 1950, it was still insufficient to enable all personnel concerned to digest thoroughly the required information.

(2) The PRINCETON performed invaluable indoctrination services to the BOXER during the first few days of operations. PRINCETON squadron and unit commanders or qualified representatives came aboard the BOXER personally to brief contemporary units in the details of operations and operational procedures. In addition, the newly arrived pilots were indoctrinated with the terrain and CAS procedure. An AD and an F4U from the PRINCETON accompanied each BOXER CAS mission in the roll of "Bird Dogs", flushing and pointing out targets. This procedure, highly recommended for newly reporting air groups, greatly expedited the effectiveness of BOXER missions.

b. Communications

(1) General

(a) Communications in general were excellent and much improved over the conditions experienced in October 1950. The pattern of messages and the means of delivery thereof particularly from the Army and the Air Force were markedly improved. The importance of this in the receipt of such messages as the bombline and TACP reports cannot be overemphasized.

(b) The volume of traffic, particularly encrypted was very heavy and taxed to the limit operating personnel. The need for more seasoned rated men, both signal and radio, was very apparent.

(2) CW

(a) The direct CW circuit (4135 KC CW) to JOC Korea proved most helpful in the exchange of vital information. This frequency coupled with 6690 KC (V) was invaluable in the processing of operational traffic.

(3) RATT circuits

(a) The Commander Naval Forces Far East RATT broadcast continued to handle a large volume of traffic. Reception, as a whole, was excellent and it was very occasional that missing messages had to be serviced.

[redacted]

5

5

[redacted]

(b) The Ultra High Frequency RATT circuit among the heavy ships proved most successful in the handling of messages, particularly high precedence flash reports.

(4) UHF Voice

(a) UHF Voice Communications were considered very good. Some maintenance problems with the TDZ/RDZ equipment were encountered in the early stages. Most of the trouble was traced to short circuits in the antenna leads following shipyard overhaul.

(5) VHF

(a) VHF communications were generally considered excellent. The TBS was used exclusively for the primary tactical circuit and proved quite reliable.

(b) At times it was noted that unnecessary traffic other than operational was sent over the primary tactical. The OTC quite rightly corrected this situation.

(6) Visual

(a) Visual communications including Nancy were excellent. The limiting of messages for delivery by Nancy to 25 groups was sound.

(7) Cryptoboard

(a) The load of traffic on the cryptoboard was very heavy. A temporary emergency extension of the cryptoroom helped considerably. However, permanent enlarged facilities for the cryptoroom and communication office are definitely indicated.

(b) An increase in allowance of officers assigned to communications is required for cryptoboard duty. At present, nine officers are allowed and an increase of at least three is indicated. These officers should have had a course of instruction in crypto procedure and at least three months' experience before they are considered eligible to fill a billet. The use of officers from other departments to fill the gap is not satisfactory due to lack of time to devote to these duties because of conflict with their primary military and departmental duties.

(8) Recommendations

(a) Enlarge the present cryptoroom and communication office. A reallocation of spaces seems indicated.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b) Increase the allowance of officers permanently assigned to communications for cryptoboard duties by three for all CV's operating under emergency conditions. A minimum of three months training should be allowed prior to their being considered as filling the billet.

(c) Increase the allowance of rated radiomen in view of the requirement to intercept three Fox schedules and the increased number of functional circuits.

c. CIC

(1) Aircraft detection ranges were very limited. Air targets were seldom picked up in excess of 40 miles and, if at altitudes above 10,000 feet, detection ranges were frequently less than 40 miles. These limited ranges on air targets were undoubtedly due to the existence of a marked temperature inversion as surface targets (DD) were picked up frequently at ranges in excess of 40 miles and land at 150 miles.

(2) Jet aircraft were seldom detected at any range if at altitudes above 15,000 - 18,000 feet.

(3) The foregoing results were obtained with the SX and SPS-6B radars. It is believed, however, that were the SPS-6B antenna stabilized and in a less obstructed location the results would have improved. The use of MK III ("G" band) IFF, coupled with identification turns and approach sectors, proved invaluable in detecting returning strikes at ranges beyond radar detection ranges and in obtaining an indication of the friendly nature of aircraft.

(4) The URD-2 VHF/DF equipment again proved its usefulness, both as a direction finder and as a standby VHF receiver Excellent results were obtained with Mark 5/10 IFF currently installed in jet aircraft. Ranges of 90-100 miles were consistently obtained with this equipment.

d. Air Intelligence

(1) Every possible attempt was made by the ship to obtain all charts, maps, and other data necessary prior to sailing from San Diego, but the material was not available. While at Pearl Harbor many deficiencies were supplied by CinCPacFlt; nevertheless, many of the deficiencies still could not be filled in Pearl Harbor. It is felt that ships destined for employment in the forward area should be issued a complete "packet" of maps and charts prior to departure from the West Coast.

[redacted]

7

7

[redacted]

(2) It is believed that prior to departure from Pearl Harbor a complete and detailed theater indoctrination of pilots and operations personnel should be conducted by an officer recently familiar through personal experience with operations in the forward area. Up to date information of flak, airfields, close air support techniques, etc., should be furnished at this time rather than the night before operations commence.

(3) Maps should be folded and fitted together, covered with thin adhesive cellulose acetate, bound in heavy file folders, and issued in sets of WAC, Pilotage and Approach Series to all pilots with 3" expanding, accordian type manila envelopes to hold them. The necessary material for this project should be obtained prior to departure from the West Coast and the cutting and the binding the maps by pilots should be accomplished on the trip out.

(4) The storage facilities for Air Intelligence material should be expanded. This is also true of facilities available in Squadron Ready Rooms for stowage of Air Intelligence material. The material required for adequate coverage in a peninsular or coastal campaign of this nature vastly exceeds the amount of material required for the "island hopping" operations of the last war. Storage facilities which were adequate then are grossly inadequate now.

(5) It is also desired to call attention to the problems encountered by Squadron AIO's in debriefing in a crowded and often disturbed Ready Room. In the design of future carriers it would be highly desirable to provide the Squadron AI Officer with a small office directly off the Ready Room for this purpose, and in which his gear could be stowed.

(6) A qualified Photo Interpretation Officer is sorely needed in the ship's Air Intelligence Organization. The work load of tactical prints in the Photo Lab has run on an average of over 1,000 per day. The need for a PI Officer is obvious.

(7) A room for the Photo pilots to annotate their films is needed and has been provided. It is being equipped with a complete set of maps, as it has been discovered that without easy access to them it is difficult for the Photo pilot to annotate their films correctly in grid coordinates.

(8) It is recommended that a special rate be established for enlisted personnel, e.g., "Air Intelligence Mate", and that a special training program be set up to qualify them in the following categories: Yeoman, Quartermaster and Photo Interpreter. The present system necessitates training on the job, a difficult procedure in the course of operations and one which hampers efficiency. It is also felt that such a rate would boost morale among enlisted personnel assigned these duties.

8

[redacted]

e. Air Department

(1) Rockets

(a) Rockets failing to fire and returned to the ship by F4U aircraft average about seven percent. Mark 5 Mod 4 launchers initially installed will not hold hung rockets during an arrested landing and the vast majority come off, endangering aircraft and personnel as well as delaying air operations. These launchers are being replaced by AERO-14 Able launchers, ten installations having been completed to date. This launcher has greatly reduced the above-mentioned hazards by its ability to retain hung rockets upon arrested landing. However, little, if any, improvement has been noted in the number of rockets returned. Most failures to fire from the AERO-14 Able launchers appear to be due to the pig-tails being severed by hot brass and links when strafing is commenced prior to firing rockets. Various measures have been employed in an effort to preclude this severing of pig-tails with some improvement noted. When a solution is reached, it is believed that the AERO-14 Able launcher will constitute a considerable improvement over the Mark 5 Mod 4 launcher.

(b) An unusual accident occurred recently when the propellant grain of a 5" HVAR burned on the flight deck. This rocket, dropped from its launcher on an arrested landing, bounced into the path of the propeller. Subsequently, it came to rest with flame erupting from a gash in the motor tube, burning out without incident. Disposal was by jettisoning and no attempt was made to determine the condition of the fuzes; however, the pressure arming base fuze probably was not armed.

(2) Jet Blast Deflectors

(a) Jet blast deflectors as presently installed have proved unsatisfactory. The usefulness and advantages of such a device are readily apparent; however, their use is precluded by lack of dependability in the mechanical operation of raising and lowering. After heating, they tend to expand and remain in an "up" position until they have cooled sufficiently to permit lowering. Obviously, such devices cannot be used when there is danger of their becoming stuck in the "up" position, with an immobilized flight deck resulting. Since the installation of the jet blast deflectors and after tests of the equipment were made, clearances between switches were adjusted. As a result of tests it has been noted that the present hoisting motor (½ ton capacity) and the hoisting cable (5,000 lbs. breaking strength) are inadequate, that the sheaves require provision for lubrication, and that possibly the vanes of the deflector are constructed of metal of insufficient gauge inasmuch

9

9

as a number have broken or cracked. It is recommended that the blast deflectors be constructed with sufficient precision and strength to insure operating dependability.

CAMERON BRIGGS

Copy to
CNO (2) (1 forwarded copy)
CinCPacFlt
ComAirPac (5)
ComFairAlameda
CinCPacFlt Evaluation Group (5)
ComNavFE
Com7thFlt
ComCarDiv ONE
ComCarDiv THREE
ComCarDiv FIVE
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)
U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
CVG-2
CVG-5
CVG-11
CVG-19
CVG-101 (5)
CVG-102

10

10

ORIGINAL

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

ORIGINAL

CV21/3-ces
A4-3
Ser 065
26 June 1951

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 30 April 1951 through 4 June 1951

Ref: (a) CNO restr ltr Op-345 ser 1196P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-101 conf ltr ser 08 dtd 5 June 1951: Action Report of Carrier Air Group 101 (30 April 1951 to 4 June 1951) p.16

1. In compliance with reference (a), the action report for the period 30 April through 4 June 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Missions

a. Composition.

(1) In accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet confidential dispatch 232332Z of April and Commander Carrier Division THREE confidential dispatch 270534Z of April, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Commander Carrier Division THREE and Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE embarked, got underway on the morning of 30 April 1951 enroute from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area in company with Destroyer Squadron SIXTEEN and rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan on the morning of 2 May 1951. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) and various heavy support and screening ships.

(2) The OTC was RADM R. A. OFSTIE, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37). RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, was second in command.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

b. Missions.

(1) The Task Force was operating in accordance with CTF-77's Operation Order 1-51.

(2) The missions of the Task Force were to provide close and deep air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, and air bombardment in order to destroy enemy forces, communications and installations in support of United Nations Forces, and to protect the force against enemy air, surface and subsurface attacks.

PART II Chronological Order of Events.

30 April 1951 -

At 0530 the BOXER, accompanied by Destroyer Squadron SIXTEEN, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for a rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. Training flights and anti-aircraft firing were conducted during the day. Also, 4 AD-4 and 3 F4U-4 replacement aircraft from the ComFairJap Pool at NAS, Atsugi, were landed aboard.

1 May 1951 -

While proceeding through the East China Sea, training flights were again conducted.

2 May 1951 -

At 0645 the U.S.S. BOXER rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN off the east coast of Korea.

At 0700 the first combat flight was launched. Air operations from the U.S.S. PRINCETON, PHILIPPINE SEA, and the BOXER, continued throughout the morning. Fog over the target area forced cancellation of the afternoon flights.

The Task Force replenished during late afternoon and early evening.

3 May 1951 -

The three carriers resumed operations. The U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA departed from the Task Force upon completion of her shceduled air operations about 1620.

4 May 1951 -

The Task Force replenished at sea.

5 May 1951 -

Full scale operations from the PRINCETON and the BOXER were resumed.

6 May 1951 -

Operations continued from the PRINCETON and the BOXER.

RADM G. R. HENDERSON relieved RADM R. A. OFSTIE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and Commander Carrier Division FIVE aboard the U.S.S. PRINCETON.

The forty-first thousandth landing aboard the BOXER was made.

7 May 1951 -

Air operations continued. LTJG F. B. ROBBINS, VA-702, was lost on a Close Air Support Mission when his AD-4 crashed and burned.

8 May 1951 -

Shrouded by a heavy fog which reduced the visibility to less than two hundred yards, the Carrier Task Force rendezvoused with the replenishing group.

9 May 1951 -

No air operations due to heavy fog.

10 May 1951 -

Fogbound most of the day; however, limited air operations were commenced at 1600.

11 May 1951 -

The Task Force maneuvered out of the bad weather of the past few days which had held the force fogbound. During the afternoon air operations were resumed. Of particular significance is the fact that two railroad bridges east and northeast of PYONGYANG, which the USAF had endeavored to destroy on numerous occasions, were severely damaged by BOXER aircraft, one span being dropped on one of the bridges and three spans on the other.

One AD and one F4U were lost this date although the pilots were safely recovered. The F4U settled into the water immediately upon take-off apparently as a result of a partial power plant failure; the AD spun-in in the landing circle.

[redacted]

12 May 1951 -

All air operations were conducted as per schedule.

13 May 1951 -

Air operations continued.

14 May 1951 -

Replenished.

15 May 1951 -

No air operations due to unfavorable weather.

16 May 1951 -

Bad weather continued through the better part of the day. At 1600 a JETCAP, a PHOTO flight, and a CAS event were launched.

17 May 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 0815 the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB-62), the U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83), and screening destroyers rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

At 1538 Commander Carrier Division THREE, aboard the U.S.S. BOXER, relieved Commander Carrier Division FIVE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, and the U.S.S. PRINCETON, with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, departed for Yokosuka, Japan.

18 May 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 0700 the U.S.S. PRINCETON, with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, rendezvoused with the Task Force after having been recalled to assist in furnishing Close Air Support for UN troops in their stand against a new Communist offensive.

At 0800 two BOXER F4U's were shot down over the front lines; LTJG Marion Thomas DRAGASTIN, VF-884, going in with his plane which exploded upon impact and LT George (n) GARRISON, VF-884, parachuting clear of his aircraft. Neither pilot was rescued. A SAR helicopter reported later, when an attempted rescue was made, that LT GARRISON had left the scene of his landing.

At 2243 Commander Carrier Division FIVE relieved Commander Carrier Division THREE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

[redacted]

19 May 1951 -

Air operations continued as per schedule with excellent results. Several strikes from the U.S.S. BOXER were highly commended by the ground controllers. The Task Force replenished during the night hours in order to render maximum air support to the UN front line troops.

At 2255 Commander Carrier Division THREE relieved Commander Carrier Division FIVE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The PRINCETON again departed for Yokosuka.

20 May 1951 -

After having replenished throughout the night, air operations were resumed at 0430. Infomation gleaned from the strike leaders indicated that this was one of the most successful operating days. A total of 111 sorties were flown.

21 May 1951 -

Air operations continued until 1200 at which time schedules were cancelled due to unfavorable weather conditions; and overnight replenishment was again accomplished.

22 May 1951 -

Morning flights were cancelled due to unfavorable weather.

At 1215 the first strike was launched.

23 May 1951 -

Air operations continued with excellent results. The forty-second thousandth landing aboard the BOXER was made this day.

24 May 1951 -

Scheduled air operations continued. LCDR G. L. CARMICHAEL, Commanding Officer of VF-884, died a few hours after parachuting from his F4U which had been hit by enemy flak over the front lines; diagnosis--a crushed chest.

25 May 1951 -

The Task Force replenished, commencing at 0330. Air operations were resumed at 1500.

26 May 1951 -

With North Korean forces in full retreat offering lucrative targets, unfavorable weather precluded flight operations.

27 May 1951 -

Continued unfavorable weather precluded flight operations.

28 May 1951 -

Full scale operations were conducted with the return of favorable weather.

30 May 1951 -

Air operations which commenced on schedule were terminated at 1200 due to unfavorable weather.

One F9F was lost when it settled into the water after a catapult launch, apparently from partial power failure. The pilot was recovered and returned aboard uninjured in the record time of less than two minutes.

The U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) rendezvoused with the Task Force to commence her initial operations in the Korean Campaign.

At 1910 the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA, having been relieved by the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD, was detached to proceed to Yokosuka for onward routing to the West Coast. Four F4U and four AD replacement aircraft were received from the PHILIPPINE SEA prior to her departure.

31 May 1951 -

Only Weather Reconnaissance, NGF, and CAP flights were flown until late in the afternoon when the weather over Korea cleared sufficiently to launch Armed Reconnaissance flights against targets north of the thirty-ninth parallel.

1 June 1951 -

Normal air operations resumed.

2 June 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 1054 the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, rendezvoused with the Task Force.

At 1125 Commander Carrier Division FIVE relieved Commander Carrier Division THREE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

At 1350 completed scheduled air operations.

At 1452 the BOXER, accompanied by Destroyer Division 162, was detached from the Task Force, and proceeded to rendezvous with the replenishment group.

At 2106 upon completion of receiving fuel oil, aviation gasoline, and ammunition, the BOXER and DesDiv-162 took departure for Yokosuka, Japan. A record ammunition loading rate of 185 short tons per hour was established.

3 June 1951 -

Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

4 June 1951 -

At 1500 , arrived Yokosuka, Japan for a period of restricted availability, during which catapults, flight deck planking, and jet blast deflectors were overhauled as well as numerous repairs made to the engineering plant.

SUMMARY OF SORTIES

DATE	REMARKS First Launch	Last Recovery	OFFENSIVE Day Prop	OFFENSIVE Day Jet	OFFENSIVE Night Prop	DEFENSIVE Day Prop	DEFENSIVE Day Jet	DEFENSIVE Night Prop	MISC Prop	MISC Jet	TOTAL
30 Apr	1000	- 1820	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	-	32
1 May	1000	- 1445	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	10	49
2 May	0700	- 1305	28	8	-	-	4	-	-	-	40
3 May	0700	- 1610	48	10	-	13	6	-	2	-	79
4 May	Replenished		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
5 May	0400	- 1610	60	8	4	6	6	2	-	-	86
6 May	0430	- 1640	54	8	4	6	6	2	1	1	83
7 May	0430	- 1645	64	12	4	6	6	2	-	-	94
8 May	Replenished		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
9 May	Fogbound		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
10 May	1600	- 2000	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
11 May	0820	- 1700	55	14	-	18	2	-	-	-	89
12 May	0900	- 1930	43	10	-	20	8	-	3	-	84
13 May	0900	- 2230	47	10	4	24	10	-	3	-	98
14 May	Replenished		-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
15 May	Unfav.Weather		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
16 May	1600	- 1900	12	6	-	-	2	-	-	-	20
17 May	0600	- 1630	47	12	-	6	8	-	2	-	75
18 May	0430	- 1630	65	14	-	2	6	-	-	-	87
19 May	0430	- 1630	48	16	4	8	8	-	2	-	86
20 May	0430	- 2230	65	14	16	6	8	-	2	-	111
21 May	0430	- 1500	39	12	7	6	6	2	-	-	72
22 May	1215	- 2230	44	-	-	17	-	-	2	-	63
23 May	0430	- 2230	53	20	12	16	8	-	-	-	109
24 May	0430	- 1630	48	14	4	6	6	2	-	-	80
25 May	1500	- 1915	27	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	29
26 May	Unfav.Weather		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
27 May	Unfav.Weather		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
28 May	0430	- 1920	34	-	4	-	-	2	2	-	42
29 May	0430	- 1800	56	38	7	4	2	2	2	-	111
30 May	0430	- 1305	39	21	4	4	-	2	-	-	70
31 May	0800	- 2000	29	2	-	8	2	-	1	1	43
1 Jun	0430	- 1700	47	22	4	4	-	2	-	-	79
2 Jun	0430	- 1350	44	16	4	4	-	2	-	-	70
	TOTAL		1112	287	82	184	105	20	97	12	1899

Total Propeller Sorties	1495
Total Jet Sorties	404
Total Sorties	1899

[redacted]

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See enclosure (1).

PART IV Battle Damage.

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties

(1) There were no combat personnel casualties during this period except those of the Air Group as reported in enclosure (1).

PART VI Comments.

a. Ship Handling.

(1) At 0700 on 8 May during replenishment, the BOXER was closing the U.S.S. KASKASKIA (AO-27) using radar. Fog conditions were such that visibility was reduced to less than 200 yards. The final approach, after radar contact was lost in the sea return, was made at a speed difference of 2 knots, with lookouts alerted to watch for the wake of the KASKASKIA. Replenishment course was 340° T, speed 11 knots. On sighting a strong wake close aboard indicating that possibly the tanker had been closed more rapidly than calculated, the BOXER turned hard left. On heading about 320° T, the wake-maker, a DD also making an approach on the AO, was sighted and course changed to 342° T. Closing the tanker from the quarter without regaining radar contact, had to be accomplished very slowly for safety. The KASKASKIA's searchlight was picked up at about 300 yards.

It is strongly recommended that during low visibility conditions, destroyers not make approaches until after CV's and support ships have reported on station.

b. Air Department.

(1) Flight Deck.

Throughout this reporting period, the flight deck was spotted with a "split spot", consisting of two AD and two or three F4U types across the deck and a dead pack of four to seven F9F's.

[redacted]

By 15 May the installation of the AERO-14A rocket launchers on F4U's had progressed to a point where the number of aircraft that could be "split spotted" across the deck was reduced to two AD's and two F4U's. This was due to the fact that F4U aircraft with AERO-14-A rocket launchers requires fourteen inches more deck space athwartship than those with Mark 5 Mod 4 type launchers with which they were formerly equipped. An echelon spotting of AERO-14-A equipped F4U's is being worked out.

The Ford tractors used aboard ship are excellent for size and maneuverability but lack sufficient power in high gear to pull a heavily loaded AD or F9F up the deck against strong winds. Second gear is too slow for expeditious respotting forward during launch/land operations. If an attempt is made to use high gear, the clutch must be slipped to such an extent that clutch troubles result. A faster speed for second gear would solve the problem, the present high and low gear ratios being satisfactory.

(2) Catapults

During the period of this report, a number of catapult troubles were encountered. The flexible return line on the port catapult ruptured. The hydraulic tensioning pump on the starboard catapult failed in the cone bearing. Since a spare cone bearing was not available, the system for tensioning by means of accumulator pressure was reinstalled. The three way valve installed under BuAer Change #29 showed leakage at the "T" fitting, necessitating the reinstallation of the old type valve. In addition, two of the four main hydraulic oil gear pumps on the starboard catapult malfunctioned, one freezing and one reduced to extremely low pressure, making it necessary to continue operations with only two pumps on the line. This resulted in doubling the time necessary to build up pressure with a corresponding increase in interval between launches on the starboard catapult. Jet pairs were launched every other shot, alternating with single jet shots from the port catapult.

(3) Gasoline.

The time required for replenishment of aviation gasoline from the tanker to the carrier is recognized as a retarding factor in the over-all replenishment operation. Experiences of previous fueling operations showed that tankers were not able to supply a steady pressure or continuous rate of flow to the carrier's forward and after gasoline systems.

The fueling rig used by the tankers has been either a four inch hose or a six inch hose with the last section reduced to four inches, from tanker to carrier. These two rigs have delivered an average of approximately 250 gallons per minute to the after tanks and approximately 400 gallons per minute to the forward tanks.

With the excellent cooperation of the U.S.S. KASKASKIA (AO-27), a six-inch hose was rigged from tanker to carrier. On the carrier's end of this six-inch hose were a quick disconnect and a wye fitting for reducing to two four-inch fittings. Two four-inch hoses were attached to the wye connection, one hose being laid out along the starboard hangar deck edge to the fueling station at frame 60 and the other four-inch hose laid out across the hangar deck to the fueling station at frame 40 port side. Gasoline was then pumped directly to the forward tanks via the connection at frame 60 and to the after tanks via the connection at frame 40. It was found that a steady pressure and a continuous rate of flow was maintained which delivered approximately 380 gallons per minute at 9.2 P.S.I. to the after tanks and approximately 600 gallons per minute at 11.0 P.S.I. to the forward tanks.

To secure optimum results with this new six-inch rig the level of fuel in the carrier's tanks must be preadjusted so that each set of forward and after tanks being fueled simultaneously will reach a full state at the same time.

The use of this system of fueling has cut the time alongside the tanker by nearly one-third, thus contributing greatly to the overall efficiency of replenishment at sea.

A report of this experimental rig, which is now accepted as standard, has been forwarded separately.

(4) Aviation Ordnance.

During the initial phases of the period covered by this report, a considerable increase was noted in the number of rockets being returned to the ship by AERO-14-A rocket launchers. Most failures to fire from these launchers was considered due to the pigtails being severed by hot brass and links when strafing was commenced prior to firing rockets.

This problem is believed to have been solved by the design and installation of deflector plates on the after end of the racks to protect the pigtails. A few similar plates have been installed on Mark 5 Mod 4 launchers with a further reduction of returns ensuing. A complete report on the above mentioned deflector plates will be submitted to Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet as soon as sufficient data has been

collected to substantiate the limited excellent results noted to date.

c. Communications.

(1) Circuit Interference.

Communications, in general, were excellent during this period with the exception of periodic interference on all long range circuits, attributed mainly to ionospheric disturbances. However, the proximity of the transmitter antennae also caused some interference.

Although little can be done in regard to ionospheric disturbances, it is considered that a study of the antennae arrangements of the CV type with a view to reallocation would prove helpful in alleviating transmitter interference.

(2) Daily Summaries.

It is estimated that over fifty per cent of the encrypted message traffic handled by the cryptoboard of this flagship was daily operational summaries, generally of high precedence with numerous addressees. The originators were: Commander Naval Forces, Far East; parallel echelons of command for the U.S. Army and Air Force; and the Commander in Chief Far East. The aggregate of these messages tended, at times, to infringe upon the time required for the expeditious processing of high precedence traffic involving current or impending operations.

It is recommended that either: (1), the reporting of such information essential to operations in progress be continued by messages of high precedence and that the remainder be transmitted by means other than messages or by messages of low precedence or; (2), as an alternative, task unit, element, and group commanders report directly to task force commanders who will in turn, correlate the summaries and transmit one summary for their respective task forces to those who need to know.

d. Supply Department.

(1) Aviation Supply.

During this period of intensified air operations,

the "availability of aircraft" has become of increasing importance due largely to the Air Group's heavy operating schedule, the limited time between operations for maintenance of the planes (particularly when replenishment is carried out at night), the increasing hours of flying time on aircraft in the third and fourth service tours (particularly the F4U's) and the increasing damage to aircraft surfaces from enemy small arms fire. In order to meet this problem immediately, the Aviation Supply Officer has been instructed to "stay on top of" every demand within reason made by the squadrons aboard, even to the extent of improvising where necessary.

The following constructive suggestions are strongly recommended for consideration by higher authority for incorporation within our Aviation Supply system:

(a) Aviation Allowance Lists should be made more realistic. The initial loading on the West Coast was based on the application of peacetime allowances to wartime operating conditions. For certain items in Section Baker Allowance Lists, even the variable multiple factor applied to the Peacetime Allowance Columns is considered to result in inadequate wartime allowances. It is believed that the variable factor column should be increased in order that additional inventories may be carried on board in an attempt to meet the demand arising from increased operating schedules. At the present time, the Supply Officer is currently preparing "marked up" allowance lists for forwarding to the ComAirPac Supply Officer reflecting 90-day usage data which may be useful in revising quantities presently shown on allowance lists.

(b) The afloat Aviation Supply situation should be strengthened to allow for more complete replenishment by the aviation stores ship U.S.S. JUPITER. Possibly, additional non-stock aviation parts could be stocked aboard this "afloat depot", since it is noted that AOG's aboard the BOXER are stemming for the major part from a lack of parts that are not stocked or intended to be stocked aboard a carrier. Insurance items, such as wings, should be stocked in greater quantities. Requisitions for both such types of parts frequently have to be passed to the United States for resupply.

(2) GSK.

Some difficulty has been encountered in routine replenishment of General Stores. Routine (Priority "C") requisitions submitted were cancelled by the supporting activity whenever the material concerned was either not in stock or not carried. This makes it necessary for new requisitions to

be re-submitted at an indefinite time in the future on a "catch-as-catch-can" basis for those routine requirements which still remain. An effort is being made to have routine requisitions obligated against due stocks, or forwarded to the United States by the supporting activity for further action, when the requirements cannot be met.

(3) Ship's Store.

The importance of continuous and adequate service by the Ship's Store cannot be overstressed as an aid to morale aboard ship. In spite of an authorization for an inventory of $195,000 prior to leaving the States, with monthly sales approaching $50,000 many of the stocks have been depleted, even the so-called luxury items. All Ship's Store Officers leaving the States should be advised to make sure that all assigned storerooms are filled to capacity with Ship's Store Stock (other than that which is perishable).

(4) Disbursing.

During this period, all ships in the Western Pacific have been ordered to pay in MPC script and to call in all U.S. currency in accordance with BuSandA Manual (Articles 53525 - 53529) and supplementary area directives. All Ship's Disbursing Officers should be advised to carry only enough American currency to meet a few "State-side paydays", since MPC's are purchased in this area by means of Money Requisition or U.S. Treasurer's check and not by converting American money to MPC.

(5) Commissary.

The logistic support given to the BOXER in all kinds of provisions, both from afloat and ashore activities, has been most gratifying.

CAMERON BRIGGS

[redacted]

CV21/3-ces
A4-3
Ser 065
26 June 1951

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

CNO (2)
CinCPacFlt
ComAirPac (5)
ComFairAlameda
CinCPacFlt Evaluation Group (5)
ComNavFE
Com7thFlt
ComCarDiv ONE
ComCarDiv THREE
ComCarDiv FIVE
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)
U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
CVG-2
CVG-5
CVG-11
CVG-19
CVG-101 (5)
CVG-102

[redacted]

Original

AR276/CV

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/3-ces
A4-3
Ser 094
27 July 1951

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific

Subj: Action Report for the period 15 June 1951 through 17 July 1951 08408

Ref: (a) CNO rest ltr Op-345 ser 1196P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-101 conf ltr ser 019 dtd 18 July 1951: Action Report of Carrier Air Group 101 (15 June 1951 - 17 July 1951) p. 12

1. In compliance with ref (a), the action report for the period 15 June 1951 through 17 July 1951 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Missions.

a. Composition.

(1) In accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet confidential dispatch 100624Z of June and Commander Carrier Division THREE confidential dispatch 140032Z of June, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Commander Carrier Division THREE and Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE embarked, got underway on the morning of 15 June 1951 enroute from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area and rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan on the morning of 17 June 1951. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), and various heavy support and screening ships.

(2) The OTC was RADM G. R. HENDERSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37). RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, was second in command.

b. Missions.

(1) The Task Force was operating in accordance with CTF-77's Operation Order 2-51.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) The missions of the Task Force were to provide close air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, and air bombardment in order to destroy enemy forces, communications and installations in support of United Nations Forces, and to protect the force against enemy air, surface and subsurface attacks.

PART II Chronological Order of Events.

15 June 1951 -

At 0729 the BOXER departed Yokosuka, Japan, for a rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan.

16 June 1951 -

At 0620, while passing through Van Diemen Straits, the BOXER rendezvoused with the U.S.S. YARNELL (DD-541) and the U.S.S. MCDERMUTT (DD-677) who acted as escorts to the operating area.

While proceeding through the East China Sea, training flights and anti-aircraft firing were conducted.

17 June 1951 -

At 0650 the BOXER rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN off the east coast of Korea.

At 0910 the first combat flight was launched with air operations continuing throughout the day. Clear skies permitted all aircraft to hit their assigned targets with excellent results.

18 June 1951 -

Air operations continued as clear weather prevailed.

19 June 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

20 June 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 0910 an F4U crashed in the water about three miles south of Songjin as a result of enemy anti-aircraft fire. The pilot, LTJG P. L. SCHAEFER, went in with his plane and was not recovered.

[redacted]

The forty-third thousandth landing aboard the BOXER was made.

21 June 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 0805 LT D. A. ARRIVEE, Officer-in-Charge of the VAN team, was lost on a Reconnaissance Mission when his AD-2 crashed in flames while attacking an enemy ground installation.

22 June 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 0615 ENS MARVIN D. NELSON, Jr., USN, parachuted from his flak damaged F4U-5NL over Wonsan Bay and was safely recovered by a helicopter from LST 799.

23 June 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

24, 25 and 26 June 1951 -

Normal air operations were conducted as nearly perfect weather continued to prevail.

27 June 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

28 June 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 1615 LTJG O. D. DROEGE, USNR, parachuted from his damaged F4U while on a close support mission just north of the bombline. He was safely recovered by a helicopter from the U.S.S. LOS ANGELES.

29 and 30 June 1951 -

Scheduled air operations continued.

1 July 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

At 0700 the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD and screening destroyers rendezvoused with the Task Force.

At 1200 Commander Carrier Division THREE, aboard the U.S.S. BOXER relieved Commander Carrier Division FIVE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and the U.S.S. PRINCETON, with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, departed for Yokosuka, Japan.

2 July 1951 -

Air operations continued. Although hampered by intermittent low clouds, fog, and reduced visibility a limited number of sorties were flown with excellent results.

At 1025 LT R. T. WALKER, USNR, parachuted from his damaged AD-2 while on a strike mission north of Wonsan. He was recovered uninjured by a helicopter from the U.S.S. TOLEDO.

3 July 1951 -

Unfavorable weather over the target areas forced the cancellation of scheduled flight operations. Only defensive air operations were conducted. At about 1110 the Task Force commenced replenishing.

4 July 1951 -

Weather again curtailed offensive operations as heavy cloud cover and rain obscured assigned targets. Only limited offensive and defensive air operations were conducted.

5 July 1951 -

Air operations were again thwarted by bad weather.

6 July 1951 -

With the return of good flying weather, aircraft from the BOXER and the BON HOMME RICHARD severely damaged the North Korean port of Wonsan in a concerted effort against enemy personnel and military installations, starting at dawn and continuing until darkness and smoke had blanketed the battered area. BOXER aircraft flew 133 combat sorties in this operation.

The forty-fourth thousandth landing aboard the BOXER was made.

4

4

[redacted]

7 July 1951 -

Air operations continued as the Task Force returned its full attention to transportation interdiction and close air support.

One F4U was lost when it settled into the water shortly after take-off, apparently from partial power failure. The BOXER helicopter was over the swimming pilot almost immediately and as soon as it was apparent that the pilot could not get into the helicopter rescue sling by himself, the helicopter crewman was quickly lowered into the water to aid the injured pilot. Both the pilot and the assisting crewman were picked up by a motor whaleboat from the U.S.S. MASON, the pilot sustaining but minor injuries.

8 July 1951 -

Air operations continued.

9 July 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

10 July 1951 -

Inclement weather precluded air operations.

11 July 1951 -

Although hampered most of the day by remnants of the previous day's bad weather, BOXER aircraft succeeded in inflicting heavy damage on rear area supplies and transportation routes.

LTJG W. F. WALLACE of VF-884 was forced to ditch his plane in Wonsan Harbor due to engine trouble. He was promptly rescued uninjured by a helicopter from LST 799.

While the BOXER was at evening General Quarters, an AD-4N carrying a pilot and two crewmen, which had just been launched from the BON HOMME RICHARD, was observed to be slowly settling to a water landing. As soon as it was obvious that a water landing was probable, the BOXER helicopter was started and was on its way by the time the plane had crash landed in the water near the U.S.S. CRAIG (DD-885) on the BOXER's port bow. Helicopter had one of the crewmen aboard the BOXER within five (5) minutes from the time of the crash and the pilot aboard within eight (8) minutes. A motor whaleboat from the U.S.S. CRAIG rescued the remaining crewman.

[redacted]

5

5

12 and 13 July 1951 -

Scheduled air operations continued.

14 July 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

At 1120 the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, rendezvoused with the Task Force.

At 2000 Commander Carrier Division FIVE relieved Commander Carrier Division THREE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

15 July 1951 -

Air operations which commenced on schedule were terminated at 1000 due to unfavorable weather.

At 1054 the BOXER, escorted by the U.S.S. TINGEY (DD-539) and the U.S.S. MCDERMUTT (DD-677), was detached from the Task Force and took departure for Yokosuka, Japan.

16 July 1951 -

At 0835, upon approaching Van Diemen Straits, the U.S.S. TINGEY and U.S.S. MCDERMUTT were detached to proceed to Sasebo in accordance with previous instructions.

Anti-aircraft firing was conducted after the BOXER had passed through Van Diemen Straits.

17 July 1951 -

At 1113 the BOXER arrived Yokosuka, Japan, for a period of tender availability.

DECLASSIFIED [redacted] Summary of Sortie [redacted] DECLASSIFIED

DATE	REMARKS First Launch / Last Recovery	OFFENSIVE Day Prop	OFFENSIVE Day Jet	OFFENSIVE Night Prop	DEFENSIVE Day Prop	DEFENSIVE Day Jet	DEFENSIVE Night Prop	MISC Prop	MISC Jet	TOTAL
16 Jun	1200 - 1630	--	--	-	--	--	-	49	10	59
17 Jun	0910 - 2330	53	8	4	32	20	2	2	0	121
18 Jun	0910 - 2330	47	8	4	30	17	2	0	1	109
19 Jun	REPLENISHED	--	--	-	--	--	-	--	--	0
20 Jun	0410 - 1730	65	12	4	8	23	2	0	1	115
21 Jun	0410 - 1730	67	10	4	8	23	2	1	0	115
22 Jun	0410 - 1730	58	10	4	15	18	2	0	0	107
23 Jun	REPLENISHED	--	--	-	--	--	-	--	--	0
24 Jun	0910 - 2330	61	12	4	19	20	2	1	0	119
25 Jun	0910 - 2030	46	12	0	14	19	4	3	1	99
26 Jun	0910 - 2330	44	12	4	19	20	2	1	0	102
27 Jun	REPLENISHED	--	--	-	--	--	-	--	--	0
28 Jun	0410 - 1730	52	10	4	13	16	2	0	0	97
29 Jun	0410 - 1730	46	8	4	13	16	2	1	0	90
30 Jun	0410 - 1730	47	8	4	13	16	2	0	0	90
1 Jul	REPLENISHED	--	--	-	--	--	-	--	--	0
2 Jul	0830 - 2030	40	6	0	16	4	0	2	2	70
3 Jul	1230 - 2030	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	12
4 Jul	0830 - 2030	26	10	0	12	0	0	0	0	48
5 Jul	Unfav.Weather	--	--	-	--	--	-	--	--	0
6 Jul	0515 - 2030	93	24	0	6	10	0	0	0	133
7 Jul	0830 - 2330	56	18	2	6	12	2	4	0	100
8 Jul	0830 - 2330	56	16	3	6	10	2	0	0	93
9 Jul	REPLENISHED	--	--	-	--	--	-	--	--	0
10 Jul	Unfav.Weather	--	--	-	--	--	-	--	--	0
11 Jul	0530 - 1730	54	16	0	2	10	0	2	0	84
12 Jul	0400 - 1730	52	19	4	2	10	2	4	0	93
13 Jul	0400 - 1900	57	21	4	2	10	2	1	0	97
14 Jul	REPLENISHED	--	--	-	--	--	-	--	--	0
15 Jul	0400 - 1000	23	8	4	2	0	2	0	0	39
		1043	248	57	250	274	34	71	15	1992

Total Propeller Sorties..1455
Total Jet Sorties..... 537
Total Sorties.....1992

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See enclosure (1).

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

[redacted]

7

17

PART V Personnel.

a. Casualties.

(1) There were no combat personnel casualties during this period except those of the Air Group as reported in enclosure (1).

PART VI Comments.

a. Operations.

Despite the difficulties imposed by AOG aircraft, ninety-eight percent (98%) of all assigned missions were carried out expeditiously as scheduled, a total of 1992 sorties being flown during this period.

b. Air Department.

(1) Bombs.

During the period of this report this ship received a number of 250 pound G.P. bombs with suspension lugs unsuitable for use with the Mark 55 bomb rack presently installed on the F4U-5NL, AD-2, and AD-4N aircraft. The top angle of the suspension lug support bracket was too great to allow the bracket to be received and held by the recessed suspension hook of the Mark 55 rack.

(2) Catapults.

A casualty was experienced on the number four (4) starboard catapult pump during the period of this report. This pump had been installed during the previous week. The system had been drained, flushed, and refilled with oil prior to such installation. Four "no-load" shots were fired to test the new pump. The pressure was pumped to 3500 PSI three times and blown down to 2200 PSI as an additional test. The installation appeared to be satisfactory in all respects, but after three service launches were made at 2250 PSI the pump froze. This was the third failure of this type experienced in the past four months. RUDM's have been prepared and submitted to BuAer on all three casualties.

c. Communications.

(1) The Guam "JIG" Fox was discontinued during this period and the traffic normally on this broadcast was switched to the Tokyo RATT. Since the RATT circuit has been found to be very reliable, the "JIG" Fox discontinuation is considered a major improvement.

(2) Radio Facsimile Equipment.

Facsimile equipment was used during this period, primarily for receiving weather maps which proved valuable in checking weather analyses and making necessary forecasts. Installation of facsimile equipment is highly recommended for all large ships.

d. Supply Department.

(1) Aviation Supply.

The lack of on-hand or area availability of aviation spares required to prevent AOG's, again presented a major supply problem. In setting out for the operating area there were no AOG's, but shortly after commencing air operations, they developed with increasing rapidity from unanticipated "runs" on certain items. In nearly all cases the items creating difficulties were non-stock, fleet controlled or insurance items, as might be expected. Such examples as: (F9F) liners, combustion chamber; body assembly, combustion chamber, fuel; control assembly, fuel; (F4U-4) harness assemblies, ignition; valve assemblies, fuel drain; section assemblies, exhaust collector; and (AD-2) reservoir assembly, hydraulic, might be readily cited. Since the number of AOG's averaged 2-3 during this period, despite the most energetic follow-up, the problem is an important one, both from the standpoint of operations and supply.

It is realized that this problem of local availability of critical parts is not an easy one to solve. Replenishment from the JUPITER, both at sea and in port, has been highly satisfactory as far as parts available are concerned. Likewise it is realized that a number of "JUPITERS" would be required to provide every part peculiar to three or more major plane types. It is desired to point out, however, that the variety of items required to maintain aging propeller types, as well as temperamental jets, is becoming larger and more unpredictable, while the scarcity of such items appears to be increasing. It would appear that, if carriers are to be prepared to meet the demands of any large scale operation in the future, there must be a speeding up throughout the aviation supply system, back through the factory production lines and initial contracting.

In an attempt to assist in the overall problem of gearing procurement to consumption, marked-up allowance lists showing actual usage data for this vessel's first three months of current operations (2 March - 2 June 1951) were submitted to Commander Air Force Pacific Fleet on 30 June.

(2) General Stores.

The only current problem under this heading is to be found linked to the new accounting system. With directives from higher authority to submit requisitions prior to 15 July 1951 to refill current allowances of special clothing, a covering special allotment is required, or overobligation is inevitable due to an immediate obligation estimated at $134,000 for clothing alone. Well over half of this figure is required for replacement of two items: winter jackets and underwear. A breakdown of requirements has been reported to the Type Commander.

(3) Ship's Stores.

The elimination by directives from higher authority of the use of coins (except pennies) in all ship's activities in the Far East has tended to slow down the service in already overburdened sales outlets, and has increased the chances of inaccurate change-making. The problem is simply the loss of the inherent advantages of coins (handling and recognition) in making change rapidly and accurately. The extent of the problem is readily measured by the amount of sales, mostly small, totalling nearly $40,000.00 each month in the ship's stores and over $8,000.00 in the soda fountains. Barring any change in existing policy to permit the use of coins at sea, consideration is being given to the adaptation of a one-dollar chit book of five (5) and ten (10) cent denominations to facilitate the very large number of sales averaging 15-20 cents in the soda fountains.

(4) Commissary.

In general, the supply of fresh and frozen provisions has continued adequate and timely. The necessity for utmost vigilance in relating the storage and distribution problems was underscored by a recent survey of about thirty thousand pounds of citrous fruits and leafy vegetables. Items judged to be wholesome from the outside appearance of the cases upon receipt and later inspections were found upon use to be deteriorating in the center of the cases after less than three weeks' storage aboard. Further inspection and use disclosed an alarmingly rapid increase in rate of spoilage, with the result that what appeared to be eighteen days' supply dwindled in short order to but a few days' fresh provisions. During a subsequent replenishment, the Commissary Officer of the reefer estimated that the provisions in question had been received in early May, nearly two months previously. Prior storage conditions were not determinable.

[redacted]

A long standing problem is the time required to accomplish feeding in the general mess. Despite the application of every effort and experimentation with various messing procedures, the three major meals average about one and one-half hours. Air operations require as many as three additional meals throughout the night. With at least two compartments ordinarily used for messing devoted most of the time to rearming activites, the maximum seating capacity of 525 is reduced to about 400. A wartime complement on board, necessitates approximately six "relays" for each scheduled meal, although in actual practice the lines are continuous.

CAMERON BRIGGS

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO (2)
CinCPacFlt
ComAirPac (5)
ComFairAlameda
CinCPacFlt Evaluation Group (5)
ComNavFE
Com7thFlt
ComCarDiv ONE
ComCarDiv THREE
ComCarDiv FIVE
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)
U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
CVG-2
CVG-5
CVG-11
CVG-19
CVG-101 (5)
CVG-102

[redacted]

11

ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/3-ces
A4-3
Ser 0115
27 August 1951

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(3) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(4) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(5) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(6) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 26 July 1951 through 24 August 1951

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 338.4 dtd 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) CVG-101 conf ltr ser 030 dtd 27 August 1951; Action Report of Carrier Air Group 101 (26 July 1951 - 24 August 1951) p.11

1. In compliance with reference (a), the action report for the period 26 July 1951 through 24 August 1951 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Missions

a. Composition

(1) In accordance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN confidential dispatch 221845Z of July and Commander Carrier Division THREE confidential dispatch 242242Z of July, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) with Commander Carrier Division THREE and Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE embarked, got underway on the morning of 26 July 1951 enroute from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area and rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan on the morning of 28 July 1951. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), and various heavy support and screening ships.

(2) The OTC was RADM G. R. HENDERSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37). RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE was second in command.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

b. Missions

(1) The Task Force was operating in accordance with CTF-77's Operation Order 22-51.

(2) The missions of the Task Force were to provide close air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, and air bombardment in order to destroy enemy forces, communications, and installations in support of United Nations Forces, and to protect the force against enemy air, surface and subsurface attacks.

PART II Chronological Order of Events

26 July 1951 -

At 0659 the BOXER departed Yokosuka, Japan, for a rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan.

Anti-aircraft firing was conducted in the afternoon.

27 July 1951 -

At 0634, while passing through Van Dieman Straits, the BOXER rendezvoused with the U.S.S. TINGEY (DD-539) and the U.S.S. MCDERMUT (DD-677) who acted as escorts to the operating area.

While proceeding through the East China Sea, training flights were conducted. One F4U-4 was lost when it made a forced landing in the water as a result of engine failure caused by loss of oil pressure. The pilot was safely recovered by the helicopter.

28 July 1951 -

At 0945 the BOXER rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN off the east coast of Korea. The BON HOMME RICHARD, and two screening destroyers departed from the Task Force immediately prior to the BOXER's rendezvous .

At 1040 the first combat flight was launched with air operations continuing throughout the day. Aircraft hit assigned targets with excellent results.

One F4U-5N crashed while making a night landing after striking the edge of the ramp. The plane was destroyed but the pilot, LTJG H. F. O'HARA was uninjured.

29 July 1951 -

The Task Force replenished, precluding full scale operations. Night hecklers and ASP were launched however. Conducted anti-aircraft firing at towed sleeve.

30 July 1951 -

Air operations continued.

31 July 1951 -

The Task Force replenished. Two defensive sorties were launched at 1830.

1 August 1951 -

Fog and heavy overcast over the force and target area limited air operations to defensive missions launched at 1830.

2 August 1951 -

Continued fog and overcast over the force and target area restricted air operations to late defensive sorties.

3 August 1951 -

Intermittent fog and overcast continued throughout the morning but abated sufficiently to permit the launching of eight (8) CAS sorties at 1330.

4 August 1951 -

Favorable flying weather permitted full scale air operations by aircraft of the BOXER and PRINCETON.

One F4U-4 was lost when it settled into the water after take-off apparently from partial power failure. The pilot, LTJG H. B. RATHBONE was not recovered.

5 August 1951 -

The Task Force replenished during the morning. Operational flights were launched at 1430.

6 August 1951 -

Air operations continued. The forty-fifth thousandth landing aboard the BOXER was made by LTJG S. M. RINES, VF-721, who piloted the first plane recovered. A total of 98 sorties were launched.

7 August 1951 -

Air operations continued. LT R. T. WALKER, USNR, made a water landing in Wonsan Harbor after his AD-2 was damaged by flak. He was recovered uninjured by a helicopter from the U.S.S. TOLEDO and returned this date to the BOXER.

8 August 1951 -

The Task Force replenished during the morning when fog and haze over inland targets prevented the carrying out of early operations. Air operations were resumed in the afternoon.

The destroyer screen, consisting of Destroyer Division 91 and units of Destroyer Divisions 11 and 132 was relieved by Destroyer Division 12, Escort Destroyer Division 21, Destroyer Squadron 13 with units of Destroyer Division 131.

9 August 1951 -

Air operations continued.

A jet Panther, side No. 112, crashed into the barrier on landing. The pilot was unable to extend the tail hook. The pilot was uninjured but the aircraft suffered major overhaul damage.

10 August 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 0650 the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD and screening destroyers rendezvoused with the Task Force.

At 0815 Captain DENNIS J. SULLIVAN, USN, reporting as relief for Captain CAMERON BRIGGS, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER, came aboard via helicopter from the BON HOMME RICHARD.

At 0820 Commander Carrier Division THREE, aboard the U.S.S. BOXER, relieved Commander Carrier Division FIVE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and the U.S.S. PRINCETON, with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, departed for Yokosuka, Japan, and the United States.

11 August 1951 -

Air operations continued.

[redacted]

12 August 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

Air defense exercises and anti-aircraft firing were conducted in the afternoon.

13 August 1951 -

Air operations continued.

14 August 1951 -

Air operations continued.

One F9F was lost when it settled into the water off the bow shortly after being catapulted. The pilot was recovered by helicopter.

15 August 1951 -

Air operations continued.

16 August 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

Anti-aircraft firing and air defense exercises were conducted in the afternoon.

17 August 1951 -

Air operations continued. At 1030 CAPT DENNIS J. SULLIVAN relieved CAPT CAMERON BRIGGS as Commanding Officer of the BOXER. Informal change-of-command ceremonies were held on the flight deck after launching the first flight of the day. LTJG W. C. WINDSOR, USNR, was awarded the Purple Heart for injuries received 1 April 1951 and W. H. SPIVEY, ABC, USN, was awarded the Commendation Ribbon for outstanding services. Letters of Commendation were given to those crew members whose outstanding service and devotion to duty merited this award.

18 August 1951 -

Air operations continued.

19 August 1951 -

The Task Force replenished. The Force deployed to the Northeast to avoid possible contact with typhoon MARGE.

[redacted]

20 August 1951 -

There were no air operations as the Task Force continued to avoid contact with typhoon MARGE.

21 August 1951 -

There were no air operations due to inclement weather as influenced by typhoon MARGE in the operating area.

22 August 1951 -

Air operations which commenced on schedule were terminated at 1100 due to inclement weather over the operating area.

At 0554 the U.S.S. ESSEX, with Commander Carrier Division ONE embarked, rendezvoused with the Task Force.

At 1437 Commander Carrier Division ONE relieved Commander Carrier Division THREE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

At 1445 the BOXER, escorted by the U.S.S. WALLER (DDE-466), U.S.S. CONWAY (DDE-507), U.S.S. CONY (DDE-508), and the U.S.S. STORMES (DD-780), was detached from the Task Force and took departure for Yokosuka, Japan.

23 August 1951 -

Continued enroute Yokosuka, Japan in company with Escort Destroyer Division 21 (less DDE-827 plus DD-780). Scheduled gunnery exercises cancelled account unfavorable flying weather and heavy seas.

At 0733 the U.S.S. WALLER (DDE-466) detached to rendezvous with the U.S.S. TOLEDO.

24 August 1951 -

Continued enroute Yokosuka, Japan. Scheduled gunnery exercises cancelled account unfavorable weather.

At 1239 the remaining three units of Escort Destroyer Division 21 detached to commence scheduled ASW exercises.

At 1530 the BOXER arrived Yokosuka, Japan, for a period of tender availability.

DECLASSIFIED

Summary of Sorties

DECLASSIFIED

DATE	REMARKS First Launch / Last Recovery	OFFENSIVE Day Prop	OFFENSIVE Day Jet	OFFENSIVE Night Prop	DEFENSIVE Day Prop	DEFENSIVE Day Jet	DEFENSIVE Night Prop	MISC Prop	MISC Jet	TOTAL
27 Jul	1100 -- 1439	---	---	---	47	18	---	---	---	65
28 Jul	1040 - 2238	16	2	4	4	8	1	2	---	37
29 Jul	Replenished	---	---	4	---	---	2	---	---	6
30 Jul	0915 - 2332	56	12	3	2	20	2	2	---	97
31 Jul	Replenished	---	---	---	2	---	---	---	---	2
1 Aug	1830 - 2036	---	---	---	2	---	---	---	---	2
2 Aug	1430 - 1739	---	---	---	3	---	---	---	---	3
3 Aug	1330 - 1638	8	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	8
4 Aug	0430 - 1722	53	12	4	6	16	2	3	1	97
5 Aug	1430 - 1909	33	6	---	2	---	---	1	---	42
6 Aug	1425 - 1720	52	15	4	6	17	2	2	---	98
7 Aug	0444 - 1704	60	14	4	6	12	2	---	---	98
8 Aug	Replenished	5	---	---	2	---	---	---	---	7
9 Aug	0913 - 2343	53	17	4	2	20	2	---	---	98
10 Aug	0914 - 2253	53	17	4	2	20	2	1	---	99
11 Aug	0914 - 2250	59	20	4	2	10	2	2	1	100
12 Aug	Replenished	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0
13 Aug	0504 - 1658	56	18	4	7	8	2	---	---	95
14 Aug	0457 - 1714	60	19	2	6	8	2	---	---	97
15 Aug	0458 - 1712	60	18	4	6	8	2	---	---	98
16 Aug	Replenished	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0
17 Aug	0958 - 2006	49	4	---	6	6	---	---	---	65
18 Aug	0826 - 1735	32	11	---	---	4	---	---	---	47
19 Aug	Replenished	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0
20 Aug	Unfav.Weath	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0
21 Aug	Unfav.Weath	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0
22 Aug	0500 - 1100	---	---	4	9	2	---	---	---	15
23 Aug	Enr.Yokosuka	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0
24 Aug	Enr.Yokosuka	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0
		705	185	49	122	177	23	13	2	1276

Total Propeller Sorties.... 912
Total Jet Sorties..... 364
Total Sorties.....1276

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See enclosure (1)

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel.

a. Casualties

(1) There were no combat personnel casualties during this period except those of the Air Group as reported in enclosure (1

[redacted]

07

PART VI Comments

a. Operations Department

(1) CIC

(a) During this period the exercise "FLASH MAGENTA" (simulating "FLASH RED" utilizing returning strike aircraft as bogeys) was continued. The experience gained by plotting, intercepting, acquiring and designating multiple targets closing in a confined (60° - 90°) sector is considered invaluable.

(b) Jet aircraft not using IFF continue to present a very serious problem, particularly at altitudes in excess of 15,000 feet. While generally detected at an optimum range of 40 miles, it is not unusual for a section to call in overhead without having been reported once. The seriousness of the inability to detect jet aircraft at altitude can be more readily appreciqted when one considers that these conditions prevail while searching with an average of 12 - 15 SPS-6B and 2 SX radars.

(c) It is felt that were it possible to install the SPS-6B radar antenna aboard this vessel in a less obstructed location, the results obtained by its use would be greatly increased. The present location provides for a "blind" sector from approsimately 30 degrees forward of the starboard beam to 40 degrees aft.

(d) Since the installation of variable elevation mechanism on the SX search system antenna a more favorable blip-scan ratio, while conducting high altitude intercepts, particularly in the final stages, has been obtained. Elevating the search system beam of course reduces the effectiveness of the SX radar against low flying aircraft.

b. Supply Department

(1) Stores Sections:

(a) Aviation Supply - During the period covered by this report, activity in the Aviation section of the Supply Department has progressed in a more satisfactory manner than in previous "at sea" periods of the current cruise with the exception of the continued high usage of F4U-4 wings. This critical item of long-standing in the Aviation Supply system is again being reflected in the non-availability of aircraft. Upon departing Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, all aircraft aboard

8

the BOXER were in an "up" status; wings had been supplied the two Corsair squadrons aboard for their previous AOG's, and an additional quantity of three (3) port and four (4) starboard were available in stock as spares. At the present time two (2) port wings and the complete stock of four (4) starboard wings have been issued, and still there are two (2) aircraft AOG for lack of starboard wings. Of the number of wings replaced, all but one were due to interior explosion of 50 calibre machine guns. The determination of cause for these explosions is considered beyond the scope of the Supply Department, and has been covered in detail by pertinent RUDM's. To highlight this critical problem of spare wings, during the current cruise since March 2nd, the Aviation Supply Officer has issued 26 F4U-4 wings, of which approximately 17 have been for replacement of wings damaged by blast tube explosions. Currently, to meet the problem of the shortage of Corsair wings aboard, the BOXER has on requisition five (5) replacement wings, which are enroute from Continental United States; however, of this number three (3) are reworked Class 265 material.

c. Air Department.

(1) On 7 August 1951, during a take off run a Corsair caught a Davis barrier nylon strap with the tail wheel. The plane continued to make a normal take-off and flew a CAP flight without incident. A normal carrier landing was made with the nylon strap still streaming from the tail wheel.

(2) On 8 August 1951, during a normal recovery, a hung rocket from a Corsair dropped to the deck without firing and struck the number 1 barrier cables with sufficient force to break the shear pins which are designed to sustain a force of 2250 pounds. The barrier operator had lowered the barrier in such a manner that the rocket passed under the cables and was trapped by its fins as it was sliding up the deck.

(3) On 9 August 1951 the pilot of an F9F-2B reported that he was unable to extend his tailhook. After burning out fuel to a low state, a carrier no-hook landing was ordered. Number 2, 4, and 5 barriers, rigged Davis, were used and a barricade of five (5) tractors was set approximately 70 feet ahead of the number 5 barrier. The plane made a normal approach and touched down at the number 3 cross-deck pendant in a nose high attitude. While still in this attitude the plane engaged the number 2 barrier and bounced back into the air. The bounce changed the attitude from a nose high to a nose low attitude and the main gear oleos extended to their maximum length. At this time the number 4 barrier engaged and sheared the main gear. Continuing up the deck the number 5 barrier was actuated by the 20MM guns in the nose, the barrier catching the nosewheel. The nosewheel held until the plane hit the tractor barricade

[redacted]

where it was finally brought to a stop. Failure of the landing gear is attributed to the fact that the oleos were fully extended and the number 4 barrier cables engaged the main gear very low resulting in a moment of force on the main struts which was beyond the strength capacity of those members. The aircraft will require a major overhaul. Only one of the tractors was damaged.

(4) Throughout the period numerous incidents have occurred in which the tail hooks of jet aircraft have dropped out while the planes were taxiing up the deck after recovery and have torn the Davis barrier from its anchor plate. Number 5 barrier has suffered the predominate number of these accidents. Investigation reveals that the most probable cause for the hooks dropping is that the tail hook of the F9F-2B is held in the the up position by an electrical relay switch and that a reduction in throttle affects the potential to the relay switch causing the hook to drop. In an attempt to avoid future damage to the barriers, jet pilots have been instructed to hold the tail hook switch in the up position until clear of the number 5 barrier.

D. J. SULLIVAN

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO (2)
CinCPacFlt
ComAirPac (5)
ComFairAlameda
CinCPacFlt Evaluation Group (5)
ComNavFE
Com7thFlt
ComCarDiv ONE (2)
ComCarDiv THREE (2)
ComCarDiv FIVE (2)
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)
U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
CVG-2
CVG-5
CVG-11
CVG-19
CVG-101 (5)
CVG-102

[redacted]

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/3-ces
A4-3
Ser 0157
8 Oct 1951

ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 3 September 1951 through 5 October 1951

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 338.4 dtd 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) CVG-101 conf ltr ser 056 dtd 5 October 1951: (Action Report of Carrier Air Group 101, 3 September through 5 October 1951) p.12

1. In compliance with reference (a), the action report for the period 3 September 1951 through 5 October 1951 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition.

(1) In accordance with Task Element 77.02 confidential dispatch 300002Z of August 1951, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Commander Carrier Division THREE and Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE embarked, got underway on the morning of 3 September 1951 enroute from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area and rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan on the morning of 5 September 1951. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9), the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-2 and various heavy support and screening ships.

(2) The OTC was RADM John PERRY, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9). RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, was second in command.

b. Mission.

(1) The Task Force was operating in accordance with CTF-77's Operation Order 22-51.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

[redacted]

(2) The mission of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was as follows:

(a) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the coast of Korea to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy route of movement and supply, and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(b) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(c) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

(d) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(e) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(f) Coordinate air operations with the Fifth Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(g) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

PART II Chronological Order of Events

3 September 1951 -

At 0830 the BOXER departed Yokosuka, Japan, for rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan.

At 1540 the U.S.S. BOXER rendezvoused with the U.S.S. TOLEDO. Air defense and anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the afternoon.

4 September 1951 -

At 0810 the U.S.S. BOXER rendezvoused with the U.S.S. STORME (DD-780), the U.S.S. CONY (DD-507) and the U.S.S. CONWAY (DDE-508).

During the afternoon seventy-two (72) training flights were launched. The forty-six thousandth landing aboard the BOXER was made by a Corsair of VF-791, piloted by LT CHARLES H. HARPER. An AD was slightly damaged when it made a barrier crash after failing to engage initial arresting wires. Damage was repairable aboard.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5 September 1951 -

At 0833 the U.S.S. BOXER rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The Task Force replenished.

6 September 1951 -

At 0545 the first combat flight was launched with air operations continuing throughout the day. Clear skies permitted all aircraft to hit their assigned targets with excellent results. A total of one hundred one (101) sorties were launched.

7 September 1951 -

Air operations continued. One hundred seven (107) combat sorties were launched. LT W. L. LAMB sustained superficial cuts and lacerations around the head and face when hit by gears shattered by AA fire. An AD was slightly damaged when it crashed into barrier after failing to engage initial arresting cables. In recognition of the excellent results of the morning bridge strike during which 10 bridges were destroyed or damaged, RADM John PERRY sent the following message: "YOUR MULTIBRIDGE DESTRUCTIONS EVENT FOUR OUTSTANDING X TO ALL PARTICIPANTS A WELL DONE X

8 September 1951 -

Air operations continued but were somewhat curtailed by adverse weather over the force and target area. One F4U suffered probable strike damage when recovered with only the left gear extended. The pilot was uninjured. A total of eighty-three (83) sorties were launched.

9 September 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

10 September 1951 -

Air operations continued. Commencing at 0910, a total of eighty-eight (88) combat sorties were launched.

11 September 1951 -

Eighty-seven (87) highway and rail interdiction strikes, bridge strikes and photo missions were launched throughout the day.

12 September 1951 -

Offensive and defensive air operations continued. A total of 86 combat sorties were launched.

13 September 1951 -

The Task Force replenished. During the afternoon, twenty-two (22) combat sorties were launched. Results of the strikes were reported excellent.

14 September 1951 -

Air operations continued. Commencing at 0425, a total of one hundred three (103) aircraft were launched against North Korean targets.

15 September 1951 -

Adverse weather over the target area limited air operations to thirty (30) sorties. Early morning heckler flights and weather reconnaissance missions were launched.

16 September 1951 -

With the return of favorable flying weather, a total of 105 bridge and photo strikes and transportation interdiction sorties were launched commencing at 0425.

BOXER helicopter recovered an ESSEX man who was thrown overboard during the fire on the ESSEX which resulted from a deck crash. Efforts to find other personnel were not successful

Four (4) F9F's and two (2) F2H's of the ESSEX were recovered by the BOXER during the fire on the ESSEX flight deck.

17 September 1951 -

Air operations continued. Six (6) ESSEX jets, recovered during the deck fire on the ESSEX, were launched. A total of one hundred six (106) sorties were launched.

18 September 1951 -

After 36 morning sorties were launched, the Task Force replenished.

One (1) F4U piloted by LTJG PODORSON of VF-884 was shot down by AA fire and was presumed to have exploded upon crashing. The pilot was not seen to leave the plane. ResCaps over the area failed to disclose fate of pilot.

LT PODORSON's wingman, LT R. N. PITNER of VF-791, was forced to land at K-18 after his plane was severely damaged by AA fire. The aircraft suffered overhaul damage which necessitated its transfer to a FASRON unit.

[redacted]

One (1) F4U spun into the water shortly after take-off because of partial loss of power. The pilot was recovered by helicopter.

19 September 1951 -

Air operations continued, eighty-two (82) effective sorties being launched.

LTJG P. M. FANT of VA-702 made a water landing ten (10) miles off shore after his AD was damaged by AA fire. LTJG FANT was recovered by the H.M.S. ANZAC.

The forty seven thousandth landing aboard the BOXER was made by LTJG R. SMITH of VA-702.

At 1500, Commander Carrier Division THREE, aboard the U.S.S. BOXER relieved Commander Carrier Division ONE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and the U.S.S. ESSEX with Commander Carrier Division ONE embarked, departed for Yokosuka, Japan.

20 September 1951 -

Air operations continued. A total of eighty-three (83) offensive and defensive sorties were launched.

LCDR E. W. ROSSON, VA-702, was forced to crash-land his plane south of KILCHU, in North Korea, after his plane was damaged by AA fire. Pilots from the BOXER and BON HOMME RICHARD flew rescap for approximately two and one half (2½) hours over LCDR ROSSON until his rescue by helicopter was effected.

21 September 1951 -

Commencing at 0856, at total of 87 sorties were launched. Successful rail and highway interdiction strikes, bridge attacks and photo missions were accomplished.

22 September 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

23 September 1951 -

Air operations continued. Commencing at 0426, early morning hecklers were the first of eighty-six (86) combat sorties launched as strikes against rail and highway facilities and bridges and as photo missions.

[redacted]

[redacted]

24 September 1951 -

Air operations continued with successful highway and rail interdiction strikes, bridge attacks and photo reconnaissance missions. Seventy-nine (79) sorties were launched.

25 September 1951 -

Air operations continued. A total of eighty-three (83) combat sorties were launched in offensive and defensive missions.

26 September 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

27 September 1951 -

Commencing at 0900, a total of seventy (70) offensive and defensive sorties were launched.

28 September 1951 -

Adverse weather over the force and target area restricted air operations to ten (10) launched sorties.

29 September 1951 -

Continued inclement weather over the operating area and the force restricted operations to defensive and weather reconnaissance missions. A total of fourteen (14) sorties were launched.

30 September 1951 -

The Task Force replenished.

Air defense exercises were conducted in the afternoon.

RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, Commander Carrier Division THREE, and Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN transferred his flag to the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31).

1 October 1951 -

With favorable weather, air operations continued. A total of eighty-seven (87) offensive and defensive sorties were launched.

[redacted]

2 October 1951 -

Air operations continued. Commencing with early morning hecklers at 0430, a total of 86 defensive and offensive combat sorties were launched.

3 October 1951 -

A total of eighty-four (84) offensive and defensive missions were flown throughout the day.

One (1) F4U, piloted by LCDR A. Y. STURDIVANT, VF-791, was hit by AA fire while making a rail break attack in the vicinity of Wonsan. LCDR STURDIVANT made a water landing in Wonsan Harbor where he was picked up by a crash boat from a friendly island and delivered uninjured to U.S.S. SHIELDS (DD-596).

At 1708, in accordance with CTF-77 confidential dispatch 022159Z of October 1951, the USS BOXER with the cruiser TOLEDO, and DD's KEYES (787), EVERSOLE (789), and SHELTON (790), left the formation of CTF-77 and departed for the continental United States via Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan.

Upon departure the following message was received from VADM H. M. MARTIN, Commander SEVENTH Fleet: "YOUR PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES, AIR GROUP, OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE CREW, HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING X YOUR DEVOTION TO DUTY AND TIRELESS EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN KOREA HAS EXEMPLIFIED THE SPIRIT AND DETERMINATION OF THE FREE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD IN THE PRESENT CRITICAL STRUGGLE X WELL DONE AND GOOD LUCK AND MAY YOU HAVE A PLEASANT VOYAGE HOMEWARD X"

4 October 1951 -

Anti-aircraft firing was conducted during the morning hours.

5 October 1951 -

At 1325 thirteen (13) F9F-2B aircraft were launched for Kisarazu Air Base and twenty (20) F4U-4, fifteen (15) AD-2 and one (1) AD-4Q were launched for NAS, Atsugi. These aircraft to be retained in the replacement pool.

At 1719, the BOXER arrived Yokosuka, Japan, to commence off-loading in anticipation of onward routing to the U.S.

[redacted]

Summary of Sorties

DATE	REMARKS First Launch	Last Recovery	OFFENSIVE Day Prop	OFFENSIVE Day Jet	OFFENSIVE Night Prop	DEFENSIVE Day Prop	DEFENSIVE Day Jet	DEFENSIVE Night Prop	MISC Prop	MISC Jet	TOTAL
3 Sept	Enroute		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4 Sept	1300	1600	-	-	-	-	-	-	53	19	72
5 Sept	Replenished		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6 Sept	0545	1800	62	20	4	4	6	2	3	-	101
7 Sept	0545	1800	66	20	4	4	6	2	5	-	107
8 Sept	0545	1635	48	20	4	2	6	2	1	-	83
9 Sept	Replenished		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10 Sept	0910	2131	48	20	4	2	10	2	2	-	88
11 Sept	0917	2145	48	20	4	2	10	2	1	-	87
12 Sept	0912	2130	48	20	4	2	10	2	-	-	86
13 Sept	1453	1829	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22
14 Sept	0425	1652	62	20	4	4	10	2	1	-	103
15 Sept	0431	0831	14	2	4	4	2	2	2	-	30
16 Sept	0425	1842	62	20	5	6	8	2	2	-	105
17 Sept	0423	1656	62	20	4	6	8	2	4	6	112
18 Sept	0426	0958	24	4	4	-	2	2	-	-	36
19 Sept	0857	2130	41	20	4	2	10	2	3	-	82
20 Sept	0902	2110	47	18	4	2	8	2	2	-	83
21 Sept	0856	2104	48	18	4	4	9	2	2	-	87
22 Sept	----	----	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23 Sept	0426	1634	48	14	4	6	10	2	2	-	86
24 Sept	0428	1642	46	12	4	6	8	2	1	-	79
25 Sept	0431	1635	47	16	4	4	8	2	2	-	83
26 Sept	----	----	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
27 Sept	0858	1808	48	12		2	8	-	-	-	70
28 Sept	1030	1805	-	-	2	8	-	-	-	-	10
29 Sept	0900	1500	-	-	-	10	-	-	4	-	14
30 Sept	----	----	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1 Oct	0428	1646	48	16	4	6	8	2	3	-	87
2 Oct	0425	1639	48	16	4	6	8	2	2	-	86
3 Oct	0426	1641	48	16	4	6	8	2	-	-	84
			1035	344	83	98	163	40	95	25	1883

Total Propeller Sorties....1351
Total Jet Sorties..... 532
Total Sorties.....1883

[redacted]

8

[redacted]

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Ammunition Expenditures

a. No shipboard ordnance casualties were experienced during the period of this report.

b. See enclosure (1) for ammunition expenditures.

PART IV Battle Damage.

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel.

a. There were no combat personnel casualties during this period except those of the Air Group as reported in enclosure (1).

PART VI Comments.

a. Operations.

(1) Air Operations.

(a) During the tour of this vessel in the Far East it has been the practice to schedule one spare aircraft as a spare for each four "go" planes. By the use of this system very few missions departed under scheduled strength. The policy of combining like type aircraft for scheduling purposes facilitated this. However some difficulties were encountered, particularly when pilots of the two F4U-4 squadrons were scheduled for the same launch, one squadron taking the strike and the other close air support or naval gunfire spot. When insufficient aircraft were available it was necessary to brief pilots of spare aircraft for both missions. Pilots of one squadron were naturally reluctant to be launched as a spare for a flight of the other squadron. It is felt that this situation could be remedied by establishing the policy that when two squadrons operating the same type aircraft are embarked together that they be treated as one tactical organization, maintaining separate squadron identity only in an administrative sense.

(2) Air Intelligence.

(a) Due to necessary physical limitations on space aboard a carrier, the problem of adequate display area is apparent in the space allotted for the air intelligence office.

[redacted]

[redacted]

It has been found that the display surfaces can be effectively doubled by the construction of a sliding panel map display case approximately twenty (20) feet long, reaching from the deck to the overhead. This installation occupies only twenty (20) square feet of deck space with ten panels each ten feet long.

(3) Photo Lab

(a) While the performance of the photographic personnel aboard the BOXER has recently been commended by Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, it is the opinion of this command that a greater volume of equally high quality work could be produced more expeditiously if negative and print dryers of an increased capacity and rate were available. Present dryers are considered adequate for the processing of routine aerial photographs, however, if photos of targets of a mobile nature are taken it is necessary that, to be of value, they be processed and evaluated within two to four hours after taken.

b. Air Department.

(1) Jet blast deflectors were used during this operating period sufficiently to indicate their great value in expedit ing flight deck operations when jet aircraft are being launched The value of the jet blast deflector is twofold. Elimination of the severe flow of hot exhaust down the deck lends to greate safety of personnel and allows greater freedom in the handling of aircraft with wings folded at the deck edge elevator. Modifications applied to the original installations have included, changing the sheaves over which the actuating cables run, increasing clearances to allow for heat expansion and strengthening deflector vane inserts which had been cracking in the welded joints. Occasional failure of the motor resulted from overloading the circuits however, and the increasing of the capacity of the presently installed motor is considered essential to the satisfactory operation of the equipment.

c. Gunnery Department.

(1) The steam winches in operation with the Burtoning Rig for loading ammunition at sea have been found to be much slower in operation than those winches used on the ammunition ships. This condition caused some difficulty when the winch operator on the servicing vessel would allow the whip to run free on loads being discharged or attempt to retrieve the hook faster than the steam winches were able to release. It is recommended that if available a faster operating winch be installed.

(2) It was found that whenever necessary to transfer freight or mail from a tanker the whole operation is greatly

[redacted]

[redacted]

facilitated by the use of the carrier highline equipment. This equipment is always immediately available and the use of the tanker highline requires at least a ten minute delay for disassembly of the carrier highline equipment.

d. Medical Department.

(1) Shortly before departure from the operating area members of the 406th Blood Bank Group, Tokyo, Japan, were invited to come aboard the BOXER to participate in the collection of blood donations for UN Forces in Korea from the members of the BOXER crew and members of embarked Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE. Commencing the day prior to departing the operating area for Yokosuka and continuing for the two days enroute a total of 2,377 pints were donated. The following commendatory dispatch was received from the Chief of Naval Operations: "ARMED FORCES BLOOD DONATION OF 2377 PINTS IN THREE DAYS BY BOXER PERSONNEL WHO WERE CONDUCTING CARRIER AIR OPERATION OFF KOREA SETS RECORD FOR WHICH ALL NAVY IS PROUD X TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN WHO GAVE THEIR BLOOD THAT THEIR COMRADES IN ARMS MIGHT LIVE X WELL DONE"

D. J. Sullivan
D. J. SULLIVAN

Copy to
CNO (2 advance)
CinCPacFlt (5) (2 advance)
ComAirPac (10) (2 advance)
ComFairAlameda
CinCPacFlt Evaluation Group (5)
ComNavFE
Com7thFlt
CTF-77 (2 advance)
ComCarDiv ONE
ComCarDiv THREE
ComCarDiv FIVE
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)
U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
CVG-2
CVG-5
CVG-11
CVG-15
CVG-19
CVG-101 (5)
CVG-102

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/02-ces
A4-3
Ser 0136

19 MAY 1952

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 10 March through 2 May 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dtd 1 July 1951
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1 of 1 September 1951

Encl: (1) CVG-2 conf ltr ser 04 dtd 2 May 1952; Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (10 March 1952 - 2 May 1952)

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 10 March through 2 May 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

(1) In accordance with Commander Fleet Air Hawaii confidential dispatch 290038Z of February, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked, departed Pearl Harbor, T.H., 1 March 1952. Staff, Commander Carrier Division THREE was embarked as passengers. The ship proceeded to Yokosuka, Japan, arriving 10 March 1952, and reported to Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The period 10 March to 29 March 1952 was devoted to operational training and to such repair and replenishment as were practicable while anchored in Truman Bay, Yokosuka. The ship was granted an upkeep period from 10 to 14 March. During the period 14 March to 28 March the BOXER was the ready carrier. Operational training was conducted in the vicinity of Honshu from 16 to 18 March and 24 to 25 March.

(2) In compliance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN confidential dispatch 250532Z of March the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked, got underway on the morning of 29 March 1952 and proceeded from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area and rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan on the morning of 31 March 1952. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), and various heavy support and screening ships.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

[redacted]

(3) The OTC was RADM F. W. McMAHON, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE was second in Command and embarked in the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47).

b. Mission

(1) The Task Force was operating in accordance with CTF-77's Operation Order 22-51.

(2) The mission of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was as follows:

(a) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the coast of Korea, to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy route of movement and supply, and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(b) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(c) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

(d) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(e) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(f) Coordinate air operations with the Fifth Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(g) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

PART II Chronological Order of Events

1 March 1952 -

Enroute Pearl Harbor, T. H., to Yokosuka, Japan.

10 March 1952 -

Moored at buoy in Truman Bay, Yokosuka, performing necessary upkeep and repair.

[redacted]

2

16 March - 18 March 1952 -

Underway operational training.

19 March - 23 March 1952 -

Moored at buoy in Truman Bay as Ready Carrier. Necessary upkeep, rapair and replenishment was effected.

24 March - 26 March 1952 -

Underway operational training period. Flight operations curtailed by adverse weather.

27 March - 28 March 1952 -

Moored at buoy, Truman Bay, Yokosuka, for necessary upkeep, repairs and replenishment.

29 March 1952 -

At 0600 the BOXER departed Yokosuka, Japan, to join Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan.

At 0755 the BOXER rendezvoused with the U.S.S. FECHTELER (DD-870).

30 March 1952 -

Air defense and anti-aircraft firing exercise were conducted during the afternoon. A total of 65 operational training flights were launched.

31 March 1952 -

At 1057, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), in company with U.S.S. FECHTELER (DD-870), rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. At 1400 the first combat sorties were launched. A total of thirty-two (32) sorties were flown to familiarize the pilots with recco routes, terrain features, and CTF-77 operational techniques.

1 April 1952 -

Air operations contined. A total of sixty-one sorties were launched. These missions included Armed Recco, rail interdiction and photo coverage.

2 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

[redacted]

3 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Commencing at 0445 with Early Morning Hecklers a total of eighty-eight (88) sorties were launched. Four trucks, five ox carts, three warehouses, twelve buildings and five fuel dumps were destroyed, thirty-seven rail cuts made and other damage inflicted.

4 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. LT Nicholas REDEYE, VA-65, made the 51,000th landing aboard the BOXER. Two ADs and one F4U-4 sustained minor damage due to flak.

5 April 1952 -

A total of ninety-two (92) sorties were launched. The Morning Hecklers aggressively and successfully attacked a freight train in North Korea. CTF-77 dispatched as follows:

"PAT ON BACK (HIGH UP) TO YOUR MORNING HECKLERS TODAY"
Two F9F-2 sustained minor damage due to flak.

6 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished. Air defense and anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted in the afternoon.

7 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Seventy-nine (79) sorties were launched with effective results. One locomotive and tender were destroyed as well as six trucks and several boats.

8 April 1952 -

No air operations due to fog and adverse weather over the force and target area.

9 April 1952 -

No air operations due to fog and inclement weather over force and target area.

10 April 1952 -

With favorable weather, air operations were resumed. Primary targets for the day were gun positions in the Wonsan area which were successfully attacked.

[redacted]

[redacted]

11 April 1952 -

Air operations were discontinued at approximately 1200 due to overcast and adverse weather. The Task Force retired to the replenishment area.

12 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

13 April 1952 -

Group strikes were launched against Chongjin in extreme Northeast Korea. A total of one hundred thirty-two (132) sorties were launched with excellent results. One F4U, one F9F and one AD sustained minor damage due to flak.

14 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Thirty one (31) rail cuts were made, two rail bridges destroyed and thirty four camouflaged trucks attacked.

15 April 1952 -

A total of sixty-six (66) offensive and defensive combat sorties were launched. Carrying forty eight tons of ordnance, two package targets were seriously damaged and 15 rail cuts made.

16 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

17 April 1952 -

Adverse weather delayed air operations until 1500. A total of fifty-four (54) combat sorties were launched during the late afternoon. These effected twenty rail cuts, destruction of two boxcars and unassessed damage on troops, buildings and flak positions.

18 April 1952 -

Air operations commenced at 1845 and continued until 2150. A total of eighty eight sorties were launched. An AD, piloted by LCDR W. P. NEEL, VA-65, crashed twenty miles northeast of Wonsan, when the port wing sheared off at the fuselage apparently as a result of a hit by anti-aircraft fire. LCDR NEEL was not seen to leave the plane prior to the crash. Three locomotives and fifteen boxcars in the Hankymyong Marshalling

[redacted]

[redacted]

Yards were destroyed.

19 April 1952 -

Air operations were curtailed by adverse weather. A total of fifty four (54) sorties were launched. They accomplished rail cuts, destruction of four trucks, and damage or destruction to numerous buildings. One F4U was slightly damaged by flak.

20 April 1952 -

One hundred (100) sorties were launched throughout the day, terminating with the Night Hecklers who landed at 2145. Three hundred (300) feet of rail track were destroyed, fifty three rail cuts made, a package target effectively damaged and other damage or destruction inflicted.

21 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

22 April 1952 -

A total of ninety-two (92) sorties were launched throughout the day. ENS S. W. HENDERSON, VF-64, piloting an F4U, was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire in the vicinity of Hungnam. ENS HENDERSON made a successful water landing in Hungnam Bay and was picked up by the destroyer, U.S.S. RUPURTUS. The pilot was wounded about the face and neck but his condition is not considered to be serious. It is anticipated that this pilot will return to flight status during the next operational period.

ENS Ralph A. WALLIN of VF-24, piloting an F9F, made the 52,000th landing on the BOXER upon his return from a strike in North Korea.

23 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. RADM JOHN PERRY relieved RADM F. W. McMAHON and assumed command of CTF-77 and Commander Carrier Division FIVE.

24 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Morning Hecklers destroyed four and damaged twenty six boxcars and two trucks.

[redacted]

[redacted]

25 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished. CTE 92.11 sent the following dispatch:

"WISH TO REPORT A WELL DONE BY BOXER REARMING FROM RAINIER X MAINTAINED AVERAGE RATE OF 203.4 TONS PER HOUR WHICH MAY BE NEW RECORD"

CTF-77 dispatched the following:

"CTE-92.11 HAS INFORMED ME THAT AVERAGE RATE TRANSFER BETWEEN RAINIER AND BOXER DURING REARMING TODAY WAS 203.4 TONS PER HOUR X INSOFAR AS RECORDS AVAILABLE TO ME ARE CONCERNED THIS MAY BE A NEW RECORD X WELL DONE"

Anti-aircraft firing was conducted during the afternoon.

26 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Inclement weather delayed morning operations until 1130 hours. A total of seventy-one (71) offensive and defensive sorties were launched during the remainder of the day and evening.

ENS Herman RADTKE, VF-24, in an F9F, piloted the 12,000th plane to be catapulted from the BOXER. This cat-shot was made from the port catapult and established a new fleet record.

27 April 1952 -

Air operations consisted of ninety-five strike, recco, photo and defensive missions. Twenty-two rail cars were destroyed and five hundred feet of rail track northwest of Wonsan was thoroughly cut.

28 April 1952 -

Inclement weather, fog and rain over the Task Force and target area forced cancellation of air operations at approximately 1300. During the afternoon the Task Force replenished aviation gasoline and fuel oil supplies.

29 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. LTJG F. A. RICE, VF-63, bailed out over Wonsan Harbor when a cockpit fire developed in his corsair (F4U). LTJG RICE was picked up by helicopter

[redacted]

from LST 1077 and taken aboard the destroyer U.S.S. CUNNINGHAM. His injuries were confined to burns about the hands and face.

30 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

The U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) joined the Task Force.

At 1321 the BOXER, in company with the U.S.S. BUCK (DD-761), the U.S.S. LOFBERG (DD-759) and U.S.S. J. W. THOMASON (DD-760), departed from the Task Force enroute to Yokosuka via Van Dieman Straits for a period of repair, upkeep and rest and recreation.

The BOXER and the accompanying destroyers comprised TE-77.04, OTC being ComDesDiv-7 aboard the U.S.S. LOFBERG (DD-759).

1 May 1952 -

BOXER enroute to Yokosuka. Anti-aircraft firing and air defense drills were conducted during the afternoon.

2 May 1952 -

At 1556 the BOXER moored at Piedmont Pier, Truman Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan, for a period of in-port availability and rest and recreation.

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

SUMMARY OF SORTIES
APRIL 1952

DATE	REMARKS FIRST LAUNCH	REMARKS LAST RECOV.	OFFENSIVE DAY PROP	OFFENSIVE DAY JET	OFFENSIVE NIGHT PROP	DEFENSIVE DAY PROP	DEFENSIVE DAY JET	DEFENSIVE NIGHT PROP	MISC PROP	MISC JET	TOTAL
29 Mar	ENROUTE		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
30 Mar	1200	1630	—	—	—	—	—	—	49	16	65 (Training enroute)
31 Mar	1400	1800	24	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	32
1 Apr	1000	1730	40	18	—	2	—	—	—	—	60
2 Apr	REPLENISHMENT		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3 Apr	0445	1830	40	16	2	4	16	2	—	—	80
4 Apr	0430	1830	46	12	6	6	16	3	—	—	89
5 Apr	0430	1630	47	22	6	6	8	2	—	—	91
6 Apr	REPLENISHMENT		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7 Apr	0900	1900	37	30	—	12	—	—	—	—	79
8 Apr			—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9 Apr			—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10 Apr	0900	2100	48	24	5	2	8	2	—	—	89
11 Apr	0900	1200	14	8	—	—	2	—	—	—	24
12 Apr	REPLENISHMENT		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
13 Apr	0430	1600	84	28	—	18	—	—	2*	—	132
14 Apr	0430	1630	53	22	5	6	8	2	—	—	96
15 Apr	0730	1630	36	18	—	6	6	—	—	—	66
16 Apr	REPLENISHMENT		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17 Apr	1500	1930	32	6	—	4	12	—	—	—	54
18 Apr	0845	2150	48	16	4	6	12	2	—	—	88
19 Apr	0845	2115	34	—	3	4	12	2	—	—	55
20 Apr	0845	2150	50	16	5	8	16	3	—	—	98
21 Apr	REPLENISHMENT		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
22 Apr	0415	1745	46	16	5	4	17	2	2	—	92
23 Apr	0415	1745	45	16	5	4	16	2	3	—	91
24 Apr	0415	1745	45	12	2	4	20	2	3	—	88
25 Apr	REPLENISHMENT		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
26 Apr	1130	2200	37	14	5	6	12	3	—	—	77
27 Apr	0830	2200	50	16	4	6	16	3	—	—	95
28 Apr	0830	1300	18	6	—	6	4	—	—	—	34
29 Apr	0830	1900	42	20	—	7	16	—	—	—	85
30 Apr	REPLENISHMENT		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1 May	ENR. YOKOSUKA		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2 May	ENR. YOKOSUKA		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	TOTAL —		916	344	57	121	217	30	59	16	1760

OFFENSIVE SORTIES:
Prop.....976
Jet.....344
Total....1320

DEFENSIVE SORTIES
Prop.....151
Jet.....217
Total....368

MISC. SORTIES
Prop.....59
Jet.....16
Total...75

TOTAL SORTIES.....1,763

(*) Indicates WEATHER RECCO.

[redacted]

[redacted]

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See enclosure (1).

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties:

(1) There were no combat personnel casualties suffered by Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action. Air Group casualties are reported in enclosure (1) of this report.

b. Performance:

(1) Personnel performance and morale have been excellent during the period of this report. During this period the average on-board count of personnel was 1965, which number was satisfactory. The total losses of various reasons were eighty-one (81); this was offset by 168 gains.

(2) The critical shortage of petty officers continues in the EM, IC, BT, MM, RM, QM, and SK rates. Every effort is being made to prosecute a vigorous on-board training program to train personnel of lower ratings to qualify for performing duty assignments in higher ratings.

(3) The recent inauguration of an orientation and indoctrination program for non-rated personnel newly received aboard the BOXER has proved to be beneficial to this command as well as to the men concerned. Each department has had an opportunity to explain to the men its functions and responsibilities aboard ship. Upon completion of the program, the personnel officer has interviewed each man and assigned him his permanent billet, taking into consideration his personal preferences and the overall needs of the ship.

c. Recreation:

(1) The following activities were initiated for the welfare and recreation of officers and enlisted men during the period of this report:

[redacted]

[redacted]

(a) Issue of daily news sheet.

(b) Daily newscast over P.A. system.

(c) Radio broadcasts and recordings.

(d) Hobby Shop opened for issue of material one hour on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.

(e) Exercise room for physical conditioning of officers.

(f) Divine Services were held as follows: Catholic Mass daily; Protestant Worship every Sunday; Latter Day Saints services every week; Christian Science services every week; Jewish services every week.

(g) Ship's Library was open at regular hours for all hands.

(h) Sightseeing tours were conducted in Japan.

(i) Glee Club formed by members of Ship's Company and embarked Air Group.

(2) Movies were shown daily. During the operation, eighty-five (85) different programs were shown a total of two hundred eighty-seven (287) times. A late night program was shown in the Training Room for personnel unable to attend regular showings.

(3) The Hobby Shop was well patronized. Craft supplies were leather, plastic, models and paints. The space occupied by the shop is quite small and no work is actually done there. The space is used only for the sale of materials. It is estimated that approximately ten (10) percent of the crew were engaged in hobby craft work.

PART VI Comments

a. Operations

(1) CIC

(a) Although task force operations were new to a large percentage of assigned personnel, the degree of training was such that no difficulties were experienced upon our joining Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. On 16 April, fourteen (14) seamen were rated as Radarmen Third Class. The on-board count of both

[redacted]

[redacted]

rated and non-rated personnel is still below authorized allowances; the personnel problem is serious but not critical.

(b) All functions of CIC were performed with the exception of radar countermeasures. Due to present antennae installation, the only signal which can be intercepted is that of our own SPS-6B radar. Since the SPS-6B is in continuous operation, no RADCM is possible.

(c) The SX radar was the most reliable system for air search and air control. The reliable detection range for jet aircraft was thirty-five miles, and for prop aircraft was seventy miles. The system has been in operation continuously and no major discrepancies occurred. Although the SPS-6B provides a greater detection range for jet aircraft, the blind sector, from 060° relative to 130° relative, greatly reduces its use for air search. A study is now being made upon which to base recommendations for the relocation of the SPS-6B antennae to eliminate this blind sector.

(2) Photo Interpretation

(a) The BOXER Photo Interpretation Officer reported aboard at Pearl Harbor. After visits to other carriers in the forward area while in Yokosuka, the extent of the present P.I. work load was realized and enlisted personnel and temporary space were acquired prior to the ship's joing the Task Force. At present the Flag Intelligence Office space is being utilized for this work but arrangements for a permanent space location must be made before the next period of operation as this space will be returned to the staff. It is recommended a space sufficient to lay out mosaics ten feet long should be permanently assigned to ship's Photo Interpretation in addition to the assigned Air Intelligence spaces. Also, to assure the necessary assistance of enlisted personnel trained in photo interpretation, it is recommended that two qualified men be assigned to the ship on TAD from VC-61 at the time the Photo Interpretation Officer receives his orders.

(3) Air Intelligence

(a) The transfer of intelligence materials and photo files from the ESSEX (carrier relieved) was made with insufficient time to properly check classified materials signed for by the BOXER Intelligence Officer. It is recommended in the event the two carriers will not be in contact for at least four hours these materials be off loaded and placed in a guard mail status ashore prior to the arrival of the relieving carrier.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b) Chart service to the BOXER was very good at all Air Navigation Offices contacted and despite the large number of 1:50,000 charts required for rail strikes no deficiencies occurred. On the 1:250,000 charts GEOREF grid coordinates were received in place of UTM on four chart series and a reorder was necessary. The initial issue of charts was covered with frisket paper which has made replacements due to wear and misuse negligible.

(c) Within the barter kits received for issue to pilots, the small plastic compass in twenty-five kits were broken open and the ball point pens in all kits were defective.

(4) Communications

(a) Message Reduction.

This command has had good results in reducing outgoing traffic by using the letter "R" in the appropriate space on smooth write-up copies, to denote the Releasing Officer of each outgoing dispatch.

It is recommended that the originator of the daily bomb-line message (JOC Korea) use a plaindress heading. This would eliminate about one hundred groups of each such message.

(b) Jet Homing

It is recommended that an automatic homing signal device (Trout) for jets be installed. Present manual keying of the Trout keeps one man continuously on watch. An automatic device would free this man for other duties.

(c) UHF RATT

Considerable difficulty prevailed with UHF communications, voice and RATT, primarily caused by material difficulties.

(d) Personnel Shortage

While not critical during this period, the loss of qualified Radiomen and Quartermasters (Signalmen) during the next three (3) months will reduce the rated personnel to such a point that efficient operations will be extremely difficult. Intensive training of strikers is being conducted with good results, but a striker of two to six months experience will not likely fill the billet of a First or Second Class Petty Officer with any degree of success. By 1 August, unless replacements

[redacted]

are received, this command will have seven rated Radiomen of twenty-one allowed, and two rated Quartermasters (Signalmen) of twelve allowed.

(5) Photographic Laboratory

(a) The BOXER, operating with CTF-77 for the third time, still lacks sufficient space to carry out, efficiently, all phases of operational photography required by present operations. It was necessary to place a new Matte Dryer in dead storage in order to make space available for a copy camera. Also, although the allowance of A1O-A film dryers is three, this ship has only one because of lack of space to install the dryers. Consequently the film and paper drying process has been slowed down considerably.

(b) K-17 Reconnaissance Photography

K-17 Reconnaissance Photography still comprises the main work load in operational photography, and there is need for a more rapid method of annotating the negatives. The present method of annotation requires a minimum of three hours for each roll of film of two hundred exposures. This is the largest factor in the total time required to deliver completely annotated sortie photographs. The first flash print is delivered, unannotated, to the Photo Interpretation Office in approximately one hour and forty five minutes after the photo plane has been recovered. The remaining prints for distribution, as directed, are ready for mailing at the beginning of regular working hours on the following day, unless a particular sortie is required sooner for operational planning.

(c) Allocation of Funds for Photography.

It is recommended that an allowance be established for the purpose of replenishment of photo supplies as needed during any operating period. The present policy is to make application to ComAirPac requesting additional funds to cover cost of major replenishments, and not to make allowances for fluctuation in the type of photography most in demand at that time. By establishing an operating allowance for Photo Laboratories, it would eliminate the draining of the regular operations allotment, which is insufficient to support a Photo Lab operating at peak production during cruises in an operating area.

From 1 January 1951 to 31 March 1952 the Photographic Laboratory expenditures for both NSA and APA supplies

[redacted]

totaled $119,965.89. Total expenditures for NSA alone has been $80,556.61 or an average quarterly expenditure of $16,111.32. The quarterly allotment for the entire Operations Department is 1,500 dollars.

(6) Aerology

(a) Although the prevailing wind direction was southerly, suggesting the establishment of the summer monsoon, the Korean weather during the operating period was largely of a transitional nature between winter and summer conditions. Cyclonic storm centers for the most part passed well to the north, with their associated frontal zones causing little or no adverse weather in the operating area. Waves forming to the south on the polar front usually remained stable, and passed south of the Japanese mainland. Notable exceptions occurred when a low that formed on the Arctic Front to the north coincided with a developing wave on the polar front to the south and casued warm moist Maritime Tropical air to be transported over the relatively colder water of the Sea of Japan. This unique combination caused the operating area to be blanketed with fog and forced suspension of flight operations on the 8th and 9th of April. As previously stated, waves that formed to the south of the area usually remained stable and moved rapidly up the Polar Front south of Japan. However, on 11 and 17 April, lows that had formed on the Polar Front in the East China Sea moved across Korea and made it necessary to suspend operations. In both cases, however, sky conditions and visibility improved rapidly after frontal passages and flight operations were suspended just half a day. One more half day was lost due to weather when an active polar trough associated with a deep low to the north passed through the operating area on 28 April. This too passed rapidly and was followed by clearing skies. In all only three and one half days were lost during the month due to inclement weather.

(b) Maximum wind velocity of thirty-four knots from the west northwest was encountered on 18 April when a rapidly moving high pressure ridge, following a deep low system, caused a tight pressure gradient over the operating area. Flight operations were not adversely affected.

[redacted]

[redacted]

AEROLOGICAL STATISTICS FOR APRIL 1952

TEMPERATURE

Average	50.5 Degrees
Average Maximum	54.8 Degrees
Average Minimum	46.1 Degrees
Absolute Maximum	64 Degrees
Absolute Minimum	41 Degrees

SKY CONDITIONS

	% TOTAL TIME
Overcast	42.1%
Cloudy	9.3%
Partly Cloudy	13.8%
Mostly Clear	34.8%

Hours of Precipitation	32
Average Relative Humidity	77.5%
Hours of Fog	52

SURFACE WINDS

PREVAILING DIRECTION	DAYS
N	1
NN	1
NE	
ENE	1
E	2
ESE	2
SE	3
SSE	2
S	6
SSW	3
SW	1
WSW	2
W	3
WNW	1
NW	1
NNW	1

Average Velocity	12.5 Kts.
Average Maximum Velocity	20.5 Kts.
Average Minimum Velocity	4 Kts.
Absolute Maximum Velocity	34 Kts.
Absolute Minimum Velocity	Calm

CEILINGS	TOTAL TIME	VISIBILITY	% TOTAL TIME
Below 1,000 Ft	4.0%	Under 1 Mile	4.2%
1,000 - 5,000 Ft	18.7%	1 to 3 Miles	3.6%
5,000 - 10,000 Ft	12.2%	3 to 6 Miles	9.2%
Above 10,000 Ft	65.1%	Over 6 Miles	83.0%

FAVORABLE FLYING CONTIONS (Ceiling 1,000 ft., or higher visibility three miles or more) 89.6%

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. Supply Department

(1) Aviation Stores.

(a) The consumption of the following structural assemblies, surfaces and propellers has been excessive for the period of this report:

Elevators (F4U-4)	8	
Elevators (46-5)	4	
Housing Assembly Tail (F4U-4)	3	
Propellers (AD)	10	
Propellers (F4U-4)	6	
Rudders (AD)	9	
Stabilizers (F9F)	4	
Tip Tank (F9F)	10	
Wings (AD)	2	
Wings (F4U-4)	7	(Plus one
Wings (F4U-5)	2	current AOG)
Yoke Assembly Tail Wheel (F4U-4)	4	

(b) A highly successful "at sea" replenishment of aviation stores and general fleet freight was made with the U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS-8) on 16 April. Thirty tons of material were transferred in the same number of minutes alongside. Many items delivered were in the "urgently" required category.

(2) Ship Store.

(a) Sales for the month of April were in the amount of $54,774.74. This sales total was the highest for any one month in the history of the U.S.S. BOXER.

c. Engineering Department

(1) On 8 April 1952, failure of a relay in the control panel for #2 lower, 5,500 lb., Bomb Elevator allowed the elevator car to hit the upper stops. As a result, the hoisting cable drum shaft was badly bent, placing the elevator out of commission until repairs can be made at the Naval Repair Facilities, Yokosuka, Japan.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) Initial cause of the failure was the breaking of a leaf spring in the motor slow-speed contactor, General Electric 50 ampere alternating current contactor, type CR5181-2. Breakage of the spring allowed the solenoid to jam in the open position permitting the elevator car to hit the up-stop at a relatively high speed, bending the hoisting cable drum shaft.

(3) Repairs were made to the contactor by placing a screw in its frame in such a position as to provide a positive stop in case of future spring failure.

d. Gunnery Department

(1) Fueling at Sea by Elokomin Method:

(a) The old method of fueling at sea, also called "Cruiser-Destroyer Method" was used during fueling operations conducted with the U.S.S. KASKASKIA (AO-27) on 2 April 1952, the U.S.S. CACAPON (AO-52) on 6 April 1952, and also with the U.S.S. NAVASOTA (AO-106) on 28 April and 30 April 1952. The operations were at first conducted with some difficulty until a wire pendant was rigged from a pad eye on the ship's side to the hook attached to the hose about twelve (12) feet from the discharge end. A quick release pelican hook in the center of the pendant facilitates rapid action in casting off. With the new pendant tending at a 45° angle the strain is taken by the pendant and eliminates the necessity for extensive hold-down lines formerly used. The Elwood Method is the preferred fueling-at-sea method and is more easily accomplished by ships of this class; however, this ship is prepared to fuel by either method.

(2) Rearming at Sea by Burtoning Method:

(a) Methods used for rearming have improved steadily since returning to the operating area. The two items worthy of mention being the use of the ammunition ship highline as Station #3 in addition #1 and #2 Burtoning whips:

(b) The wire used allows heavier loads to be received at this station plus eliminating highline personnel on the receiving ship. The ammo ship controlling the inhaul by their power winches.

(c) A triple swivel is being used by the ammunition ship on the Burtoning hooks which eliminates to a great extent the twisting of the wire formerly experienced and allows loads to be spotted quickly and accurately. The above improvements

[redacted]

[redacted]

were used by the U.S.S. RAINIER (AE-5) when her spirited crew joined with that of the BOXER to set a new unofficial ammunition loading record of 203.4 tons per hour on 25 April 1952.

(3) Anti-aircraft Firing Exercises:

(a) During the period of this report, six (6) anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted. Emphasis was placed on GEORGE and BAKER type runs. A very noticeable improvement has been observed in the accuracy of fire of the 5"/38 batteries in spite of the drastically reduced training allowance and the majority of personnel being previously inexperienced. Training ammunition expended this period: 5"/38 = 122 rounds; 40 MM = 488 rounds.

e. Air Department

(1) Aircraft Handling

(a) During this period the aircraft on board consisted of one jet squadron (F9Fs), two Corsair squadrons, one AD squadron and the normal number of specially configured aircraft. A split spot consisting of two AD types and two or three F4U types was used for the launching arrangement. It is considered that this arrangement of aircraft utilizes the available flight deck space with the maximum efficiency and allows the versatility required in scheduling. F9F types were spotted tailed outboard on both the port and starboard sides in an arrangement that allows the deck edge elevator to be used for handling duds.

(b) To facilitate rearming of returning aircraft, immediately after each recovery (except the last recovery of the day), the wings of AD type aircraft were spread and the planes loaded forward while holding a ready deck. AD wings were then folded and the planes tightened in the forward spot to prepare for the next recovery.

(c) Normally, the forward spot prior to the jet recovery consisted of either four F4U or three AD type aircraft spotted to starboard allowing for a single row of F9F types to be spotted along the port side during the recovery.

(d) A casualty to the deck edge elevator, resulting from sheared linkage between motors and pumps, hampered the movement of planes between the hangar and the flight deck for a period of seven hours during scheduled flight operations. However, operations were conducted on schedule through use of

[redacted]

the remaining elevators. The repair of the deck edge elevator required the manufacture and installation of new parts.

(e) On 14 April an AD aircraft crashed through the barriers and hit the electrical panels of the LeTourneau crane. As a consequence, the crane was out of commission for seven days since spare parts were not available. As an emergency measure, it was planned that in the event of a flight deck crash, blocks and tackle rigged on the seven ton Hyster fork lift would be used to clear the deck. Although there were no flight deck crashes during the period of time that the crane was out of commission, it is believed that the alternate system of riggin noted above is capable of successful crash handling when time is not the major consideration. To date, the crane has not been completely repaired. However, by using switches available, a temporary control panel has been installed that will cause all moving parts to function except the boom tilting mechanism.

(f) For test purposes, under the authority of ComAirPac letter serial 70/20332 of 23 November 1951, and BuShips letter serial 533-3036 of 9 November 1951, the Naval Shipyard San Francisco, during the ship's last availability, applied a mixture of neoprene and cement to a small jet turn up area forward of the barriers as a deck covering. It was used also to fill holes in the landing area that resulted from flight deck crashes. Indications are that the mixture will prove satisfactory as a deck covering. Also it can be used as a temporary "fix" to fill holes in the landing area if four or more days are allowed for setting and drying. It is recommended that a study be made with the view toward application of the material in lieu of marine glue between the flight deck planking and as a deck covering from number one barrier to the two hundred foot mark near the catapults. It is believed that a covering of this type will not only protect and preserve the planking but will provide the necessary traction for stopping aircraft, particularly jets, as they come out of the gear.

(2) Catapults

(a) On 27 April the 12,000th catapult shot was recorded with a perfect record of "cold shots".

(b) Maintenance problems mainly consisted of liners breaking from fair-lead sheaves and temporary hydraulic pump failures. Four towing and one retracting sheave were replaced. Electrical trouble accounted for pump failure on two occasions and a malfunctioning oil gear pump relief valve was responsible in a third instance.

(c) This ship had catapult change #33 incorporated on the starboard catapult. The pressure available for launching as a result of this change cannot, however, be utilized for launching loaded jets during low wind conditions since launching bridles of sufficient capacity to withstand the greater load imposed, are not as yet available in this area. When low wind conditions exist it becomes necessary to reduce the bomb load in the interest of flight safety.

(d) The basic weight of an AD-4 aircraft, including four 20MM guns, armor plating, full ammo, full gasoline and oil, and pilot is about 16,350 pounds. BuAer Technical Order 15-52 of 4 February 1952 limits the maximum catapult weight of AD-4 aircraft to 20,500 pounds. Therefore, in effect, an AD-4 aircraft cannot be catapulted with a load greater than 4,150 pounds. The standard load in this area is 5,000 pounds of bombs. Since space considerations preclude a safe take-off run for heavily loaded planes during low wind conditions and AD-4 aircraft cannot be catapulted at the weight imposed, a reduction in load becomes mandatory and accordingly, maximum effectiveness is lost.

(3) Jet Blast Deflectors

(a) The new jet blast deflectors installed by the San Francisco, Naval Shipyard, have proved to be highly satisfactory. Since their installation the jet blast deflectors have been used for over 800 jet turn-ups. No cracking of the vanes has been detected.

(4) Arresting Gear

(a) Almost 22,000 engagements have been recorded on the number one arresting gear engine. However, no excessive wear is apparent.

(5) Barricade

(a) There have been no complete engagements of the barricade during this period.

(b) Extra bungee is used to hold the straps to the deck in order to prevent prop tailwheels from catching the nylon engaging straps of the barricade during deck launches.

(6) Maintenance

(a) The Aircraft Shops Division acted in support of the embarked squadrons by rendering assistance to the VF squadrons using F4U-4 aircraft in the installation of Ordnance Change #432 and by turning out complete engine changes.

DECLASSIFIED

(7) Ordnance

(a) A casualty to the number two lower bomb elevator necessitated the use of emergency ammunition handling equipment for a protracted period. One hundred pound and 250 pound bombs were hoisted through A-321-T from A-528-M and A-527-M for a period of three weeks without hampering operations. It is doubtful however, that the large volume of bombs necessary for current usage could have been handled had there been a further casualty in the remaining lower stage elevators.

(b) On several occasions F9F aircraft with Mark 55 bomb racks installed have returned with hung 250 pound GP bombs. In most cases the hung bomb was dropped during landing upon engagement of the tail hook. In one instance a 250 pound bomb with a .01 nose and tail fuse, armed after about 500 feet of travel up the deck. It came to rest only after striking an aircraft near the forward aircraft elevator, but did not explode.

(c) Excellent napalm was obtained in ambient temperatures in the 40° - 50°F range using 50 pounds of powder and three pints of sylenol per 100 gallons of gasoline.

(8) Gasoline

(a) Casualties to the gasoline system include the following: (1) The sylphon bellows and the neoprene diaphragm in the forward starboard automatic valve were ruptured by unknown causes; (2) The eductor discharge 4 inch gate valve in number one gasoline pump room froze in the closed position. However, these casualties were repaired and operations were not hampered.

(b) In accordance with Carrier Division FIVE Standing Order, the last two rows of aircraft on the flight deck must be degassed prior to night recoveries and in preparation for a night ready deck. Since the degassing valve of AD type aircraft usually will not prpperly reseat after it has been opened, valves must be replaced if this type aircraft is degassed. Therefore, F4U type aircraft are spotted in the last two rows for degassing. An RUDM is being submitted by VA-65.

(c) The ship was replenished with aviation gasoline as follows:

2 April - U.S.S. KASKASKIA - received 57,850 gal.
6 April - U.S.S. CACAPON - received 107,600 gal.
12 April - U.S.S. MISPILLION - received 98,000 gal.
16 April - U.S.S. MISPILLION - received 125,000 gal.
21 April - U.S.S. MANATEE - received 124,000 gal.
25 April - U.S.S. NAVASOTA - received 127,000 gal.
28 April - U.S.S. NAVASOTA - received 42,000 gal.
30 April - U.S.S. NAVASOTA - received 69,000 gal.

(9) Personnel

(a) The Air Department commenced the period with many new and inexperienced men and few experienced petty officers. A training program featurning prescribed training exercises and BOXER techniques was vigorously pursued and many of the rough spots have been smoothed out. It is difficult to present a true loading problem to the ordnance crews without the expenditure of much ammunition and many bombs. During the training period, order to avoid wasteful expenditure of heavy bombs, it is recommended that one complete day be devoted to spotting, reamming, respotting and dearming to truly simulate a TF-77 operations schedule. In order to more accurately simulate the condition, the number of planes aboard should approximate the number and type aboard an operating carrier when some planes are airborne. The planes aboard could be armed forward, respotted aft for launch, dearmed, taxied forward to simulate a launch and recovery, armed forward, and the process repeated as schedule training events throughout the operating day.

(b) When the rotation of certain key Air Department Officers is to be effected, orders should be issued in sufficient time that the relieving officer can report on board and observe at least two weeks of actual operations on the line prior to the detachment of the relieved officer. If rotation is to be effected while the ship is in a continental U.S. port, it is considered desirable to send relieving officers to an operating carrier on the line for a period of about two weeks to observe actual operating conditions prior to their reporting for duty. Among the key officers are the Air Officer, the Air Ordnance Officer and the Aircraft Handling Officer.

(c) It is believed that valuable information could be exchanged for the improvement of operating procedures through visits on operating days by key Air Department officers to other carriers on the line.

D. J. SULLIVAN

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

CNO (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT EVAL GROUP
COMNAVFE (1 advance)
COMNAVFE EVAL GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1 advance)
CTF-77 (1 advance)
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERVPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMFAIRJAPAN
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)
U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV-33)
U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
U.S.S. ORISKANY (CV-34)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
U.S.S. SHANGRI-LA (CV-38)
U.S.S. TARAWA (CV-40)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. WASP (CV-18)
U.S.S. INTREPID (CV-11)
U.S.S. TICONDEROGA (CV-14)
U.S.S. CORREIGDOR (CVE-58)
U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL-29)
U.S.S. CABOT (CVL-28)
U.S.S. SAIPAN (CVL-48)
COMCARDIV-1
COMCARDIV-2
COMCARDIV-3
COMCARDIV-4
COMCARDIV-5
COMCARDIV-6
COMCARDIV-14
COMCARDIV-15
COMCARDIV-16
COMCARDIV-17
COMCARDIV-18
[redacted]
CVG-2
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
[redacted]

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/02-cfy
A4-3
Ser 0155

14 JUN 1952

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 12 May through 28 May 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dtd 1 July 1951
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1 of 1 September 1951

Encl: (1) CVG-2 conf ltr ser 06 dtd 1 June 1952 Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (12 May 1952 - 28 May 1952)

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 12 May through 28 May 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

(1) In accordance with COMCARDIVTHREE confidential dispatch 090730Z May 1952, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), Commander Carrier Division THREE embarked, got underway the morning of 12 May 1952 enroute from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area for rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Accompanying the BOXER were the PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), the ST PAUL (CA-73) with COMCRUDIVONE embarked, U.S.S. ROWAN (DD-782) with COMDESRONFIVE embarked, and the U.S.S. ISBELL (DD-869), all of which composed Task Element 77.01.

Rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was effected the morning of 14 May 1952.

(2) The OTC was RADM John PERRY, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE was second in command.

PART II Chronological Order of Events

a. The following is an outline of the BOXER's employment during the period of this Action Report:

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

[redacted]

12 May 1952 -

At 0700 the BOXER departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area.

13 May 1952 -

Enroute to operating area. Air defense and anti-aircraft exercises were conducted and training sorties launched in the afternoon.

14 May 1952 -

At 0855 the BOXER rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The Task Force replenished.

15 May 1952 -

A total of 98 offensive and defensive sorties were launched.

16 May 1952 -

Air operations continued. While flying ResCap over a downed A/F pilot, LTJG J. E. KORDEFLESKI, piloting a F4U, was shot down. The pilot did not leave the plane which exploded on impact.

17 May 1952 -

Air operations continued.

18 May 1952 -

The Task Force replenished. The BOXER established a new fleet ammo replenishment-tonnage per hour record in passing 225.2 tons per hour for a period of seventy-two (72) minutes.

19 - 21 May 1952 -

Heavy fog and light rains over the Task Force and target area precluded air operations.

22 May 1952 -

In clear weather, 64 combat sorties were launched.

23 May 1952 -

Air Operations continued.

[redacted]

24 May 1952 -

The Task Force replenished. Anti-Aircraft firing exercises were held in the afternoon.

25 May 1952 -

Group strength strikes were launched against Chongjin. CTF-77 sent the following dispatch: "Performance BOXER today spendid X My compliments to Captain SULLIVAN and his fine airplanes and operators X"

LTJG W. R. BROWN, VF-24, piloting an F9F Panther Jet, made the 53,000 landing aboard the BOXER.

26 May 1952 -

Combat sorties were launched during the morning. At 1532, in company with NICHOLAS (DD-449), the BOXER departed from Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN for Yokosuka, Japan, via Tsugaru straits.

27 May 1952 -

Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan, GCI exercises were conducted.

28 May 1952 -

At 1638 the BOXER arrived Yokosuka, Japan, and tied up at Piedmont Pier for a period of rest and recreation.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See Enclosure (1).

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties:

(1) There were no combat casualties suffered by Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action. Air Group casualties are reported in enclosure (1) of this report.

b. Performance:

(1) Personnel performance and morale have been excellent

during the period of this report. During this period the average on board count of enlisted personnel was 1988, which number was satisfactory.

(2) Critical shortages continue in EM, IC, BT, MM, RM, and QM rates. A virgouous on-board training program is being conducted to train personnel of lower ratings to qualify for advancement. During the period of this report, two enlisted men were transferred and six received. Upon arrival in port on 28 May, 90 men were transferred to U.S., 74 of whom were rated.

c. Recreation:

(1) The following activities were initiated for the welfare of officers and enlisted men during the period of this report:

(a) Issue of daily ship's newspaper.

(b) Daily newscast over P.A. system.

(c) Radio broadcasts and recordings.

(d) Hobby Shop opened for issue of material one hour on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

(e) Exercise rooms for physical conditioning of officers and enlisted men.

(f) Smoker held on 27 May, featuring boxing matches, a raffle for the benefit of the Navy Relief Society, and entertainment by Ship's Orchestra and Boxer Glee Club.

(g) Ship's Library opened at regular hours for all hands.

(2) Movies were shown daily. During the operation, 90 different programs were shown a total of 115 times. A late night program was shown in the Training Room for personnel unable to attend regular showings.

(3) The Hobby Shop was well patronized. Craft supplies were leather, plastic, models and paints. The space occupied by the shop is quite small and no work is actually done there. The space is used for sale of materials only. It is estimated that approximately ten percent of the crew were engaged in hobby craft work.

d. Religious Activities:

(1) Divine Services were held as follows:

(a) Catholic Mass daily; Catholic Evening Devotions daily; Protestant worship every Sunday; Latter Day Saints services every week; Christian Science services every week; Jewish services every week.

(b) Ship's Chapel established and was open at all times to men of all faiths for spiritual reading and prayer.

e. The below tabulations summarize the heavy turn-over of officer and enlisted personnel for the current quarter (1 April - 30 June 1952).

(1) OFFICER

TRANSFERS RANK	No.	USN OR USNR	PRIMARY DUTY: No.	Desig.	REASON FOR TRANS: No.	Disposition
CDR	Two	USN	Two	Av.	One	PAT
					One	CD
LCDR	One	USN	One	Av.	One	DIS
	Two	USNR	Two	Line	Two	CD
LT	Six	USN	Two	Av.	Seven	CD
	One	USNR	Five	Line		
LTJG	One	USNR	One	Line	One	DIS
ENS	Six	USN	Six	Line	One	PAT
	One	USNR	One	Spec.	Six	CD
CWO	Two	USN	Two	Spec.	One	PAT
					One	CD
WO	One	USN	One	Spec.	One	CD

TOTAL 23

RECEIPTS	No.	Class	PRIMARY DUTY: No.	Desig.	AS REPLACEMENT	
CDR	One	USN	One	Av.	One	YES
LCDR	One	USNR	One	Line	One	YES
LT	Three	USN	One	Av.	Three	YES
	One	USNR	Three	Line	One	NO
LTJG	One	USN	One	Av.	Three	NO
	Two	USNR	Two	Line		
ENS	One	USNR	One	Spec.	One	YES
CWO	None	None	None	None	None	None

[redacted]

[redacted]

RECEIPTS	No.	USN OR USNR	PRIMARY DUTY: No.	Desig.	REASON FOR TRANS: No.	Disposition
WO	Two	USN	Two	Spec.	Two	YES

TOTAL 12

LEGEND: USN - Regular Navy
USNR - Reserve Navy
Av. - Aviation
Line - General Line
Spec. - Specialty
PAT-Patient in hospital
CD-Change of Duty
DIS-Discharge

(2) ENLISTED

RATING GROUP	RECEIPTS	ORDERED TO REPORT	TRANS.
I DECK	2	1	27
Pay Gradws E-2 & E-3	119	100	43
II ORDNANCE	1	4	9
III ELECTRONICS	1	1	5
IV PRECISION EQUIPMENT	0	0	0
V ADMIN. & CLERICAL	4	2	36
VI MISCELLANEOUS	2	5	6
VII ENGINEERING & HULL	11	35	64
Pay Grades E-2 & E-3			
IX AVIATION	18	12	23
Pay Grades E-2 & E-3	6	0	9
X MEDICAL	2	1	0
XI DENTAL	0	0	0
XII STEWARD	4	0	3
Pay Grades E-2 & E-3	2	0	2
TOTAL	211	169	235

PART VI Comments

a. Operations

[redacted]

[redacted]

(1) Aerology

Period 14 to 26 May was characterized by the resumption of the southerly monsoon over the Sea of Japan with nine of the thirteen operating days showing south as the prevailing wind direction. Visibilities during this period were unusually bad with 46% of all observations showing visibilities restricted to below 10 miles, and 15% of all observations restricted to below 1/8 of a mile.

Operations were suspended for three days during the period because of fog which blanketed the entire northern Sea of Japan, and reduced visibilities to as low as 1/16 of a mile. This fog was formed when a low pressure area over south eastern Manchuria, and low over the southern portion of Japan, combined to transport warm moist Maritime Tropical Air over the colder water of the northern operating area. The other predominate restriction to visibility during this period was dust which, although it did not cause suspension of flight operations, definitely reduced their effectiveness.

The average temperature of 57.7 degrees shows a rapid rise over April's average of 50.5 degrees, and the average relative humidity of 80% also showed a slight increase. An average wind velocity of 13.8 knots was observed during the period, however the average minimum wind of 5.9 knots, is considered a better criteria of operating wind conditions.

Pressure and frontal systems affecting the area during this period were relatively weak with a minimum pressure of 1004.5 millibars being recorded.

Frontal Passages were characterized by wind shifts and temperature drops, but showed little associated cloudiness. Frequently they would be marked by only a narrow band of cumulus type clouds based at 1000 to 2000 feet with tops at 2500 to 3500 feet and no precipitation. Favorable flying conditions (Ceilings 1000 feet or higher visibilities 3 miles or more) were observed 82% of the operating period.

b. Gunnery

(1) Gunnery Section:

Ships guns and firecontrol equipment functioned satisfactorily. Firecontrol equipment and particularly Mk 25 Radar required constant maintenance and tube replacement which taxed the ability of Electronics and Firecontrol Technicians.

Anti-aircraft Firing Exercises were conducted on three occasions.

[redacted]

Enroute Operating Area - 13 May - "Baker" and "Uncle" runs.

Replenishment Period - 18 May - "Baker", "George", and "Uncle" runs.

Replenishment Period - 24 May - "Baker" and "Oboe" runs.

Condition Three gun crews were exercised during firing practice to indoctrinate inexperienced personnel.

Ship's Gun Ammunition expended:

5"/38	40MM
VT - 67 Rounds	HEIT - 953 Rounds
MTF - 60 Rounds	
127 Rounds	

The performance of all ammunition expended was considered satisfactory. Approximately 13% of VT fuzed ammunition was activated in the "early burst" category. It is believed that some "early bursts" were the result of proximity of projectiles from other batteries.

Previously the Gunnery Liaison Team had at its disposal in CIC, two remote PPI scopes with attached Target Designation Panels. Each of the stations was manned by a TD Officer who by means of six button switch box, could select any combination of four 49JY circuits and the 5 and 6JW circuits. A high record of early acquisition of air contacts by the maximum number of directors was consistent. Multiple targets could be handled easily as a result of the duplicate TD system.

The Staff F.D.O. uses one of the remote PPI scopes with attached TD panel, the remaining PPI and TD panel is used jointly by the Gunnery Liaison Team and the Flag Gunnery Officer. In addition the Gunnery Liaison Team has a VK scope at its disposal. The latter has no automatic TD system connected to the directors and the TD Officer is reduced to verbal designating. Gun Control has been considerably reduced in effectiveness as a result the lack of target designating equipment.

(2) Deck Section:

Routine transfers were accomplished by Highline and Burtoning Whip, and destroyers fueled periodically as listed below:

Highline Transfers - May 16, 18, 24, 25, 26
Refueling from AO - May 14, 18, 24
Refueling Destroyer - May 21, 22, 23

Special emphasis was placed upon the use of the Forward Highline Station (Frame 72S) with the result that an increased tonnage was received using both Highline and House Fall methods. Additional loading area was gained by securing the pad (in the form of a wire strap) to the armored wiring truck approximately three feet from the overhead. This system enabled loads to be hauled inboard well clear of the side gaining approximately seven feet.

On 18 May 1952 a new fleet ammunition loading record of 225.25 short tons per hour was established while rearming from the U.S.S. RAINIER (AE-5). Details of rearming were forwarded to Com7thFlt in U.S.S. BOXER letter CV21/017-CV S78.

Non-skid paint applied on deck at all loading stations proved successful. It is recommended that a standard non-skid paint be made available for all Carriers participating in loading and fueling at sea operations during which personnel are required to work close to the side of the ship.

D. J. SULLIVAN

AUTHENTICATED:

H. R. Jorgensen

H. R. JORGENSEN
SCLK, USN
Ship's Secretary

DISTRIBUTION LIST: DECLASSIFIED

CNO (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT EVAL GROUP
COMNAVFE (1 advance)
COMNAVFE EVAL GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1 advance)
CTF-77 (1 advance)
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERVPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMFAIRJAPAN
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)
U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV-33)
U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
U.S.S. ORISKANY (CV-34)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
U.S.S. SHANGRI-LA (CV-38)
U.S.S. TARAWA (CV-40)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. WASP (CV-18)
U.S.S. INTREPID (CV-11)
U.S.S. TICONDEROGA (CV-14)
U.S.S. CORREIGDOR (CVE-58)
U.S.S. BATTAN (CVL-29)
U.S.S. CABOT (CVL-28)
U.S.S. SAIPAN (CVL-48)
COMCARDIV-1
COMCARDIV-2
COMCARDIV-3
COMCARDIV-4
COMCARDIV-5
COMCARDIV-6
COMCARDIV-14
COMCARDIV-15
COMCARDIV-16
COMCARDIV-17
COMCARDIV-18
CVG-1
CVG-2
CVG-3
CVG-4
CVG-5
CVG-6
CVG-7
CVG-8
CVG-9
CVG-11
CVG-15
CVG-17
CVG-19
CVG-101
CVG-102
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
VC-3
VC-11
VC-35

DECLASSIFIED
[redacted]

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/02-11w
A4-3
Ser 0290

23 July 1952

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 9 June through 8 July 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dtd 1 July 1951
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1 of 1 September 1951

Encl: (1) CVG-2 conf ltr ser 06 dtd 8 July 1952 Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (9 June 1952 - 8 July 1952)

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 9 June through 8 July 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

(1) In accordance with CTF-77 confidential dispatch 070052Z the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), Commander Carrier Division THREE embarked, got underway the morning of 9 June 1952 enroute from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area for rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Accompanying the BOXER was the U.S.S. HELENA (CA-75) and rendezvous was later made with the U.S.S. FETCHELER (DD-870).

Rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was effected the morning of 11 June 1952.

(2) The OTC was RADM John PERRY, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-47). RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE was second in command.

(3) After rendezvouing with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, the U.S.S. BOXER relieved the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE which departed for Yokosuka, Japan, enroute to the United States. RADM A. SOUCEK, Commander Carrier Division, relieved RADM John PERRY, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and became OTC and CTF-77.

ORIGINAL

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

PART II Chronological Order of Events

a. The following is an outline of the BOXER's employment during the period of this Action Report:

9 June 1952 -

During the morning the BOXER departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area accompanied by the HELENA (CA-75).

10 June 1952 -

Enroute to the operating area. At 0653 BOXER rendezvoused with U.S.S. FETCHELER (DD-870) after passing through Van Diemen Straits. Air defense and anti-aircraft exercises were conducted and training sorties launched in the afternoon.

11 June 1952 -

At 1006 the BOXER rendezvoued with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The Task Force replenished. At 1342 COMCARDIVTHREE relieved COMCARDIVFIVE as CTF-77 and assumed tactical command of the Task Force.

12 June 1952 -

98 combat sorties were launched throughout the day.

13 June 1952 -

Air operations continued. LCDR L. ROBINSON, Commanding Officer VF-64, was forced to ditch his Corsair (F4U) in Wonsan Harbor after his engine failed. He was picked up by friendly small boat after a short interval in his raft and transferred to LST-799 for treatment of bruises. Air defense training was conducted during the afternoon.

14 June 1952 -

Air operations continued. Air defense training was conducted during the afternoon.

15 June 1952 -

No air operations; the Task Force replenished. Air defense exercises were conducted during the afternoon.

16 June 1952 -

Air operations resumed with group strength strikes against Kowon in North Korea. Results of day long attacks were successful.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

17 June 1952 -

Group strength strikes were launched against Hungnam throughout the day. As a result of intense and accurate enemy AA fire two AD's of Squadron VA-65 and 1 F4U of VF-64 were shot down. LT(jg) Richard C. ROWE and ENS Dale FALER are listed as missing after the AD believed to have been piloted by ENS. FALER disentegrated and the pilot observed to bail out. The plane believed to have been piloted by LT(jg) ROWE plunged into the ground and exploded. Neither pilot was observed on the ground.

An F4U piloted by LT(jg) John De Masters lost a wing and crashed after a mid air collision which is believed to have been the result of an AA hit. LT(jg) MASTERS parachute was observed trailed away from his seat pack on a sand bar in a river. LT(jg) DE MASTER is listed as missing; he was not observed on the ground.

18 June 1952 -

Air operations continued.

An F4U, piloted by ENS Arthur ZIMMERLY of VF-63, was ditched off shore south of Sinpo as a result of damage from enemy flak. ENS ZIMMERLY was picked up by Helo from LST 799 and subsequently returned to the BOXER.

19 June 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

20 - 21 June 1952 -

Group strength strikes were launched against selected targets in North Korea with excellent results.

22 June 1952 -

No air operations; the Task Force replenished.

23 June 1952 -

An all-out bombing effort by the carriers BOXER, PRINCETON, PHILIPPINE SEA, and BON HOMME RICHARD of Task Force 77, in conjunction with the U. S. Air Force and Marine Air Wing was planned to begin in the early morning hours. Targets were hydro-electric installations in North Korea.

Weather precluded the launchings until mid-afternoon. Approximately 208 planes from the task force, of which 53 planes were from the BOXER, participated in the raid.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

Once again the Navy, particularly the BOXER planes, distinguished themselves in demonstrating the precision of dive-bombing on selected targets. BOXER AD's made the initial attack on Suiho Dam.

An F4U, piloted by LCDR W. S. MILLER, Commanding VF-63, was hit by enemy AA during the strike against Koysen No. 4 hydro-electric plant. The resulting fire forced LCDR MILLER to make a water landing south of Tanchon. The pilot was recovered by helocopter after spending a short period in his life raft. LCDR MILLER suffered painful though no serious burns about his face and hands.

24 June 1952 -

Group strength strikes against North Korean hydro-electric installations were again launched from four carriers. Results were effective. Included in the dispatches which were received congratulating TF-77 on the success of the action for 23 and 24 June were:

From CNO to CTF-77 and CG First MARAIRWING -

"IT WAS WITH GREAT PRIDE THAT I READ THE DISPATCH AND NEWS REPORT OF THE MAGNIFICENT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF YOUR FORCES IN THE SUPER ATTACKS UPON THE NORTH KOREAN POWER INSTALLATIONS. THE EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE OF DUTY AND HIGH COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS DEMONSTRATED BY YOUR FORCES AND PARTICULARLY THE PILOTS INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL COMBAT ARE DESERVING OF THE HIGHEST PRAISE - AN INSPIRATION TO OUR OWN PEOPLE AND A WARNING TO THE ENEMY OF HIS INEVITABLE DEFEAT. WELL DONE."

From COMNAVFE to COM7THFLT -

"IT IS WITH THE UTMOST PLEASURE THAT I PASS ALONG THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CINCFE FOR PUBLICATION TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF ALL UNITS PARTICIPATING." "I WISH TO EXPRESS MY DEEP ADMIRATION AND TO EXTEND MY FULLEST CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU FOR THE HIGH DEGREE OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE EXHIBITED BY ALL ELEMENTS OF YOUR COMMAND IN THE ATTACK ON THE NORTH KOREAN HYDRO ELECTRIC SYSTEM. THE RESULT OF THE ATTACK CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THE REDUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S WAR MAKING POTENTIAL. THE COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN NAVAL, MARINE AND AIR FORCES LEFT NOTHING TO BE DESIRED AND PERMITTED OF A MOST SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN SPITE OF LAST MINUTE CHANGES IN THE TIME OF ATTACK.

"IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE TO COMMEND SUCH A COMPETENT AND DEPENDABLE NAVAL COMPONENT WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO THE SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ALL ASSIGNED MISSIONS IN WHICH THE ATTACK ON THE HYDRO ELECTRIC SYSTEM WAS CONDUCTED BE CONVEYED TO ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMAND.

" I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT MY HEART SWELLS WITH PRIDE IN YOUR SUPERB PERFORMANCE. TO ALL HANDS A MUCH DESERVED WELL DONE." VADM R. P. BRISCOE.

From GEN BARKUS FIFTH AIR FORCE to CTF-77:

"MY HATS OFF TO THE NAVY FOR A TERRIFIC JOB. WE MUST GET TOGETHER AGAIN SOME TIME." SIGNED GEN BARKUS.

25 June 1952 -

Air operations continued.

26 June 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

27 June 1952 -

Air operations continued.

28 June 1952 -

Inclement weather, haze and overcast over the force and target areas prevented operations after the early morning launches.

29 June 1952 -

No air operations due to weather.

30 June 1952 -

No air operations due to weather.

1 July 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

2 - 3 July 1952 -

Air operations were conducted throughout the day.

4 July 1952 -

Air operations continued.

An F9F photo escort plane, piloted by LT. J. W. GRIFFITH, CAG-2 Staff, crashed and exploded upon impact south of Wonsan on Green 3, probably after being hit by enemy AA. The pilot was not seen to leave the plane and is listed as missing.

5 July 1952 -

Air operations continued.

6 July 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

At 1403 the BOXER in company with U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA and escorting units of the Task Force all comprising TE 77.02 departed for Yokosuka, Japan, for a period of rest and recreation and yard availability. OTC was COMCARDIV 3, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN.

A new Navy re-provisioning record was probably established during replenishment. The following dispatches were received:

From CTF-77 to BOXER -

"FAST TIME PROVISIONING OF BOXER BY ALSTEDE SETTING A RECORD FOR THE FORCE OF 134.4 TONS PER HOUR IS ALSO BELIEVED TO SET AN ALL TIME NAVY RECORD X THIS SHOWS GREAT COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO SHIPS WHICH IS A REFLECTION OF CAREFUL PLANNING, GOOD ORGANIZATION AND EXCELLENT SEAMANSHIP X WELL DONE X"

7 July 1952 -

Enroute to Yokosuka. Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the afternoon.

8 July 1952 -

Arrived Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See Enclosure (1).

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties

(1) There were no combat casualties suffered by Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action. Air Group casualties are reported in enclosure (1) of this report.

b. Performance

(1) Personnel performance and morale have been excellent during the period of this report. During this period the average on board count of enlisted personnel is 1970, which number was satisfactory.

(2) Critical shortages continued in EM, IC, RM, TE, MM, BT and SK rates. The on-board training program has been continued to train personnel of lower ratings to qualify for advancement. During the period of this report, 5 enlisted men were transferred and 107 received.

c. Recreation

(1) The following activities were initiated for the welfare of officers and enlisted men:

(a) Issue of daily ship's newspaper.
(b) Daily newscast over PA system.
(c) Radio broadcasts and recordings.
(d) Hobby Shop opened for issue of material one hour on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.
(e) Exercise rooms for physical conditioning of officers and enlisted men.
(f) A Happy Hour, featuring boxing and other entertainment, was held on 7 July.
(g) Ship's Library opened at regular hours for all hands.
(h) The Commissary Officer maintains a record of birthday and anniversary dates of all enlisted personnel. Names of men having birthdays appear in the Plan of the Day with a request to report to Commissary Office to receive birthday cake and ice cream.

[redacted] ORIGINAL

(i) A Divisional softball league was started during in-port period for recreation and entertainment.
(j) Small quotas allotted for Rest and Recuperation have been supplemented by three-day leave periods for officers and enlisted men.

(2) Movies were shown daily. During the operation, 111 different programs were shown a total of 156 times. A late night program was shown in the training Room for personnel unable to attend regular showings.

(3) The Hobby Shop was well patronized. Craft supplies were leather, plastic, models, and paints. The space occupied by the shop is quite small and no work is actually done there. The space is used for sale of material only. It is estimated that approximately 10 percent of the crew were engaged in hobby craft work.

d. Religious Activities

(1) Divine Services were held as follows:

(a) Catholic Mass daily; Catholic Evening Devotions daily; Protestant Worship every Sunday; Latter Day Saints services every week; Jewish Services every week.
(b) The Ship's Chapel was open at all times to men of all faiths for spiritual reading and prayer.

e. Venereal Disease. An analysis of the incidence of venereal disease was made as of 30 June. A total of 392 VD cases have been treated. Despite a comprehensive and continuing shipboard program of VD education, approximately 14% of the crew have been infected with venereal disease in Japan. Increased emphasis is being placed on all phases of VD education to insure that all men receive thorough and continuing instruction on venereal disease prevention.

f. Personnel Turn-over. The following personnel data, although not confined to the period covered by this action report, are included herewith for information. The heavy turn-over of both officer and enlisted personnel during period August 1951 through June 1952 is apparent from the following analyses.

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

(1) OFFICERS

(a) Average months on board by rank for period August 1951 through June 1952:

RANK	AV. MONTHS ON BD	RANK	AV MONTHS ON BD
CDR	9.2	ENS	7.0
LCDR	9.8	CWO	11.6
LT	10.3	WO	7.5
LTJG	11.1		

The over-all months-on-board average for all officers during this 11 month period was 9.5 months.

(b) Turn-over of Officer Personnel - August 1951 through May 1952:

RANK	CDR	LCDR	LT	LTJG	ENS	CWO	WO
GAINS	6	6	12	21	22	4	4
LOSSES	7	6	17	16	15	8	1
% TURN-OVER	81.2%	54.6%	85.3%	74%	68.6%	50%	

The over-all turn-over percentage for all ranks during this 11 month period was 69%.

(2) ENLISTED. The following tabulation shows turn-over of enlisted personnel by rating groups during period August 1951 through May 1952:

RATING GROUP	BUPERS ALLOW.	GAINS	LOSSES	TOTAL TURN-OVER	TURN-OVER PERCENTAGE
I - DECK	102	29	88	58.5	57.3%
II - ORD	78	25	65	45	57.7%
III - ELECT	21	12	17	14.5	69%
V - ADMIN & CLER	147	77	164	120.5	81.1%
VI - MISC	30	18	21	19.5	65%
NON-RATED SA - SN	470	490	175	332.5	70.8%
VII - ENG - HULL	301	93	239	166	55.1%
NON-RATED FA - FN	203	92	68	80	39.4%
IX - AVIATION	162	98	207	152.5	94.1%
NON-RATED AA - AN	349	230	100	165	47.3%
X - MED	25	18	18	18	72%
XI - DEN	4	4	4	4	100%
XII - STEWARD	42	21	25	23	54.8%
	1934	1207	1191	1199	

Over-all percentage of turn-over for all rating groups for this period was 62%.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

PART VI Comments

a. Operations

(1) CIC

During the period of this report, all functions of CIC were satisfactorily performed.

This report covers a short period during which four (4) carriers were operating with the force. The communications problems inherent in this particular antennae installation were considerably increased. When using the AN/ARC's with the greater numbers of aircraft airborne, the feed-over from one channel to another made efficient CAP control and strike control impossible. Since any TDQ transmission blocked the Screen Common, the TDQ/RCK's could not be used.

A representative from the Operations Evaluation Group of CNO was aboard during this period to make a detailed study of the performance of the SX and SPS-6B radars. Although complete results of the study are not yet available, the curve of detection range plotted against altitude of target reveals that both radars are operating at peak performance.

(2) Photo Interpretation

Aerial photography and the photo interpretation section covered the following assignments during the period of this report:

1. Anti-aircraft defense studies
2. Target searches and target studies
3. Damage Assessment
4. Special photography as called for by units other than TF-77.

The departure from strict interdiction operations brought about a more diversified program of photo intelligence. More photo coverage was flown and interpreted for target studies and damage assessment than the routine flak studies.

Flak studies continued to be of major importance and the volume of photography for this purpose accounted for a high percentage of the time spent on interpretation and production of pictorial aids to the air groups. The enemys AA defenses in the Navy area were more or less stable in their location. No major shifting of AA defenses was detected during this period.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

The problem of space, personnel, and equipment has been partially solved. The Photo Interpretation section is at present functioning in the Ozalid room aboard ship. The section is operating with the following personnel:

1. One Photo Interpretation Officer (TAD to the ship)
2. One AF3 (Full time - from the Air Group)
3. One AF3 (Part time - from the Air Group)
4. One Musician Seaman (Part time - from the ship)

Photo Interpretation provides at minimum 75% of the basic intelligence information of the enemies installations and operations in this theater. An infinite amount of intelligence information is available in Aerial Photography and it is possible to find and evaluate only a part of this information with the inadequacies that exist in space allotment and provision for trained personnel.

The Air Groups effectiveness against an assigned target is very strongly dependent upon information as to target location and description. Too much time and effort cannot be spent in providing a description of the target, its environment as to terrain and AA defenses to the striking groups.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A Photo Interpreter, trained officer or enlisted man be assigned to the Air Group with the full-time duty of providing photo intelligence target information to the Air Group.

2. A Photo Interpretation team be assigned to each CV type carrier. The team to consist of one Photo Interpretation officer and two Photo Interpretation trained men with backgrounds in photography and drafting if possible. This is the minimum complement needed to provide for effective operational evaluation and dissemenation of photo intelligence aboard a CV type ship.

3. A space for the Photo Interpretation section be designated aboard all CV type ships. The space to be properly outfitted with chart tables, sliding chart panels and proper lighting for Photo Interpretation work.

(3) Aerology

Period 9 June to 8 July was characterized by the normal southerly monsoon with south winds being observed 51.8% of the time. Average wind velocities remained low with an average wind of 11.3 knots and an average minimum wind of 4.5 knots.

Visibilities increased materially over the preceding month with 91% of all observations showing 6 miles or more. The prevalance of fog showed a sharp decrease being observed only 2.9% of the time as compared to 7.9% for the preceding month.

The average temperature of 67.6 degrees shows a rapid rise over May's average of 57.7 degrees and the average relative humidity of 85% showed a 5% increase.

Pressure and frontal systems continued to be relatively weak but the increase of associated cloudiness and precipitation was apparent.

Operations were suspended because of weather when a low forming on the Polar Front in the East China Sea, moved northward into the Yellow Sea, and across central Korea into the Sea of Japan. The circulation associated with the low, and a well developed extension of the semi-permanent Pacific High, brought warm, moist, Maritime Tropical Air over the operating and target areas causing considerable low cloudiness and fog. This low established the Polar Front through the area and caused operating conditions to be adverse for about five days.

Favorable flying conditions (ceilings 1000 feet or higher and visibilities 3 miles or more) were observed 93% of the operating period.

b. Gunnery

(1) Two material casualties occured on the ship's ordnance equipment.

a. The first, involving the Power Drive of #51 Twin 5"/38 Cal. Mount placed the mount out of commission for approximately one week. Symptoms of the casualty were indicated by the motor running hot and before the motor could be stopped the controller relays burned out. The entire Train Unit was disassembled. All equipment was inspected and checked. The cause was found to be worn bearings and gears in the Planetary Reduction Gear assembly. Worn gears and bearings were replaced from spares, equipment reassembled by ship's force Gunners Mates and is now operating satisfactorily.

Analysis of the casualty indicated that the worn bearings and reduction gears caused an abnormal overload on the drive motors with resulting overload on the controller circuits.

Inspection of the remaining drives by Navy Yard has been requested for next Navy Yard overhaul. This request is considered justified due to shortage of trained personnel.

b. The second material casualty involved the Dead Time Prediction Multiplier in the #1, Mk 1A Computer. This casualty was made evident by A Test tolerances being excessive. Inspection was made and the casualty was found to be sheared teeth on an aluminum alloy helical gear meshing with a steel helical gear in the Dead Time input gear train to the Dead Time Prediction Multiplier. Replacement gears are not carried on allowance lists. Two matching miter gears were manufactured by ship's force machine shop and installed since manufacture of helical gears is beyond the capacity of ship's force. After necessary adjustments were made tests were run that were satisfactory. The computer was out of commission approximately 48 hours.

Analysis of the casualty indicates that a poor mesh of the original gears was made when installed by Factory or Activity that performed Mk 1A change.

(2) Anti-Aircraft Firing Exercises were conducted on 6 occasions:

Replenishment Period	- 11 June	- Small Drone
Replenishment Period	- 19 June	- "Baker" & "Oboe" runs
Replenishment Period	- 11 July	- Small Drones
Operating Period	- 4 July	- "Baker" & "George" runs
Operating Period	- 5 July	- "Baker" & "George" runs
Enroute from Operating area to Yokosuka, Japan	- 7 July	- "Baker" & "George" runs

Ship's Gun Ammunition Expended.

5"/38		40MM	
AAC (MTF)	- 137 rds.	HEIT	- 658 rds.
AAC (VT)	- 13 rds.	BL&T	- 164 rds.

A total of eight towed sleeves and one Small Drone were shot down by ship's guns during this period.

Deck Seamanship:

(1) On 9 June 1952, the ship made preparations to get underway from Buoy #10, Yokosuka Harbor, Japan. The sea was choppy and a moderate wind prevailed, both making for dangerous working conditions on the buoy. In attempting to unmoor, the pin (free end) froze in the mooring shackle, due to having been burred while trying to remove it. In order to hasten departure, it was necessary to break the port chain at the 15 fathom detachable link. This left the first shot of the port chain, as well as the detachable link, mooring shackle, and pin connected to Buoy #10. In order to prevent a similar recurrence, two spare mooring shackle pins have been milled down on the free end, forming an approximate 30° bevel about the periphery.

(2) The ship replenished on the following days, with no casualties or losses:

June 11, 15, 19, 22, 26
July 1, 6

On 6 July 1952, during replenishment operations, a new all Navy record of 134.4 tons per hour was reached when loading provisions from the U.S.S. ALSTEDE (AF-48).

(3) The ship refueled destroyers on the following days:

June 14, 17, 18, 24, 30
July 2, 3, 4

On 3 July 1952, while refueling the destroyer U.S.S. PIERCE, heavy swells were encountered making for difficult station keeping. On one such swell, the destroyer veered away, causing the number 1 hose to become extremely taught, all three saddles having been slacked, resulting in the #1 section taking on a bad kink and receiving damage to threads, the #5 section parted about 18" outboard of the #3 saddle. The easing out line on the number 2 hose (on the destroyer) parted and no damage was taken by the hose.

(4) High line transfers were made from destroyers on the following days with no casualties or losses:

June 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 30
July 1, 2, 3, 4, 6

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

Approximately 150 personnel transfers were made. The twin chair rig was used on the majority of the personnel transfers. It is noted that when using the forward high line with the twin chair rig, the destroyers being out about 80 feet, 2 personnel could be transferred every 50 seconds. On the 26th of June 1952, 49 personnel plus their baggage, were transferred in 30 minutes.

D J Sullivan
D. J. SULLIVAN

ORIGINAL

[redacted]

15

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

CNO (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT EVAL GROUP
COMNAVFE (1 advance)
COMNAVFE EVAL GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1 advance)
CTF-77 (1 advance)
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERVPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMFAIRJAPAN
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)
U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV-33)
U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
U.S.S. ORISKANY (CV-34)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
U.S.S. SHANGRI-LA (CV-38)
U.S.S. TARAWA (CV-40)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. WASP (CV-18)
U.S.S. CORREIGDOR (CVE-58)
U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL-29)
U.S.S. CABOT (CVL-28)
U.S.S. SAIPAN (CVL-48)
COMCARDIV-1
COMCARDIV-2
COMCARDIV-3
COMCARDIV-4
COMCARDIV-5
COMCARDIV-6
COMCARDIV-14
COMCARDIV-15
COMCARDIV-16
COMCARDIV-17
COMCARDIV-18
CVG-1
CVG-2
CVG-3
CVG-4
CVG-5
CVG-6
CVG-7
CVG-8
CVG-9
CVG-11
CVG-15
CVG-17
CVG-19
CVG-101
CVG-102
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
VC-3
VC-11
VC-35

[redacted]

16

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/02-llw
A4-3
Ser
0306
30 JUL 1952

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN

Subj: Report of Operations for period 21 - 24 July 1952

Encl: (1) Flight Track Charts
(2) Report of squadron flights during joint operations, 22 July 1952

1. Report of operations for the period 21 July through 24 July 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

(1) In accordance with COM7THFLT Confidential dispatch 290548Z July 1952, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), and the U.S.S. FRANK KNOX (DDR-742) forming TE 77.31, got underway the morning of 21 July 1952 enroute from Yokosuka, Japan, to the area off the East coast of Japan. Training consisted of anti-aircraft firing exercises, simulated air attacks on selected inland air bases and ASW exercises with CTG 96.7.

(2) The OTC was CAPTAIN D. J. SULLIVAN, USN, Commanding Officer U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21).

PART II Chronological Order of Events

a. The following is an outline of the activities of TE 77.31 during the period of this Action Report.

21 July 1952 -

At 0732 the BOXER departed Yokosuka, Japan.

At 1145 commenced launching aircraft to conduct tactical training exercises. Two ADW's and 4 ADN's conducted ASW exercise Y-81-AW with CTG 96.7.

At 1200 AA firing at towed sleeves was conducted. At 1400 40 props were launched for squadron tactics. Conducted carrier qualification landings for 5 pilots of VU-5A with F6F-5 aircraft.

22 July 1952 -

At 0845 commenced launching aircraft (Four jets and nineteen props), for simulated attacks on Tachikawa and Yokota airfields. These invading BOXER aircraft successfully accomplished their mission. No interception occurred until after retirement.

At 1045 18 props and 4 jets were launched to make a simulated strike on Atsugi air base Yokohama AA defenses. Defending Air Force planes intercepted this flight.

At 1430 12 AD's and 6 jets were launched for Johnson and Tachikawa Air Bases. This flight was intercepted by Air Force planes before arrival over target area.

23 July 1952 -

Weather postponed the launching of the scheduled simulated attacks.

At 1030 the first simulated strike on Misawa was launched and reached target area at 1200. The flight was successfully completed and was not intercepted until after retirement from the Misawa area.

The scheduled simulated attack on Chitose Air Force Base was cancelled because of weather.

At 1230 the last strike of this tactical training period was launched. At 1400 the flight arrived over the Misawa target area. The mission was accomplished and no interception occured until after retirement.

24 July 1952 -

The BOXER returned to the Port of Yokosuka, Japan. At 1030 the ship moored alongside Berth 12 (Piedmont Pier).

PART III Performance Ordnance Material and Equipment

No comment.

PART IV Battle Damage

During the performance of the air tactical training exercises, no damage was sustained by the ship or aircraft.

[redacted]

PART V Personnel

No casualties were suffered by the ships company or air group during the performance of the training exercises.

PART VI Comments

a. Communications

(1) For this period, communications with the air defense forces were established on one voice and one CW net. On 21 July from 1000I until 1900I no contact with Air Force stations was made although continual efforts were made to establish communications. This caused concern as to whether correct frequencies were being used. At about 1900I communication was established with Air Force stations on night frequencies, both voice and CW. Contact was maintained, both day and night, for the remainder of the period of this report. Frequencies used by this command on 21 July while attempting contact were correct.

(2) Excessive teletype signal interference was encountered most of the period on 10900 KC, the day alternate CW frequency. CW interference was considerable on the day voice frequency. Reception was excellent on both voice and CW night frequencies.

(3) In general, communications, once established, were good.

b. Aerology

(1) During the period 21 to 24 July the operating area was under the influence of a westward extension of the semi-permanent Pacific High. This high pressure area caused predominantly clear skies, which with an average wind velocities of 10.2 knots made operating conditions mostly ideal. Adverse weather conditions were encountered during the morning of 23 July when fog and marginal fog conditions caused cancellation of early morning flight operations.

c. Gunnery

(1) Concerning the AA exercises on 21 July the performance and accuracy of the gun crews was considered excellent.

SHIPS GUN AMMUNITION EXPENDED:

	5"/38		40MM
MTF -	33 Rounds	HEIT -	16 Rounds

D. J. SULLIVAN

[redacted]

[redacted]

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ComNavFE
ComFairJap
ComSEVENTHFleet
ComCarDiv 3
ADOC, Nagoya

AUTHENTICATED:

H. R. JORGENSEN,
Ship's Secretary.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

The flight of 6 AD's and 12 F4U's in company with 2 RCM planes was launched at a point 45 miles east of Onahama and proceeded to the coast at a point midway between the radar stations at Hitachi and Haranomachi at 4,000 feet.

Five miles inland the flight turned north for a feint of about 10 miles at which time the strike group dropped to an altitude of about 1,000 feet above the terrain and proceeded to points B, C, D, and E as shown on the accompanying track chart.

The RCM planes continued in a northerly direction for 10 minutes dropping "window" in small amounts. After remaining in this general area for an additional 10 minutes the RCM planes returned to the ship.

At point E, about 20 miles from the target the strike group commenced a maximum power climb from low altitude to 10,500 feet from which point a dive bombing run was executed at 1000I on the gun positions and installations at Tachikawa and Yakoto.

The jet flight was launched about 30 minutes after the strike group and arrived in a position over the strike group at Point E. They proceeded in this cover position to the target and initiated their runs on flak positions just prior to the prop attack.

All planes retired at maximum speed and low altitude to Tokyo Bay where they rendezvoused under cover of the jets, and returned to the ship.

The only opposing VF sighted during the attack was an F9r sighted by the jets near Point E. This plane apparantly did not sight the F9F's as no interception was attempted.

[redacted]

Departed USS BOXER at 1030, 23 July 1952 proceeded to Hei Saki (point Able) with eight F4U's, six AD's, and one ADN on course 345 and altitude 500'. Arriving there at 1121.

One 360 degree circle was made at Miyako climbing to 2500' and proceeded on course 270 degrees maintaining approximately 800' above the terrain through the valley to point Baker. Ten miles before arriving at point Baker, one ADN was dispatched on heading 000, 7000' altitude and instructed to drop window. The remainder of the flight proceeded through point Charlie to point Dog maintaining 500' above terrain, indicated airspeed 170 knots. At point Dog a high power climb was initiated on heading 030 degrees and 7000' altitude obtained at push over point just southwest of Misawa Field.

A coordinated attack on the field was made from southwest to northeast at 1158 with recovery overthe ocean and rendezvous effected at 2000', three miles from the beach. (Rendezvous included the one ADN aircraft). Departure was taken from this point at 1203 south along the coastline at 2500'.

At 1213 in the vicinity of Kuji-wan Bay two F84 aircraft were sighted high at three o'clock. Several attacks were made and the two aircraft departed at 1217. After the first two attacks no further attempts were made to counter. The flight then proceeded to Hei Saki (point Able) climbed to 4000' and proceeded on course 160 degrees to the carrier.

[redacted]

EVENT 3

The flight rendezvoused at normal altitudes of 1,500 feet for AD's and 2,000 feet for F4U's and then dropped down to 500 feet upon departing BOXER for Point Able. This altitude was maintained until the coast and Point Able was reached at which time a climbing left turn of 360 degrees was made to 1,500 feet. This altitude was maintained from Point Able to Point Dog. Between Point Able and Point Baker the jet escort rendezvoused with the flight. Between Point Baker and Point Charlie the flight was intercepted by approximately 12 Air Force jet fighters of the P80, P84, and P94 types. The interceptors made continuous runs on the flight the rest of the way into the targets and to the east side of Tokyo Bay during the retirement.

The flight split at Point Dog and started a high-power climb, the AD's heading for Atsugi and the F4U's for assigned gun battery positions around Yokohama. The jet escort accompanied the AD's and went in on Atsugi airfield first in flak suppression runs. AD's followed in clean glide-bombing runs from 7,500 feet. The F4U's did glide-bombing from approximately 5,000 feet.

Both flights then returned to Point Able at high speed, at an altitude of 4,000 feet, where a rendezvous was effected for return to the BOXER. Two jets, two AD's, and two F4U's landed at Atsugi due to engine troubles and low fuel in one jet. Return to the BOXER was made at an altitude of 4,000 feet.

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

The flight made a normal rendezvous and began to climb slowly enroute to point Able. Base altitude at the time of reaching the coast was 7500'. A port turn was made and the flight proceeded south along the coast for about 10 miles to consume time. This was followed by a 180 degree reversal of course and a return to point Able, letting down to 3500'. Between point Able and point Baker the flight descended to 3000' to remain below the overcast. At point Baker, a NR "window-dropping" plane was detached accompanied by one AD wingman. The two planes began a climb above the flight to point Charlie, where they then turned to the starboard and headed for the coast. Upon reaching the coast they turned north, still climbing and intermittently dropping window. About half-way between the point where they first reached the coast and the Masawa Air Base they were intercepted by two Air Force jets at 12,000'. In the meantime the strike group continued inland toward point Dog under cloud cover and at tree-top altitude. A turn to starboard was made short of point Dog and the coastline was finally reached at the post-attack rendezvous point. Here a 360 degree climbing turn was made to 4500' and then the F4U's headed directly for Misawa Air Base followed by the AD's. About five miles from the target a P80 type jet was passed going in the opposite direction at the same altitude, but no interception was attempted. Jet fighters were caught by the F4U's on their take-off run and would have been shot down. The AD's simulated an attack on parked jets at the air base.

Retirement was due east to the coast line, followed by a 270 degree turn and retirement to the rendezvous point. At this time intercepting jets made runs on the formation.

Departure for the Boxer was made on a mag. heading of 165 at an altitude of 4000'. This was gradually increased to 5000' and held until 20 miles from the Boxer when a gradual let-down was started.

[redacted]

EVENT 6

TARGET - - Johnson A.F.B.
ATTACK TIME - - 1600
LAUNCH TIME - - 1430

After rendezvous the high altitude element of the strike group, consisting of 12 F4U's, flew to the coastline at an altitude of 500' arriving at a position 75 miles north of Mito, from this position a 1000 ft/min. climb was initiated causing the group to arrive just north of Mito at 19,000 ft., 1530 hours. The fighter escort, which consisted of 6 F9F's, had arrived at this point earlier to await the arrival of the strike group. Soon after arriving over Mito at 20000 ft. they were attacked by 4 F94's. The F9F's were still under attack when the strike group arrived. The F9F's immediately rendezvoused on the strike group, in order to escort them to the target, and were followed by the intercepting F94's. As the strike group proceeded on a course of 290 degrees T the intercepting planes tracked them, but made no effort to attack. Immediately after the strike group turned to a true heading of 175 degrees, the F94's commenced attacking and continued to do so until the glide bombing run on the target was completed. It is felt that, had the strike leader instructed the escorting F9F's to stay clear, the strike group would have escaped interception.

The low element of the group consisted of 6 AD's and 6 F4U's. After launch they proceeded to the coastline at an altitude of 500'. A run in to the target was initiated from the vicinity of Otaha staying at an altitude of 500'. Shortly before reaching the Tone-Gawa River a high speed climb to 10,000 ft. was commenced and during the climb the strike group was sighted by a flight of F51's. Shortly after being sighted attacks were made by the F51's and a number of effective runs were made prior to reaching a "push over" point for the ensuing dive bombing runs.

Prior to the time that either element reached the coastline, two AD countermeasure aircraft commenced a run on a heading of 080 T degrees south of Tokyo bay. Dispensing window, as these aircraft turned to a heading of north for the final run on the target they were intercepted by 2 F9f's and theoretically put out of action. However, they continued the attack and saturated the target area with window.

All elements of the attacking group were effectively intercepted prior to attack on the targets.

[redacted]

EVENT 7

DECLASSIFIED

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/02-11w
A4-3
Ser [0329]
[29 A U G 52]

[redacted]

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

29 Aug 1952

Subj: Action Report for the period 1 August through 11 August 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG-2 conf ltr ser 010 dtd 14 August 1952 Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (1-11 August 1952) p.14

1. In compliance with OpNav Instruction 3480.4 the Action Report for the period 1 August through 11 August 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

(1) In accordance with Task Element 77.01 confidential dispatch 010600I of August, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Commander Carrier Division THREE embarked, got underway on the morning of 1 August 1952, from Yokosuka, Japan to the operating area and rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan on the morning of 4 August 1952. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9), and heavy support and screen ships.

(2) RADM A. SOUCEK, USN Commander Carrier Division THREE relieved RADM REGAN, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, as OTC Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), upon rendezvousing with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN relieved the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) which departed TF-77 for Yokosuka, Japan.

MISSION

The mission of this force, as set forth by CTF-77 OpOrder No. 22-51, second revision, was to conduct a systematic program of air and surface interdiction, provide close air support of ground operations, assist in maintaining control of vital sea areas and operate as a fast carrier task force when directed, in order to support UN Forces in Korea and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

[redacted]

1

PART II CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

a. The following is an outline of the BOXER's employment during the period of this Action Report.

1 August 1952

At 0640, the BOXER, escorted by the following ships, the U.S.S. SPROSTON (DDE-577), U.S.S. STEMBEL (DD-644), and the U.S.S. JENKINS (DDE-447), forming Task Element 77.01, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area.

Emergency drills and exercises were conducted throughout the day in preparation for the forthcoming change of command.

2 August 1952

Enroute to the operating area. During the morning, the destroyers U.S.S. TAYLOR (DDE-468) and the U.S.S. WALKER (DDE-517) joined TE 77.01. Departmental inspections were conducted as ordered, incident to the forthcoming change of command.

3 August 1952

Group Air Tactics were conducted.

4 August 1952

At 0640, the BOXER and TE 77.01 rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan.

At 0930 CAPTAIN MARSHALL B. GURNEY, USN, relieved CAPTAIN DENNIS J. SULLIVAN, USN, as Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21).

At 1324 ComCarDiv THREE relieved ComCarDiv ONE as CTF 77 and assumed tactical command of the Task Force.

The Task Force replenished.

5 August 1952

Commencing at 0300, a total of one hundred and six (106) combat sorties were launched.

6 August 1952

Eight combat sorties had been launched when the outbreak of a fire on the hangar deck precluded further flight operations. In a matter of seconds the hangar deck was a raging inferno as a result of the explosion of a gasoline tank on one airplane which quickly set off others. On deck there were some 58 aircraft loaded with ammunition including high explosive, frag-

[redacted]

mentation, incendiaries, and 50 Cal. and 20MM ammunition. The ship was making 30 knots at the time. The decision to be made was "whether to launch what was on deck with a view of saving planes or to take a chance and taxi the planes forward, jettison the bombs and ammunition, reduce the ships speed and fight the fire." The latter, of course, was chosen. The first report received indicated it to be a port side fire, when actually the entire hangar deck was enveloped in flames even though the fire had broken out on the port side. Word was soon received that entry to the hangar deck could not be made on the starboard side and that the flames would have to be attacked from the Number TWO elevator, which was in the raised position. Accordingly, a turn was made to starboard so that the fire fighting crews could enter the hangar deck from up wind. There followed a grim fight on the part of the crew to control the fire in spite of 50 Cal. and 20MM shells exploding all over the hangar deck. The holocaust was added to by the exploding of a 500 pound bomb. Sixty-three men who were trapped, jumped over the side and were quickly rescued by attending helicopters, destroyers and cruisers. The smoke was terrific and enveloped the entire ship. Engineering spaces were almost untenable and two fire rooms had to be abandoned. It was at this point that considerable doubt existed as to our ability to control the fire. A further loss of power would have left us dead in the water and without water pressure for the fire hoses. Fortunately, tenacious men in the engineering department hung on to the point of exhaustion until the flames could be controlled. The Damage Control Central Station functioned throughout and was in constant communication with its four repair parties. Every man not trapped below unhesitatingly entered the inferno without regard to personal danger from exploding ammunition and bombs. The performance of the crew was magnificent and was a most impressive demonstration of a selflessness, determination and teamwork. While the fire fighting was progressing on the hangar deck, crews on the flight deck removed bombs and ammunition from aircraft and ready service lockers thus eliminating a terrible threat against the life of the ship. After having accomplished this herculean task in a matter of minutes, these men turned to the business of fighting the fire. It was from 4 to 5 hours later before we could be sure that there was no additional threat of fire, enter spaces, and determine who of those who had been trapped were safe and who of those who had been driven over the side had been rescued by accompanying ships. The final total was determined to be: 8 dead, 1 missing, 1 critically injured, 1 seriously burned and some 70 overcome by smoke. Of the 63 who had gone over the side, all were rescued and returned to the ship.

Work was immediately started to make repairs and restore the ship to operating condition after assessing the damage. By dint of whole hearted effort on the part of the crew, the ship

[redacted]

was restored to a condition in which it could operate its aircraft. 18 aircraft were damaged or destroyed. It was decided by higher authority that the ship was to return to the Repair Base at Yokosuka to get rid of its duds, receive replacement aircraft, make minimum repairs and return to the operating line.

The following dispatch was received by the BOXER from CTF 77:

MY ADMIRATION FOR YOU AND YOUR FINE CREW IS GREATER THAN EVER X PERFORMANCE WAS MAGNIFICENT X

7 August 1952

In compliance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 061326Z plans were made to depart TF 77 on 8 July for repairs in Yokosuka, Japan.

No flight operations were conducted.

8 August 1952

At 1500I the BOXER, escorted by the U.S.S. PERKINS (DDR-877), departed TF 77 enroute to Yokosuka in accordance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 080252Z.

9 August 1952

Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan for repairs.

10 August 1952

In the early morning the escort ship U.S.S. PERKINS (DDR-877) departed the BOXER to return to TF 77 in compliance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 080252Z.

During the afternoon, Memorial Services were held to honor those who lost their lives during this tour of duty.

11 August 1952

Arrived Yokosuka, Japan in early morning for repairs.

5

SUMMARY OF SORTIES

DATE	REMARKS	OFFENSIVE			DEFENSIVE			MISC		TOTAL
	First Launch / Last Recovery	DAY		NIGHT	DAY		NIGHT			
		Prop	Jet	Prop	Prop	Jet	Prop	Prop	Jet	
1 Aug										
2 Aug										
3 Aug	1500 1700							52	14	66
4 Aug	Replenished									
5 Aug	0330 1530	58	17	6	4	26	2	5		118
6 Aug	0300 0530			6	2		2			10
7 Aug										
8 Aug										
9 Aug										
10 Aug										
11 Aug										

Total Propeller Sorties . . 133

Total Jet Sorties 57

Total Sorties 190

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

PART III Performance of Ordnance Equipment and Material

a. Anti-Aircraft Firing Exercises were conducted on 2 occasions; performance was considered satisfactory. The dates of firing are listed below:

(1) Enroute from Yokosuka, Japan to operating area, 2 August 1952 - BAKER, GEORGE and HOW runs.

(2) Replenishment Period 4 August 1952 - BAKER and OBOE runs.

b. See enclosure (1) for ammunition expended during anti-aircraft exercises and ammunition jettisoned during the fire.

PART IV Battle Damage

a. No battle damage was sustained by the ship as a result of enemy action. Included under Damage Control and Gunnery is a resume of damage resulting from the fire of 6 August 1952.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties

(1) There were no combat casualties suffered by Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action. Air Group casualties are reported in enclosure (1) of this report.

(2) One officer and eight enlisted men were killed as a result of fire on the BOXER on 6 August. Two of the enlisted personnel were attached to the Marine Detachment of the BOXER:

KOSUKI, Arthur M. PFC, USMC
ROULSTON, Terrell R. CPL, USMC

The remainder of the casualties were Carrier Air Group TWO personnel and are reported in enclosure (1).

b. Performance

(1) Personnel performance and morale have been excellent during the period of this report. The average on-board count of enlisted personnel was 2012, which was satisfactory.

(2) Critical shortages continue in EM, IC, MM, BT, RM, SK, and QM rates. The on-board training program has been continued to train personnel of lower ratings to qualify for advancement. During the period of this report, there were no transfers or receipts of enlisted personnel.

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

c. (1) The following activities were initiated for the welfare of officers and enlisted men:

(a) Issue of daily ship's newspaper.
(b) Daily newscast over P.A. System.
(c) Radio broadcasts and recordings.
(d) Hobby Shop opened for issue of material one hour on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.
(e) Exercise rooms for physical conditioning of officers and enlisted men.
(f) Ship's library opened at regular hours for all hands.
(g) The Commissary Officer maintains a record of birthday anniversary dates for all enlisted personnel. Men are notified in the Plan of The Day to report to Commissary Office on their birthdays to receive free cake and ice cream.

(2) Movies are shown daily. During the operation, 16 different programs were shown a total of 48 times. A late night movie was shown in the Training Room for personnel unable to attend regular showings.

(3) The Hobby Shop was well patronized. Craft supplies were leather plastic, models, and paints. The space occupied by the shop is quite small and no work is actually done there. The space is used for sale of material only.

d. Religious Activities

(1) Divine Services were held as follows:

(a) Catholic Mass daily; Catholic Evening Devotions daily; Protestant Worship every Sunday; Latter Day Saints Services, Christian Science Services, and Jewish Services were held.

(b) The Ship's Chapel was open at all times to men of all faiths for spiritual reading and prayer.

(c) Memorial services were held on 10 August for seven pilots killed or missing in action since the BOXER left the continental United States last February and for the one officer and eight men who died as a result of a fire in the ship on 6 August 1952.

[redacted]

7

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

PART VI Comments

a. Operations

(1) Aerology

The operating area was under the domination of a weak high pressure area during the period 4 through 8 August. Scattered to broken cumulus of fair weather with a minimum of middle and high clouds prevailed throughout period. Winds continued light with an average velocity of 9 knots and an average minimum velocity of 2.5 knots. Operations were not suspended because of weather during the period.

At 0645I on 6 August, the Aerological Office was secured because of heavy smoke from the fire on the hangar deck. Normal operations were resumed at 1115II. Investigation revealed that the only damage sustained in Aerology, outside of superficial damage from smoke and water, was to the anemometer repeater unit which short-circuited when the intense heat in the office caused condensation inside the unit.

(2) Photo Interpretation

The Photo Interpretation Section made a damage assessment and flak study of hydro-electric plants in the Navy area. A flak study touraid was also made up from the photo coverage of the one day operating period.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Optical glass should be used in the camera ports in the F9F type photo aircraft in place of the plexiglass covers now in use. It is estimated through comparison that a 20 per cent increase in quality of photography could be anticipated. A large amount of distortion is obtained especially in low altitude oblique type photography from the plexiglas camera ports.

b. Damage Control

The fire of 6 August caused considerable damage to both the ships structure and to equipment. A list of damaged or destroyed gunnery equipment will be found in Gunnery Comments. Other damages are listed below:

STRUCTURAL DAMAGES:

Forward bulkhead beam of Arresting Gear 9 and 10 space buckled, Fr. 125. Athwartships beam (heavy) at frame 121 buckled.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Bulkhead and athwartships beam at frame 117 (port and starboard) buckled.

Thirteen longitudinal girders buckled (port side) fr. 117 to 121.

Twel.. longitudinal girders buckled (port side) fr. 121 to 125.

Four longitudinal girders buckled (starboard) fr. 117 to 121.

Bulkheads at frs. 111 and 113 at athwartships passage buckled.

Seven longitudinal girders were buckled in Port Squadron Office.

Longitudinal girders, starboard, Fr. 113 to 117, four buckled.

Longitudinal girders, starboard, Fr. 107 to 111, one buckled.

Longitudinal girders in Flight Crew's Locker, fr. 107 to 111, four were buckled.

Longitudinal girders in Electronics Storeroom #3, Fr. 107 to 111, three buckled.

Fore and aft bulkhead, fr. 113 to 135 was buckled.

Approximately 50 feet of light metal athwartship catwalk and railings, fr. 111 to 113 were damaged or missing.

02 D.ck girders - some were buckled and decking was warped with blast and shrapnel holes, fibrous glass insulation burned off under decking and under Flight Deck in open areas.

DAMAGES TO SEVERAL SPACES:

Port Squadron Office - doors, escape scuttles, all furniture, fibrous glass insulation and ventilation ducts were damaged or destroyed.

Electronics storeroom #3 all bins damaged or destroyed.

Flight Crew's Locker, B-021lL, fr. 107 to 111, port - door, insulation, bunks and lockers were destroyed.

Aviation Radio Shop #1, starboard, fr. 100 to 105 had large blast hole in deck.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Small shrapnel hit forward edge, port, of athwartships catwalk, 02 deck, fr. 77.

Rubber light excluder forming port side of expansion joint at frame 112 was entirely burned.

Four port roller curtains were badly damaged or demolished, fr. 108 - 111, fr. 114 - 117, fr. 122 - 125 and fr. 139 - 142.

Hangar Deck Sprinkler and Water Curtain piping was broken and damaged in numerous places from frame 100 to frame 125.

Heavy supporting frameworks between roller curtains port side of Hangar at frames 107, 111, were buckled, one at frame 117 was slightly buckled.

Expansion joint plating across Flight Deck at frame 112 was buckled, numerous holes were chopped in deck to allow fighting fire below.

Hard patches in Hangar Deck over Marine Compartment, fr. 107 to 111, have several leaky rivets.

Several joiner and fumetight doors need to be replaced or straightened and overhauled.

Joiner doors to Ready Room #4, Squadron Office, and fumetight door 2-100-2 are warped, and also the following:

Port joiner door to Gunnery Office.
Joiner door to Starboard Squadron Office.
FTD 02-131-1
Joiner door and escape scuttle to Port Squadron Office.
Joiner door to Flight Crew's Locker.
Armored doors to Electronics Storeroom #3.

Bulkhead, 2nd deck, fr. 111 in Compartment B-201-1L was buckled, heavy fore and aft longitudinal and one supporting stanchion, fr. 107 were bent and buckled.

Hydraulic board - Void flooding control to void tanks #3 port - all gauges were demolished to B-18V, B-20V, B-26V, B-28V, B-34V, B-36V, B-42V and B-44V. Air duct for Ready Room #1 had a hole at frame 107.

c. Gunnery

(1) On 6 August, as a direct result of the fire and the salt water to combat it, the following equipment was destroyed, partially destroyed or placed in an inoperative state:

[redacted]

[redacted]

(a) The Mk 56 G.F.C.S. No. 49 was almost completely destroyed. Only the director unit remained undamaged.

(b) Mk 63 G.F.C.S. No. 47 was damaged by fire and salt water. Inspection made by representatives of Repair Facilities, Yokosuka indicated that most of the units of the Mk 63 G.F.C.S. could be salvaged.

(c) Two 40MM Quad Mounts, No's. 45 and 47 were inoperative in Local and Automatic. Power feeder cables supplying these Mounts were destroyed by fire.

(d) All remaining Ship's Ordnance Equipment was in a completely operative state.

(2) Most of Ship's Gun Ammunition stowed in ready service lockers topside magazines was jettisoned during the emergency created by fire. A list of the jettisoned ammunition is found in enclosure (1).

Deck Seamanship:

(1) In ten (10) days, a total of 13 destroyers engaged in underway transfers with the BOXER, involving one hundred fifty two (152) personnel transfers by highline, six (6) tons of cargo by highline, eight (8) destroyers being refueled. In such a relatively short time in the forward area, this is a very high rate of underway transfers. No casualties, losses, or injuries were sustained.

(2) The fire of 6 August caused considerable loss of deck gear. Due to excessive heat and smoke, numerous men were forced to abandon the ship. All possible aid was given the men in the water in the way of life preservers. Approximately four hundred fifty (450) life jackets were lost during this operation. Three (3) floater nets were lost, eight having been placed in the water, five being retrieved. Two life rafts were lost over the side, and two were severly burned. The number two Motor Whale Boat was badly scorched on the inboard hull, and the hoisting gear was lowered into the water by manila falls on 11 August for repairs. The port after accomodation ladder was badly damaged by fire and concussion. The bales and hand rails were salvaged, but were badly heated. The upper platform for the ladder was severly damaged, while the lower platform was undamaged. All the gangway falls and tackle were completely destroyed. Numerous cargo nets, cargo mats, and cane fenders were destroyed. One 1 5/8" s[illegible]ng lay mooring line was destroyed. Approximately 700 fathom of manila line was destroyed, along with 30 miscellaneous blocks. The majority of this gear belonged to the Second Division and was stowed on the uptakes on the starboard side of the hangar deck amidships. The incinerator was flooded, but not damaged by fire; some of the fire bricks will need replacing.

[redacted]

//

(3) Due to quick action of the crew on the flight deck and fantail, many deaths were averted by life saving gear having been placed in the water.

ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRING

5"/38
AAC (MTF) 43 Rounds

40MM
HEIT - 258 Rounds

JETTISONED ORDNANCE

TYPE	NUMBER	WEIGHT IN POUNDS
5"/38 Cal		
Powder (SPDN)	560 Rounds	20,160
Projectiles ACC	280 Rounds	15,120
Projectiles VT	280 Rounds	15,120
Projectiles Illum	4 Rounds	216
Short Charges	12 Rounds	336
40MM		
Heit (SD)	8460 Rounds	60,950
BI&T	240 Rounds	1,725
Nose Fuses AN-MK155	264 Rounds	1,694
AN-MK155	264 Rounds	1,694
AN-MK149	2335 Rounds	7,275
(UT) MK172	300 Rounds	2,475
Flares, Para, AN-M26	30 Rounds	2,925
Signals, Night, Drift AN-MK5	30 Rounds	280
Lights, Float, A/C AN-MK6	8 Rounds	160
Black Cannon Powder	300 Rounds	300
3 PDR, Saluting Charges	54 Rounds	300
Total (Weight in pounds).....		129,036

d. Medical

While enroute to the operating area, the entire ship's company and air group personnel were inoculated against Cholera and Typhus. The Medical Department carried out routine duties until 6 August 1952 at about 0630 when the fire occurred on the hangar deck resulting in the death of one Medical Officer and eight enlisted men. There were injuries to twenty three personnel requiring admission to the sick list, of which one was critical and one serious. Approximately fifty men were slightly injured or overcome by smoke. They were given first aid treatment and returned to duty. During the fire it was necessary to set up aid stations in the wardroom and on the flight deck, these stations were operated until the fire was brought under

[redacted]

control at which time all patients requiring admission were removed to sick bay. Most of the patients admitted were suffering from smoke exhaustion and were discharged from the sick list within 1-3 days after admission. On arrival in Yokosuka 11 August 1952 the remains of eight personnel were transferred to USNH for preparation and shipment to ConUS. Two injured men were transferred to USNH for treatment and disposition.

M. B. GURNEY

AUTHENTICATED:

H. R. JENSEN
SCLK, USN
Ship's Secretary

[redacted]

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/02-llw
A4-3
Ser 003

8 September 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 23 August through 6 September 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG-2 Conf ltr ser 017 dtd 6 September 1952 Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (23 August - 6 September 1952)

1. In compliance with OpNav Instruction 3480.4 the Action Report for the period 23 August through 6 September is hereby submitted.

PART I - Composition of own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

(1) In accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 200312Z of August 1952, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), got underway on the afternoon of 23 August 1952, from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area. The BOXER was joined by the U.S.S. FECHTELER (DD-870) on the afternoon of 24 August. The rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan was accomplished on the afternoon of 25 August.

Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9), the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) and heavy support and screen ships.

(2) RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE was OTC Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

b. Mission

(1) The mission of this force, as set forth in CTF 77 Op Order No. 22-51, second revision, was to conduct a systematic program of air and surface interdiction, provide close air support of ground operation, assist in maintaining control of vital sea areas and operate as a fast carrier task force, when directed in order to support UN Forces in Korea and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

[redacted]

PART II - Chronological Order of Events

a. The following is an outline of the BOXER's employment during the period of this Action Report.

23 August 1952 -

At 1301 the BOXER departed the port of Yokosuka, Japan, enroute to the operating area.

24 August 1952 -

At 1315 the BOXER was joined by the U.S.S. FECHTELER (DD-870) at the west end of Van Diemen Strait and proceeded for rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

During the afternoon emergency drills and exercises were conducted.

The following dispatch was received from Commander Task Force NINETY:

"CONGRATULATION TO THE BOXER AND THE FINE SPIRIT WHICH HAS ENABLED SHIP TO RETURN TO ACTION IN RAPID TIME X READ ADM MCINERNEY"

25 August 1952 -

During early morning, six HRS-2 Marine helicopters were launched from the BOXER for flyaway to Korea, where they were to be utilized by the United Nations ground forces.

Commencing at 0800 a total of 67 training sorties were launched. At 1545 the U.S.S. BOXER rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan.

26 August 1952 -

RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, and CTF 77 transferred to the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) from the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9). The Task Force replenished.

27 August 1952 -

The BOXER conducted air operations off Northern Korea. Strikes were launched against targets in the vicinity of Chosen and against inland storage and supply areas south of Wonsan.

Commencing at 0930 a total of 86 combat sorties were launched.

2

28 August 1952 -

Adverse weather delayed scheduled flight operations until 1230. A total of 43 combat sorties were launched on targets in the Songjin-Kilchu area.

One F6F-5K drone was launched under control of 2 AD control planes.

29 August 1952 -

Commencing at 0800, a total of 112 combat sorties were launched against targets in the areas near Pyongyang and Wonsan.

One F6F-5K drone was launched.

30 August 1952 -

The Task Force replenished. No flight operations were conducted this date.

31 August 1952 -

Four sorties were launched but adverse weather precluded further air operations.

1 September 1952 -

Commencing at 0430 a total of 130 sorties were launched with industrial and mining installations at Chongjin and Musan as their targets.

Two F6F-5K drones were launched.

2 September 1952 -

A total of 97 combat sorties were launched for interdiction strikes and strikes on rear area supply and troop concentrations in North Korea.

Two F6F-5K drones were launched.

3 September 1952 -

No air operations were conducted because of adverse weather.

4 September 1952 -

At 1557 the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Commander Carrier Division THREE embarked, the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9), and the U.S.S. PARK (DD-884), formed Task Element 77.02 and departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN for Yokosuka, Japan.

CAPTAIN P. D. STROOP, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) was designated OTC, Task Element 77.02.

A total of forty-six aircraft were launched for flyaway to Atsugi.

5 September 1952 -

Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan. At 0302 in accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 040351Z, the U.S.S. PARK (DD-884) departed Task Element 77.02 to return to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

6 September 1952 -

At 0715 three aircraft were launched for flyaway to Atsugi. At 1112 the BOXER arrived Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III - Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

No material casualties were experienced during this period.

PART IV - Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V - Personnel

a. Casualties:

(1) There were no combat casualties suffered by Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action.

b. Performance:

(1) Personnel performance and morale have been excellent during the period of this report. During this period the average on board count of enlisted personnel was 2,035, which number was satisfactory.

(2) Critical shortages continue in EM, IC, MM, BT, RM, TE and QM rates. The on board training program has been continued to train personnel of lower ratings to qualify for advancement. During the period of this report there were no transfers or receipts of enlisted personnel.

c. Recreation:

(1) The following activities were initiated for the welfare of officers and enlisted men.

DAILY SUMMARY OF SORTIES

DATE	REMARKS		OFFENSIVE			DEFENSIVE			MISCELLANEOUS		TOTAL
	First Launch	Last Recovery	DAY		NIGHT	DAY		NIGHT			
			Props	Jets	Props	Props	Jets	Props	Props	Jets	
23 Aug	NONE		ENROUTE TO OPERATING AREA								
24 Aug	NONE		ENROUTE TO OPERATING AREA								
25 Aug	0800								51	17	68
26 Aug	REPLENISHED		NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS - REPLENISHMENT								
27 Aug	0930	1830	56	18	0	2	10	0	0	0	86
28 Aug	1230	1700	27	9	0	2	4	0	1	0	43
29 Aug	0400	1800	78	30	0	0	4	0	0	0	112
30 Aug	REPLENISHED		NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS - REPLENISHMENT								
31 Aug			2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	4
1 Sept	0430	1700	88	32	0	6	4	0	0	0	130
2 Sept	0930	1830	72	12	0	9	4	0	5	0	102
3 Sept	NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS - FOUL WEATHER										

Total Prop Sorties . . 401
Total Jet Sorties . . 144

Total Sorties 545

(a) Issue of daily ship's newspaper.
(b) Daily newscast over P.A. system.
(c) Radio broadcasts and recordings.
(d) Hobby Shop opened for issue of material one hour on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.
(e) Exercise rooms for physical conditioning of officers and enlisted men.
(f) The Commissary Officer maintains a record of birthday anniversary dates of all enlisted personnel. Names of men having birthdays appear in the Plan of the Day. They report to the Commissary Office and receive complimentary birthday cake and ice cream.

(2) Movies were shown daily. During the operation, 26 different programs were shown a total of 92 times.

d. Religious Activities:

(1) Divine Services were held as follows:

(a) Catholic mass daily; Catholic Evening Devotions daily; Protestant Worship every Sunday; Latter Day Saints Services, Christian Science Services and Jewish services were held.

(b) The Ship's Chapel was open at all times to men of all faiths for spiritual reading and prayer.

PART VI - Comments

a. Operations

During the period of this report, GMU-90 was aboard for the purpose of evaluating a television guidance system. A total of six (6) F6F-5(K) drones were launched against selected targets in North Korea. This is believed to be the first time that a guided missile has been launched from a ship against enemy forces in Korea.

From an operational standpoint, the following comments are believed to be worthy of consideration for planning purposes:

1. The tests were made at a time when the BOXER was engaged in maximum effort strikes, and had a full complement of eighty (80) planes on board. In order to bring the two (2) drones and two (2) AD-2(Q) control planes aboard, it was necessary to keep two (2) of the ship's AD's on the beach. Replacement drones were brought aboard as others were expended.

2. The starboard wing of the F6F-5(K) could not be folded when the television camera pod was installed. Due to space limitations on the hanger deck, this often interferred with scheduled work and with spotting incident to flight operations.

3. Thirty (30) minutes were required to warm-up and check the equipment after the planes were brought up to the flight deck. It is believed that additional planes should be sent to the beach to make available sufficient space to permit the check of the equipment to be made on the hanger deck. This would make possible an immediate launch when the planes were brought up, and would not interfere with other scheduled operations.

4. It is noted that the ship must maintain a steady course for the drone gyro stabilization to be checked and until it is launched.

(1) CIC

(a) During the period of this report, all the normal functions of CIC were satisfactorily performed. Maintenance of equipment was particularly difficult. This fact is attributed to the heat and water damage suffered by the equipment during the recent fire. Prior to our deployment, all equipment was thoroughly checked and tested. However, the SU radar was the only system which performed satisfactorily without a breakdown.

(b) During this operating period, the ship was in high winds resulting from the typhoon "Mary". At a relative wind of sixty (60) knots, the overload in the SPS-6B drive assembly tripped, and the antennae was allowed to run free. At times, the rotation rate was as high as 20 RPM, but there was no damage to the equipment. A relative wind of seventy (70) knots resulted in erratic rotation of the SX antennae. However, the SX performed satisfactorily throughout the storm, and was invaluable as a source of weather information.

(2) Aerology

(a) Period 23 August through 6 September was characterized by the normal summer monsoon weather. Prevailing winds remained south to southwesterly with an average velocity of 14 knots, and an average minimum velocity of 5 knots. Low cloudiness over target areas caused delay of early flights on 27 August and cancellation of operations on 31 August.

(b) Operating area remained operational throughout period with the exception of 3 September when Tropical Storm "Mary" moved rapidly through the Yellow Sea, across central Korea, and into the Sea of Japan causing low cloudiness, precipitation, restricted visibilities, and strong winds.

(3) Photography:

Total No. Negatives made	1,601
Total No. Prints made	8,321
Total Amt. Motion Picture Film exposed.	3,500

(4) Photo Interpretation

(a) The Photo Intelligence section produced routine flak studies, target studies, damage assessment and target search reports during the period covered by this report. The special GMU-90 Drone project group was aided with photo intelligence of their targets by the ship's P.I. Section. The section also provided one of the three targets used for the test.

(b) The change in the Task Forces offensive plan from a strict Communications interdiction program brought about a rapid change in the enemys anti-aircraft defenses. Many heavy and medium A/A batteries have been rapidly moved to the defense of the remaining possible usable Hydro-electric plants and other industrial targets.

b. Gunnery

(1) No material casualties were experienced during this period.

(2) Anti-Aircraft Firing Exercises were conducted on two occasions:

(a) Replenishment period 26 August 1952	BAKER, OBOE and HOW runs
(b) Enroute from Operating Area to Yokosuka, Japan 5 September 1952	BAKER, UNCLE and GEORGE runs

(3) Ship's Gun Ammunition expended:

5"/38	40MM
AAC (MTF) - 118 rds	HEIT (SD) - 65 rds

DECK SECTION

(4) During the above mentioned period, the following seamanship exercises were carried out with no casualties or losses:

Refueled from two AO's
Rearmed from two AE's

(5) Seven High Line transfers involving 96 personnel and approximately six tons of cargo.

M. B. GURNEY

AUTHENTICATED:

H. R. JORGENSEN,
Ship's Secretary.

U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA21/02-jsj
A4-3
Ser: 0257

7 July 1953

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 10 May through 21 June 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dtd 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) ATG-1 conf ltr ser 010 dtd 26 June 1953, Action Report of Carrier Air Task Group ONE (10 May - 21 June 1953)

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 10 May through 21 June is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

(1) On 10 May 1953, in accordance with CTF-77 confidential dispatch 281224Z April 1953, the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), with RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, and Air Task Group ONE embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, accompanied by the U.S.S. BLACK (DD-666), enroute to the operating area.

(2) Rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was effected the afternoon of 12 May 1953. The OTC and CTF-77 was RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, embarked on the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37). RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, was second in command. Ships present at the time of rendezvous included the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37), the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), the U.S.S. BREMERTON (CA-130), and various screen ships. The U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39), the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB-62), and the U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83) were operated with at various times during the period of this report.

b. Mission

The mission of this ship, as a component of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, is set forth in Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN Op-Order 2-52. Briefly stated it is as follows:

(1) Assist in the program for the systematic interdiction of enemy movement and resupply over the Northeast Korean railroads, road complexes, and storage areas.

[redacted]

(2) Destroy electric power generating plants and electric distribution systems in Northeast Korea.

(3) Furnish Close Air Support to and air strikes in support of front line ground forces, coordinating operations with Fifth Air Force, Korea, through the Joint Operations Center, Korea.

(4) Protect the Task Force against air, surface, and submarine attacks.

(5) Assist the UN Blockading and Escort Force in over-all defense and local ground defense of friendly Korean Islands as required using air support.

(6) Conduct Photo and armed reconnaissance in support of the interdiction program, providing photographs and photographic interpretation studies.

(7) Provide air cover for UN Naval Forces as directed.

PART II Chronological Order of Events

a. The following is an outline of the BOXER's employment during the period of this Action Report:

10 May 1953 -

At 0650, in compliance with CTF-77 confidential dispatch 281224Z April 1953, the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) with RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, and Air Task Group ONE embarked, accompanied by the U.S.S. BLACK (DD-666), departed Yokosuka, Japan enroute to the operating area and Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Captain M. B. GURNEY, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) was OTC.

11 May 1953 -

Enroute to the operating area. A total of sixty-three (63) Photo, ASP, and Jet Tactics training sorties were flown. Anti-aircraft firing exercises and various other drills were conducted during the day.

12 May 1953 -

The U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) and the U.S.S. BLACK (DD-666) rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN at 1205. RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, was embarked on the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37). No air operations were conducted due to replenishment. The following dispatch was received:

CTF-77 120250Z

"GLAD TO HAVE THE TOUGH OLD VETERAN BACK WITH US"

13 May 1953 -

At 0826, the BOXER launched her first combat sortie of her fourth Korean tour of duty. Sixty-three (63) combat sorties were flown during the day. The following dispatch was received:

CTF-77 130838Z

"PERFORMANCE BOXER AND HER AIR GROUP TODAY VERY FINE X MY FORECAST COLON SOON YOU WILL BE BETTER THAN ANY PREVIOUS BOXER OR BOXER AIR GROUP AND THATS PRETTY GOOD"

14 May 1953 -

One hundred and nine (109) combat sorties were launched.

15 May 1953 -

The Task Force replenished, no air operations were conducted. At 0800, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, embarked aboard U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), assumed command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

16 May 1953 -

A total of one hundred and twelve (112) sorties were flown.

17 May 1953 -

Commencing at 0801 the BOXER launched one hundred and twenty-four sorties. At about 1200 ENS G. M. WITTERS, USNR, 556691, VF-194, flying an AD-4NA BuNo 125756, parachuted in Wonsan Harbor, Korea after his aircraft had been hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. The pilot was immediately rescued, uninjured, by the helicopter of the U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83).

18 May 1953 -

After a morning of replenishment, the BOXER began launching aircraft at 1200. Forty-four sorties were flown.

19 May 1953 -

One hundred and seven (107) combat sorties were flown.

20 May 1953 -

Eighty (80) sorties were flown this date. At about 1240, LTJG W. J. O'HEREN, USNR, 347629, VF-194, flying an AD-4NA BuNo

[redacted]

127005 was forced to ditch forward of the ship upon take-off due to bridle-breakage on the catapult shot. He was rescued by the U.S.S. MC CORD (DD-534) sustaining minor injuries of the head and right shoulder.

21 May 1953 -

No air operations conducted due to replenishment of the Task Force.

22 May 1953 -

No air operations conducted due to non-operational weather over the Task Force and the Korean Peninsula.

23 May 1953 -

Eighty-nine (89) sorties were flown by BOXER aircraft. LT H. M. WOLFE, USNR, 419564, VF-194, was forced to ditch his AD-4NA BuNo 126919, east of Hungnam, Korea after damage by enemy anti-aircraft fire. The pilot was rescued uninjuried by the U.S.S. ARDENT (AM-340).

24 May 1953 -

Beginning at 0857, one hundred and nine (109) combat sorties were launched by the BOXER. At about 2040, the F4U-5N BuNo 121852, flown by LT W. (n). WHEELER, USNR, 475420, VC-3, was observed to crash in the vicinity of Soho-Ri, Korea. Darkness precluded further observation. LT WHEELER is listed MIA.

25 May 1953 -

No air operations due to replenishment of the Task Force. At 1019 there was a minor collision between the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) and the U.S.S. MISPILLION (AO-105). The seaworthiness or combat effectiveness of neither ship was impaired. During the afternoon anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted.

26 May 1953 -

One hundred and eight (108) combat sorties were launched.

27 May 1953 -

One hundred and four (104) combat sorties were flown.

28 May 1953 -

No air operations were conducted due to replenishment of the Task Force.

[redacted]

29 May 1953 -

No air operations were conducted due to adverse weather conditions over the Task Force and the Korean Peninsula.

30 May 1953 -

One hundred and seven (107) sorties were launched.

31 May 1953 -

Commencing at 0156, the BOXER launched fifty-five (55) sorties.

1 June 1953 -

The Task Force replenished in the morning. During the afternoon fifty-five (55) sorties were flown.

2 June 1953 -

Commencing at 0920, the BOXER launched one hundred and two (102) sorties. LTJG J. J. CHAMBERS, USN, 532708, VF-52, flying an F9F-2 crashlanded at K-18 due to enemy anti-aircraft fire damage to his aircraft. The pilot was wounded in the left wrist and the right leg.

3 June 1953 -

One hundred and twenty-two (122) combat sorties were flown.

4 June 1953 -

No air operations conducted due to replenishment of the Task Force. At 1804, RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE relieved RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

5 June 1953 -

During the morning and early afternoon, forty-five (45) sorties were flown. Low clouds and haze precluded most of the scheduled afternoon air operations.

6 June 1953 -

No air operations due to adverse weather.

[redacted]

7 June 1953 -

The Task Force replenished in early morning. Flight operations were begun at 1425 when the weather cleared. Thirty-eight (38) sorties were flown.

8 June 1953 -

Commencing at 1049, sixty-six (66) combat sorties were launched.

9 June 1953 -

Air operations began for the BOXER at 0259. Eighty-eight (88) sorties were flown. The BOXER observed its 59,000TH landing establishing a new Fleet Record.

10 June 1953 -

A total of ninety-five (95) sorties were flown. The BOXER replenished during the night.

11 June 1953 -

One hundred and thirty (130) combat sorties were launched. At about 1124 ENS W. W. SPEAR, USNR, 557934, VF-194, flying an AD-4NA BuNo 126950 was forced to ditch his aircraft due to power failure east of Kangnung, Korea. He was immediately rescued by the helicopter based at K-18, the emergency landing strip.

12 June 1953 -

Air operations began at 0602 and a total of twenty-two (22) sorties were launched. The Task Force replenished at night. The following dispatch was received:

CTF-77 131522Z

"THE BOXER DID HER FULL SHARE IN A TEAM PERFORMANCE TODAY WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE REMEMBERED EVEN MORE BY THE ENEMY THAN BY OURSELVES X A GREAT PERFORMANCE"

13 June 1953 -

One hundred thirty-nine (139) sorties were launched.

14 June 1953 -

BOXER aircraft flew one hundred and thirty-one (131) combat

[redacted]

[redacted]

sorties. At 0643 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, embarked on the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) relieved RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. During the night the Task Force replenished.

15 June 1953 -

Commencing at 0557, BOXER aircraft flew one hundred and forty-seven (147) combat sorties. At 0906 LT JOSEPH (n) ARKINS, USNR, 428709, VF-194, flying an AD-4NA BuNo 125754, was forced to ditch his aircraft forward of the ship due to power failure on takeoff. The pilot was rescued immediately by the BOXER's helicopter and sustained minor back injuries. The Task Force replenished during the night.

16 June 1953 -

A total of one hundred and twenty-four (124) combat sorties were launched by the BOXER. The Task Force replenished during the night.

17 June 1953 -

Commencing at 0430 the BOXER launched sixty-four (64) sorties. The Task Force replenished in the afternoon and during the night.

18 June 1953 -

No air operations were conducted due to adverse weather over the Task Force and the Korean peninsula.

19 June 1953 -

Adverse weather limited air operations to seventy-eight (78) sorties. At about 1130 LT D. H. OPSAHL, USNR, 407367, VF-111, flying an F9F-5 BuNo 126204 was forced to ditch at sea due to fuel exhaustion. The pilot was rescued by helicopter and was taken aboard the U.S.S. ST PAUL (CA-73) for treatment of back injuries.

At 1715, the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) accompanied by the U.S.S. CUSHING (DD-797) departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in accordance with Com7thFlt Op-Order 190340Z, enroute to Yokosuka, Japan, for a period of maintenance and rest. Captain M. B. GURNEY, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) was OTC.

The following dispatches were received:

Com7thFlt 190414Z

"COM7THFLT APPRECIATES THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE BOXER TO THE KOREAN CONFLICT BY REMAINING IN THE OPERATING AREA AT A

[redacted]

[redacted]

CRITICAL PERIOD OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR A PERIOD OF 38 DAYS AND DELIVERING OVER 2600 AIR SORTIES AGAINST THE ENEMY X WELL DONE X VADM CLARK SENDS"

CTF-77 191050Z

"I NOTE WITH PLEASURE COMSEVENTHFLT 190414Z X YOU HAVE CONTRIBUTED YOUR SHARE AND HAVE EARNED A WELL DESERVED RESPITE X RADM JOHNSON"

20 June 1953 -

Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan. At 1112, after being refueled, the U.S.S. CUSHING (DD-797) was detached from escort duty.

21 June 1953 -

At 1651, the BOXER moored to Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

~~(See Air Department Report)~~ SEE PAGE 36 + PART III ENCL (1)

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See Enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties

(1) There were no combat casualties suffered by Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action. At 0215, 13 May 1953, LOVELESS, Edward Glenn, BM3, USN, was lost at sea as a result of falling over the bow of the ship and drowning. LOVELESS was on watch as the Lookout Supervisor and was proceeding forward on Flight Deck to inspect the starboard bow lookout station. In doing this he normally climbed down to the lookout station on a ladder just aft of the forward edge of the Flight Deck, but in this instance he overshot and fell over the bow. CIC conned the rescue vessel to the scene. Only a life ring which had been dropped when LOVELESS fell over the side was retrieved.

Air Group personnel casualties are reported in enclosure (1).

b. Performance

(1) An average of only 1998 enlisted personnel comprised the ship's company during this period. Morale was excellent. Intensive

[redacted]

[redacted]

"on-the-job" training supplemented by training periods during lulls in operations proved highly satisfactory and gratifying as noted by the optimum efficiency of the vessel with a limited number of senior petty officers. During this period 220 personnel were advanced in rating including four PO1's to Chief Petty Officers. Of the average of 1998 enlisted personnel in ship's company, 773 were petty officers and 1225 non-rated. Of this total an average of 73 personnel were absent on TAD, including 5 men on annual leave to the Philippine Islands and 8 men on emergency leave to the continental United States. During the period 27 enlisted personnel were transferred to other duty and 15 men reported aboard. One enlisted man from an accompanying destroyer reported aboard for a four day visit with his brother in the Marine Detachment. Electronic Technician ratings are still critically short with no relief in the foreseeable future. Supervisory rates in the Communications group are critically short although adequate and well-trained strikers are assigned.

(2) There was a total of 117 ship's company officers on board during this period. 5 officers were detached and 4 officers reported. 12 officers have orders for detachment and 25 officers are ordered to report. Of the number ordered to report, 13 are Ensigns.

(3) Twenty-three Wardroom guests from the other branches of the Armed Forces and the HMS OCEAN were entertained during this period, including 6 UN civilian correspondents and representatives. Visits varied from one day to three weeks.

(4) There was a total of 27 Mast cases during this period. 7 Summary Courts-Martial and 2 Special Courts-Martial were awarded.

c. Training

(1) The Training Room was used for Divisional training classes, supervised group study, rate training, progress testing, health and hygiene lectures, church services, and recreational movies on replenishment days. The I&E program obtained and still is in the process of obtaining 25 high school diplomas and high school equivalency certificates from high school principals and state departments of education.

(2) 55 GED tests (high school level), 6 (college level) and 4 ECC tests were administered. After-hour classes in English and Math were established. A college level counseling program was launched and resulted in 40 men taking college entrance exams from universities and colleges throughout the U.S.. Lack of space for testing has hindered the I&E program.

[redacted]

d. Public Information

(1) Total news releases and feature articles originated during the period of this report are as follows:

(a) 10 news feature stories.
(b) 27 news photo releases.
(c) 2 hometown feature stories.
(d) 1,141 hometown news stories (Ship's Company Roster).
(e) 53 hometown news stories (Ship's Company Roster).
(f) 81 hometown news stories (VF-151 enlisted men's Roster).

(2) A considerable amount of additional public information material was released in cooperation with Commander Carrier Division ONE.

(3) Four enlisted journalists from ComNavFe were on TAD to ComCarDiv ONE. Working with the ship's public information office, they released a total of 17 feature stories, 31 hometown feature stories and 24 recorded radio interviews.

(4) Two enlisted radio correspondents from the Korean Armed Forces Radio Network recorded 16 interviews aboard.

(5) The following civilian correspondents visited the BOXER to write feature stories and interview men from their respective areas:

(a) Tys Torway, radio station WMBS, Memphis, Tenn.
(b) George Sisler, Memphis Commercial-Appeal.
(c) Jack Foisie, San Francisco Chronicle.
(d) Gordon Gammack, Des Moines Register.
(e) Bill Moore, Kansas City Star.

(6) A combat camera group was on TAD to the ship from NAS Atsugi, Japan. They shot 5,000 feet of motion picture film in preparing a movie-television release covering all phases of the BOXER's operations, tentatively entitled, "The Pugilist".

(7) The Ship's Public Information office published the ship's four page photo-offset newspaper daily at sea, using current ship's news and wire-service news received by radio-teletype. A special four page Sunday supplement featuring shipboard items was also published.

e. Religious Activities

Protestant Bible classes were held weekly at 1800 to 1900. These classes were held on Tuesday and Sunday. Protestant Communion service was held on the second Sunday of each month. Protestant Divine Services were held on Sunday at 1000. Latter Day Saints services were

held each Sunday at 0830, and a study class was held weekly for the Latter Day Saints. Christian Science services were held each Sunday at 1000. Protestant choir met twice weekly. Catholic Mass was offered at 0630 and 0900. Confessions were held before and after each Mass. The two Chaplains on board alternated in delivering a prayer over the announcing system each evening.

f. Recreational Activities

Movies were shown nightly in the Wardroom CPO lounge, first class mess, training room, and the mess decks. Whenever possible, the hangar deck was used for movies, with two performances on that evening. During this period 58 different programs were shown a total of 342 times. A late night movie was held in the training room for those personnel unable to attend the regular showings, and on replenishment days movies were shown morning and afternoon in the Training Room and on the Mess Decks to the Air Group and Air Department personnel who were unable to see the regular showings. Each evening at 2030 snacks were served for the crew on the Mess Deck. Bingo games were held on the Mess Decks, in the Wardroom and CPO lounge. Merchandise was given as prizes with the profits being given to Navy Relief. The Library was open from 0900 to 2100 daily. Library books were available and adequately distributed. A total of 2,200 books were drawn from the library. 100 books were received and 700 pocket books were received and distributed. 384 magazines were received and distributed to the Wardroom, Warrant Officers' lounge, CPO lounge, first class mess, crew's library, each division, and the squadrons embarked. Hobby Shop materials were offered for sale through the Hobby Shop and the demand for such materials has been and still remains high. The Photo Hobby Shop was open from 1800 until taps Monday through Friday of each week. An exercise room for physical conditioning of officers and men was placed in service and was well patronized.

PART VI Comments

a. General Comments

(1) Operational Problems with F9F-5 Aircraft

(a) Limited F9F-5 operations with H4B catapults. The ordnance load capabilities of the F9F-5's are seldom fully utilized during low wind conditions which normally exist off Korea in the summer months. Last minute reduction in ordnance loads is the rule rather than the exception. On occasion it has been necessary to abort an entire F9F-5 strike flight because of insufficient wind across the deck. Aborted flights create an immediate respotting problem which often carries over into succeeding events.

(b) Heavy aircraft handling.

The design weight limitations on number two elevator precludes handling of bomb loaded F9F-5 aircraft on number two elevator.

This limitation tends to slow the process of striking below loaded aircraft that are "downed", and does not permit emergency loading of F9F-5 aircraft on the hangar deck.

(c) Flight characteristics and performance

Except for F2H2P photo escort missions, for which F9F-5's only are used, the F9F-5's and F9F-2's perform the same missions. However, the differences in flight characteristics precludes the interchange of pilots between squadrons, and the dissimilarity of engine performance prevents mixing of the two types on a single mission. It is therefore considered highly desirable that the jet fighter aircraft squadrons assigned any air group be all of the same type.

(2) Flight Schedules

(a) Air Plan Differencies

During the tour two different air plan systems were used. One system required periodic recovery of all airborne aircraft which necessitated a dead spot aft on launches. The second system maintained a number of aircraft airborne at all times which eliminated any dead spot on launches and facilitated rapid rearming and respot. This system scheduled a greater number of sorties, but was more easily executed.

(b) Reschoduling, Delayed Air Operations

When scheduled air operations are delayed until further notice or are to commence with a later event, it is strongly recommended that the ordnance load, then on the aircraft, be utilized on the original target or on a new target calling for the same ordnance load. The morale and efficiency of ordnance handling and loading crews is adversly affected by repeated changes to ordnance loads during a delayed schedule situation.

(3) Air Controller Experience

The control of aircraft returning to the Task Force in adverse weather conditions should be assigned to ships with experienced air controllers. On several occasions inexperienced air controllers directed returning aircraft to shift to their parent ship land launch frequency when the aircraft were (a) on top of the overcast, (b) could not see the Task Force, and (c) were directly over their parent ship in the ship's radar blind spot. To regain control of the aircraft it was necessary to shift the aircraft back to an air control frequency, vector the aircraft out of the blind spot for radar contact and identification, and control the let down until the aircraft could give a "see you" before shifting them back to the land launch frequency. Low

state aircraft caught in the above situation imposed an additional problem in that critically low state aircraft had to be individually worked into the pattern to expedite recovery.

It is recommended that control of aircraft in adverse weather conditions not be assigned to new arrivals on the line until their air controllers have an opportunity to gain experience by controlling multiple aircraft in VFR conditions.

(4) Personnel Fatigue

Continuous day air operations sustained by night replenishment resulted in a general fatigue condition in both pilots and ship's company personnel. Indications of this were the dark circles under the eyes, the dull listless conversations and greater tendencies toward temper flare ups. Landing patterns were sloppy, pilots were slow in answering Landing Signal Officer's signals, and landings were rough.

During the day personnel with an opportunity to sleep were disturbed by air operations, catapults, bomb hoists, elevators, and air attack drills. At night, sleep was interrupted during replenishment by noise of hoists, winches, and handling of heavy materials on the hangar deck. The fact that personnel did not know when they could expect a rest appeared to aggravate the condition.

It is recommended that in a three or four carrier Task Force a periodic respite for part of a day would help correct the fatigue problem and would also provide an opportunity for aircraft maintenance.

(5) Spare Parts Procurement after Protracted Operations

(a) Aircraft spares.

There were eleven (11) aircraft AOG during this operating period. Parts for seven (7) of those were received in an average of four and one half (4½) days via air from the aviation stores ship in the area. Four (4) aircraft required parts available only at ASD Oakland, delivery of which averaged eighteen (18) days.

(b) Electronic Spares

This ship deployed from CONUS with approximately eighty percent (80%) of its allowance of electronic spares although one hundred percent (100%) had been requisitioned. The shortage of spare parts has made it impossible to maintain required electronic equipment in an operating status.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. Operations

(1) Air Operations

Three officers and nine enlisted personnel were assigned to Air Operations. The Air Operations Watch consisted of one officer and three enlisted men during early morning and night operations. Two officers and five enlisted personnel during daylight operations. Two enlisted personnel were on duty during such periods when the ship had night ready deck, or aircraft in a readiness condition.

During early morning and night air operations the 2-JG sound power phones were not manned. Launch and recovery data was sent to the ready rooms over the MC circuit.

The X-JA sound power circuit was manned during all air operations. One station was manned in Air Plot and the other on the bridge. The bridge watch maintained a status board by means of grease pencil. The board was mounted in the window frame just aft of the Captain's chair. This board was made of plexiglass and had sections ruled off to show the number of aircraft scheduled for each event by type with the launch and recovery times. The number of aircraft by type, the number of aircraft with hung ordnance by side number, the critical fuel state by type aircraft figured on the distance to the nearest landing field, the bearing and distance to the nearest landing field, any unusual circumstances such as aircraft in the lame duck circle, etc, the Task Force ready deck schedule, and the latest Korean weather.

Air Operations maintained a manifest in Air Plot of all passengers embarking and debarking by helicopter and COD. Helicopter and COD flights were met on the flight deck by Air Operations personnel. Embarking COD passengers were taken to Air Plot where the Mess Treasurer assigned quarters and the Ship's Writer checked orders. Debarking passengers reported to Air Plot 45 minutes prior to scheduled take-off time for aircraft assignment. COD arrivals and departures were announced over the ship's loud speaker system, airlines style, upon arrival and 45 minutes prior to departure.

(2) CIC

A three section watch bill was employed for both officers and men during the operating period. Two officers and fifteen men comprised the normal watch. Additional men were employed from the oncoming watch section as required until ComCarDiv ONE shifted his flag to the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN on 5 June 1953.

Air Search and air control functions were conducted primarily with SPS-6B radar. Despite a "blind spot" caused by stack and superstructure interference in a 40-degree sector from 020 to 060 degrees relative, this equipment proved to be the most reliable. Mark X IFF is available only through the SPS-6B and is presented in

[redacted]

CIC at SX Console #1 and a VK repeater between the communication consoles. The master Mark X IFF control installation is located in the SPS-6B radar room.

A fire in the amplidyne transformer on 24 May 1953 rendered the RHI system of the SX radar inoperative except for emergency use. Use of the equipment was curtailed pending further investigation of the trouble during an in-port availability. Two similar failures have occurred in the past five months. The SX search system performed satisfactorily for most of the operating but the lack of IFF information with the equipment precluded its use for air control purposes except as a standby installation.

To improve IFF presentation and derive maximum benefit from the SX search system a request has been initiated for authorization to re-install a slaved antenna on the SX platform, or as an alternate, to incorporate Field Change 10 to the SX radar and thus provide the Mark X presentation. Reliable 360 degree IFF coverage would then be more likely attainable.

(3) Photo Interpretation

During this period the primary efforts of the Photo Interpretation office were directed toward the production of a large quantity of target mosiacs. A record of 75 target mosiacs, illustrating major enemy buildup in the near vicinity of the bomb-line, were produced in the last four operating days of this period.

The assigned complement of 2 enlisted men and 1 officer was supplemented by a third enlisted man and the P.I. working space was shifted from the ozalid room to the flag spaces in this operating period. Both of these factors contributed to the productivity and efficiency of this office.

(4) Air Intelligence

During this first line period of the BOXER's current cruise, the Air Intelligence Office evolved into a functional team operating to serve the intelligence needs of both ship and air group.

The intelligence office complement consists of 3 officers and 4 enlisted men. This number is felt to be adequate for the job. A routine work schedule was evolved with 2 officers and 3 enlisted working during the day; 1 officer and 1 enlisted man comprised the night 'crew'.

Various techniques developed to aid in disseminating information include the following:

(a) A running air schedule board was maintained to record launch and land information. Made of plexiglass, this board aids in keeping accurate information for use in the strike flash report and the daily air summary.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b) A plexiglass air summary board was maintained on an event basis which indicated the information used to make up the daily air summary. Use of this board made it possible to send out the summary well within the time limits imposed.

(c) The display of available target coverage on a 1:250,000 map proved most useful as a means of selecting possible target areas for armed recce and heckler missions and as a means of target orientation. Each target area was identified by a small square together with the target mosiac number making it possible to quickly determine targets available in any area.

(d) The special Hydrographic Office texoprint charts (plastic surfaced) HO 15642-1.2 are in use by 2 squadrons for evaluation purposes. Thus far the pilot's reaction to the use of these charts has been quite favorable.

(e) Each day the Air Intelligence Office originates a shipwide broadcast summary of air operations news designed to give the officers and men a better understanding of the ship's part in the war effort.

(5) Communications

Several days prior to joining the task force this ship with ComCarDiv ONE embarked reported in on nets guarded by CTF-77 and commenced intercepting traffic to or originated by CTF-77. This procedure proved to be of considerable value in that cognizant staff and ship officers were given an opportunity to become familiar with the type of traffic to be expected when operating with the task force. Radio operators received a short intensive period of training on heavily loaded circuits, communication watch officers, radio supervisors and clerical personnel became accustomed to handling a high volume of traffic and new members of the crypto-board were rapidly qualified. There was no disruption of communication services incident to the relieving of the Task Force Commander. Considerable delays occurred in processing some encrypted traffic that was being held for correction or repetition.

To adequately support the communication plan, this ship with the Task Force Commander embarked, would have required almost 100% continuous availability of transmitters installed. Outages of major transmitters necessitated assignment and reassignment of communication guards to other ships. It was noted that other ships having a similar transmitter installation were unable to cover certain circuits due to outages of equipment. After the Task Force Commander transferred to a converted carrier, BOXER was able, in spite of about 60% availability of transmitters, to adequately cover all the assigned communication guards. The types TCS

[redacted]

[redacted]

and TCZ transmitters proved to be of doubtful value for the communications required. The URT-4 transmitter, installed for evaluation, continues to prove totally unreliable and represents a maintenance problem wholly out of proportion to its value. This has been made the subject of an evaluation report. The following tabulation of major transmitters has been prepared to show the urgent need that existed for standby equipment as well as an adequate number of qualified electronics technicians to service the equipment and perform technical maintenance. Radio strikers are used to set up and make adjustments to the low, medium, and high frequency transmitters and perform operators' maintenance within their capabilities to transmitting and receiving equipment. The ship has the following major communication transmitters installed: 2 TBM, 4 TCK, 4 TCZ:

TRANSMITTER	LOCATION	*TOTAL OUTAGE TIME	INCLUSIVE DATES
TBM	RDO II	514 hours	17 May-19 June
TBM	RDO III	46 hours	22 May-15 June
TCK #2	RDO II	768 hours	19 May-19 June
TCK #1	RDO III	78 hours	1 June-9 June
TCZ #1	RDO II	77 hours	16 May-19 June
TCZ #2	RDO II	240 hours	6 June-16 June
TCZ #1	RDO III	456 hours	16 May-16 June

*Transmitters were considered "out" when they were not fully operational for the purpose of this summary.

In order to process traffic and maintain the required guards an experienced supervisor, assistant supervisor, two "call break-down" men, five experienced CW operators, one voice operator, two teletype operators and two utility men and messengers were required for each of three watch sections. The flag Chief Radioman, the ship's Chief Radioman and Radioman First Class divided their time in such a way that at least one was present in Radio central at all times to check traffic, monitor watches on the various circuits, instruct personnel and to handle unusual or emergency situations. Early in the period, the Radioman First Class was transferred without relief and it became necessary for the Chief Radiomen to spend from 12 to 16 hours daily in Radio Central. Due to the high volume of traffic handled and the necessity for rapidly processing this traffic, operators and supervisory personnel received training which would take months to achieve under ordinary circumstances. It was noted that on some circuits, particularly the Task Force Common, that many operators were at slow speeds. On other circuits it was noted that traffic moved at high speeds and all operators were alert and efficient. On these circuits the NCS operator was invariably an accomplished speed key operator and the other operators were either good bugmen or hand-key operators able to receive through interference. The ship to shore RATT circuit to Radio Yokosuka was the principle means of relaying traffic outbound from

[redacted]

[redacted]

the task force. Frequent outages on this circuit due to a combination of equipment failures and poor signals somewhat delayed traffic. The UHF RATT circuit between the carriers was frequently overloaded when more than two carriers were present and reception was less than excellent. Late in the period this ship put up an additional UHF RATT circuit with the Task Force Commander and traffic was expeditiously handled.

Two experienced members of the crypto-board were detached before the ship arrived in the Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN operating area. Three additional experienced members were detached before the tour was half finished. To offset the continuing loss of experienced crypto-board members, three junior officers from the Supply Department, two Ship's Clerks and the Administrative Officer were assigned to stand watches in the cryptocenter while the ship was on the line. The loss of personnel had been anticipated and these Supply and Administrative section officers had been qualified as cryptographers during the time the ship was enroute to this area from the United States. To adequately process traffic through the cryptocenter, a continuous watch of three qualified cryptographers was required. A fourth officer was continuously available to assist with handling of classified traffic during peak periods. Several rated telemen had been cleared for processing classified traffic, but because of the urgent need of their service in Radio Central and the Communications Office, could not be spared for the cryptocenter watches.

A continuous watch of an experienced Communication Watch Officer, two write up men, a ditto operator, a classified traffic messenger, and two other messengers was required to process and deliver messages internally. In addition to this the Flag and the ship each furnished a communications office supervisor. These supervisors were not assigned regular watches. Their principle duties were to insure that messages were processed in a timely manner, routing accomplished as indicated by the CWO and that messages were properly filed.

During the period 15 May through 19 June a grand total of 27,795 messages were handled by CTF-77 and BOXER. A breakdown of traffic handled over the principle radio circuits follows:

CKT	SENT	RECEIVED
B32	-	8164
B5		9472
C16	225	308
C4.3(c)	357	2952
D188	333	676
A4.7	2121	85
T6	863	1070
2340 kcs.	259	436
A8(b)	177	51
D189	125	106

[redacted]

A daily average of 350 messages were handled in the communications office as being addressed to or originated by CTF-77 or BOXER. Approximately 35 percent of these messages were classified. Serially numbered General messages were received in all cases and the ship departed the area with complete up to date files of these messages.

Visual communications consisted almost exclusively of sending and receiving administrative type messages. The Task Force was not manouvered by flaghoist. Full use of Nancy equipment was made during darken ship periods. On replenishment days almost the entire signal force was required to be on watch to handle the visual traffic.

The incoming mail service, except for one brief period, was considered to be excellent during the entire tour on the line. The several changes in the employment orders for this ship caused the mail to be delayed during that period. The ship's stamp credit of $15,000 is considered adequate. 82 pouches of air mail and 78 pouches of parcel post were received while the ship was on the line. During this period 2,133 money orders valued at $90,127.70 were sold. During pay days money orders were sold in the wardroom, the chief petty officers' mess and the post office and these facilities were made available until hands had been served.

The communication section officer personnel allowance, augmented by cryptographers from other departments, is considered adequate for the type of operations just completed. The allowance of rated radiomen and telemen is considered adequate provided it is filled to near 100%. The ship operated successfully with less than 23% of the allowance of rated radiomen. That this was possible is attributed to the excellent leadership and the untiring efforts of the petty officers and the willingness and enthusiasm of the non-rated men.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That CVA's acting as flag ships for force commanders be supplied with enough reliable medium and high frequency transmitters so that standby equipment may be readily available on important circuits and that routine maintenance may be carried out without having to resort to guard ship arrangements.

2. That enough rated radiomen be assigned to enable the ship to carry out its mission and at the same time pursue a realistic training program for non-rated men.

3. That incentives be provided to encourage radiomen to become qualified speed key operators.

4. That visual communications with yard arm blinkers

[redacted]

and 8 inch adaptor equipped lights be permitted during hours of darkness when no conditions of radio silence are in effect.

5. That the allowance for a hand operated ditto machine be changed to an electrically operated machine.

6. That a standard Ditto-mat message form for CVA's in AirPac be adopted.

7. That the requirement for originators of messages to use the abbreviation "NOTAL" where required be rigidly enforced.

8. That all junior officers ordered to CVA's and not scheduled to fill a particular billet be further ordered to a course of instruction in cryptography prior to reporting aboard.

(6) Photography

Upon departure of the ship from Yokosuka to the line, personnel within the photographic laboratory were divided into two shifts; each shift of 12 hours duration and changing at 0700 and 1900. This arrangement was very good for maintaining a smooth flow of work throughout the operating period. No troubles were experienced within the laboratory and camera failures were at a minimum. Except for the drastic drain on 8x10 copy film, all supplies ordered prior to departure from San Diego were adequate. The high expenditure of copy film was due to flag requirements for duplicate negatives of target studies. In this connection it is recommended that the present allowance of copy film be substantially increased for carriers operating with flag embarked.

The reduction of sonne print distribution by carriers on the line as established by ComCarDiv ONE has eased the workload in the photographic laboratory considerably. At the present time one flash print and only two annotated prints are being made from the aerial film. With this arrangement it is possible to devote more attention to quality and also maintain a fast turnover for other types of work within the laboratory.

Excellent results have been obtained with the F56-20" aerial camera installation in the AD aircraft. The damage assessment photographs obtained with this camera are far superior to those previously made with the K-17-24" and K25-6 3/8" cameras.

Ozalid reproductions have not been as high as originally anticipated; however, much of the material that has been reproduced could not have been accomplished otherwise because of size and type reproductions desired.

[redacted]

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

Photographic coverage of barricade engagements has been greatly improved with the installation of a fixed K-25 aerial camera on the splinter shield of the flag bridge. This camera is borosighted on the barricade and is electrically operated. One photographer stationed on the flag bridge during flight quarters is able to operate both this camera and a high speed motion picture camera. A description of this installation together with examples of photographs obtained will be made a part of a separate report to be forwarded later.

A breakdown of work performed in the photographic laboratory during this period on the line follows:

NEGATIVES MADE		PRINTS MADE		GUN CAMERA FILM PROCESSED
9X18	8,188	9X18	20,453	
9X9	3,091	9X9	4,248	21,556 feet
4X5/8X10	1,205	4X5/8X10	9,473	
		18X22	300	(Target studies for AI
Total	12,484	Total	34,174	briefing)

(7) Aerology

The period 13 May to 19 June was characterized by the resumption of the Southerly Monsoon over the Sea of Japan with twenty-one of the thirty-eight days having a prevailing wind direction between Southeast and Southwest. In general a low pressure area existed over Manchuria and Siberia with a series of fronts and troughs moving eastward over Southern Manchuria and Korea. The polar front was located south of Korea and Japan with cyclonic wave development occurring off the coast of China and again to the east of the Japanese islands. Weak high centers or ridges were situated over the operating area for a total of 12 days during this 38 day period. The weather was largely of a transitional nature with an unusually large number of extratropical cyclonic storms moving through the operating area. Eight low centers moved across Korea into the Sea of Japan causing a cessation of flight operations due to weather for two and one half days: May 22nd, June 18th and 19th. Three other low centers moved into the Sea of Japan from south of Korea causing flight operations to be suspended for one day - May 29th.

Typhoon "Judy" which crossed over the southern Japanese island of Kyushu on 7 June influenced the weather in the operating area for three days - from 5 to 7 June. The approach of the typhoon from the East China Sea coincided with the development of a low center and trough over the Yellow Sea and later Korea. This combination caused a moderate south to southeasterly flow of warm moist Maritime Tropical Air over the relatively colder water of the Sea of Japan, blanketing the operating area with low stratus, fog,

[redacted]

[redacted]

and drizzle, and causing a suspension of flight operations for half a day on the 5th, all of the 6th, and three-fourths of the 7th of June.

For this 38 day period an unusually large amount of cloudiness occurred with clear skies only 24% of the time and more than eight-tenths of the sky covered for 65% of the time; ceilings were below 5000 feet almost half of the time (42%). The majority of low ceilings occurred with south to southeasterly winds which transported the lower cloud layers over the coastal plains of North Korea, and reduced the effectiveness of flight operations over the coastal target areas.

The incidence of fog was also unusually high (21% of the time) and has a direct relationship to the southerly wind flow. In the majority of instances the fog formed in the early morning and dissipated by 1000 local time in the coastal operating area. As a result, flight operations were delayed from 4 to 8 hours on several occasions and in three cases early morning replenishment operations were delayed due to the reduced visibility.

Winds less than 10 knots occurred about one third of the time. Although flight operations were not suspended nor delayed excessively due to lack of sufficient wind, their effectiveness was reduced by necessitating a decrease in ordnance loadings on aircraft on several occasions.

A total of six days were lost due to inclement weather during this operating period.

AEROLOGICAL SUMMARY
OPERATING PERIOD
13 MAY THROUGH 19 JUNE 1953

TEMPERATURE	
AVERAGE	63.7 DEG.
AVERAGE MAX.	68.9 DEG.
AVERAGE MIN.	60.3 DEG.
ABSOLUTE MAX.	80 DEG.
ABSOLUTE MIN.	55 DEG.

SKY CONDITIONS	% TOTAL TIME
OVERCAST	41.5%
CLOUDY	23.8%
PARTLY CLOUDY	10.6%
MOSTLY CLEAR	24.1%

HOURS OF PRECIPITATION	57
AVERAGE REL. HUM.	80.3%
HOURS OF FOG	150

SURFACE WINDS

PREVAILING DIRECTION	DAYS
N	3
NNE	2
NE	2
ENE	1
E	2
ESE	2
SE	6
SSE	4
S	7
SSW	1
SW	3
WSW	2
W	3
WNW	0
NW	0
NNW	0

[redacted]

[redacted]

AVERAGE VELOCITY	12.7 KTS
AVERAGE MAX. VELOCITY	20.7 KTS
AVERAGE MIN. VELOCITY	4.7 KTS
ABSOLUTE MAX. VELOCITY	32.0 KTS
ABSOLUTE MIN. VELOCITY	CALM

CEILINGS	% TOTAL TIME	VISIBILITY	% TOTAL TIME
BELOW 1000 FT	25.0%	UNDER 1 MILE	4.6%
1000 TO 5000 FT	17.0%	1 TO 3 MILES	2.4%
5000 TO 10,000 FT	11.6%	3 TO 6 MILES	16.4%
ABOVE 10,000 FT	46.4%	OVER 6 MILES	76.6%

FAVORABLE FLYING CONDITIONS (CEILING 1000 FT. OR HIGHER, VISIBILITY THREE MILES OR MORE): 75.0%

c. Supply

(1) Commissary

Provision replenishment was received at sea four times during the current tour on the line as follows:

Date	Ship	Tons Ordered	Tons Received	Loading Time
15 May	USS PICTOR (AF-54)	64	51	75 Min.
25 May	USS POLARIS (AF-11)	82	60	110 Min.
4 June	USS POLARIS (AF-11)	49	40	60 Min.
17 June	USS PICTOR (AF-54)	19½	15½	140 Min.

A problem which created an inefficient operation was encountered during two replenishment periods when ammunition was received aboard just prior to provisioning. This situation resulted in congestion of hangar deck working space and shortage of material handling equipment to move stores and strike them below to stowage spaces.

During replenishment days and when bad weather conditions prevented flying, sandwiches were provided for the crew. They were prepared on thirty-five (35) different occasions during this period on the line. Hamburgers, hot dogs, and grilled cheese proved to be the most popular types of sandwiches.

An average of 325 night rations were served each night during the tour on the line.

Provision items which were difficult to obtain from reefers were: Jam and jelly, tomatoes, lettuce, mace, graham flour, pork luncheon meat, beef hash, hominy, corn on cob FF, cherries FF,

[redacted]

[redacted]

lima beans , FF, green onions, dry onions, radishes, cucumbers, turnips, and blueberries FF.

The following amounts of provisions were consumed during this operating period. All indicated amounts are in pounds. Flour 41,400, preserved meat 8,246, meat, boneless 27,357, meat, smoked 52,847, ,vegetable canned 23,678, vegetable fresh 133,639, vegetable frozen 16,506, fruit canned 18,988, fruit-fresh and frozen 44,754, fruit and vegetable 6,944, coffee 9,360, evaporated milk 18,914, milk-skimmed and powdered 5,623, butter 4,980, shortening 9, 493, granulated sugar 24, 350, milk-made 1,890 gallons, and fresh eggs 8,900 dozen.

(2) Ship's store and C&SS

During the last period on the line sales in the Ship's Store activities seemed to operate in satisfactory manner. The water shortage presented a "salt water" problem in the laundry, but in the event that problem arises again the laundry will be able to cope with the situation.

Adequate stocks of all Ship's store items prevented any difficulties which might have existed from exhaustion of stocks during the operating period. Due to cold weather and extended tour, candy supply ran low, but will be restocked upon return to Yokosuka.

(3) Aviation Supply

Due to the extended period of operations on the line, and unusually large number of missions flown, stocks of high usage items were depleted. This condition was caused by the tactical situation and the replenishment at night which permitted full operation daily. It is apparent that the standard 180 day allowances are insufficient in certain items for this sustained type of operations.

A total of 2,268 line items were received on stub requisitions. Of these requests 97 percent of the line items were furnished.

The USS JUPITER (AVS-8) replenished aviation stores at sea on 15 May 1953. Approximately 55% of the items requested were supplied. However, a large number of the items requested were items required for OEC buildups, which accounts for the low percentage of the total requests furnished.

The June replenishment was offloaded by the JUPITER prior to her departure for the line, as the BOXER was ordered into Yokosuka on the date of the JUPITER's departure from Yokosuka. Summary of results of percentage items furnished from this replenishment will be included in the next summary.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(4) General Supply

An initial problem existed in the matter of aviators' breathing oxygen. Usage with three (3) jet squadrons aboard averaged about 13 cylinders per day. BOXER has no oxygen plant aboard so it is essential that all tankers maintain substantial stock of this gas for all replenishments. One tanker arrived with no oxygen aboard which caused a request of 72 cylinders at the next replenishment because of no reserves aboard BOXER. This request was filled and no future difficulties were experienced.

Certain outages of electronic equipment were caused by lack of on-board spare parts. This is particularly true of QK-259 magnetrons for AN/2PN-12 Radar and almost all parts for AN/URT-4 radio transmitters. Full stocks of spare synchros for all equipment, radio transmitter motor generator armatures, bearings, and fittings, QK-259 magnetrons should be aboard prior to leaving CONUS.

(5) Wardroom Mess

In order to utilize the personnel available most efficiently it was found that a separation of stewards' duties between wardroom and stateroom duties proved most successful.

The following items were in short supply:

Stock Number	Item Description
R14-G-984-575	Grease
R14-H-110	Hydrolube
R17-SFIC-162	Detector
R17-1-7476-1	Inverter
R82-NAF-603410-1	Points
R83-GR-134095	Cylinder
R83-M2260	Valve
R83-APD-25400-20	Valve
R83-T-5828	Tires
R84-PW-J48P6	Engine
R85-PW-131868	Plugs
R85-PW-198153	Fuel Controls (HO-7008c)
R85-PW-184765	Filter
R85-WAC-138043	Rings
R86-PE-011047-030-02	Pump
R86-EC-40E01-2A	Regulator
R87-APD-P100206	Propellor
R88-1-1325-012-000	Indicator
R88-G-1021-050-000	Gage
R94-GR-135330-L/R	Chute
R94-GR-135311-L/R	Chute
R94-C-78550	Chargers AERO-13A
R94-BUA-52A323E1	Switch
J941-BUA-122-275	Food Mach.
J941-BUA-122-300	Food Mach.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ACOG's were as follows:

Aircraft	Stock Numbers	Nomenclature	Source Supply	No. Days ACOG
F9F-2	R85-PW-132162	Cover	ASD, Oakland	14
F9F-5	R83-MMM-2200	Valve	USS JUPITER	3
AD4NA	R16-P-5690	Potentimeter	ASD, Oakland	23
AD4NA	R87-APD-P100206	Propellor	USS JUPITER	5
F9F-2	R83-AP-25400-20	Valve	USS JUPITER	3
AD4NA	R82-DG-4254985	Shaft	Yokosuka	6
AD4NA	R86-PE-011047-030-02	Pump	USS JUPITER	5
AD4NA	R83-DG-5256715-94	Line Assy:	ASD, Oakland	Not rec. to date
AD4NA	R83-DG-5256715-98	Line Assy:	ASD, Oakland	Not rec. to date
F9F-5	V84-PW-J48-P6A	Engine	ComFairJap	8
F9F-5	R17-SFIC	Detector	USS JUPITER	2

A considerable increase in ration cost was experienced during this tour. This was brought about by several factors. It was found that many pilots and personnel concerned with early morning launches ate four (4) meals per day, since they were required to work unusually long hours.

The lack of storage space for Wardroom Stores and the extended at sea period created the necessity for abnormal purchases from the General Mess. These purchases in many cases were considerably more costly than they would be ashore.

A sandwich mess operated from 2000 until 2400 each evening has proved very successful. From six to ten types of sandwiches are available each evening. The officers sign chits for the sandwiches and they are collected monthly by the Mess Treasurer with the officer's mess bill.

d. Gunnery

(1) Performance of Ordnance Equipment and Material

Anti-aircraft Firing Exercises were conducted on two occasions; performance was considered good. Firings were:

(a) Enroute from Yokosuka, Japan to Operating area, 11 May 1953 GEORGE and HOW runs.
(b) Replenishment period 25 May 1953 - One (1) OBOE run.

(2) Only routine casualties were encountered during this period.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(3) Ordnance

Ordnance expended in AA firing:

5/38	40MM
AAC (MTF) 27 rds.	HEIT 254 rds.

Only two AA firings were accomplished during forty two operating days. The increased pace of air operations and night replenishments prevented more exercises in the Task Force. Weather cancelled scheduled exercises enroute from operating area to Yokosuka.

(4) Seamanship

During the period 10 May 1953 to 21 June 1953, the following seamanship exercises were conducted:

(a) The ship replenished 19 times from a total of 29 replenishment ships:

Fuel	15
Ammunition	9
Fresh Provisions	4
Aviation Stores	1

(b) The ship refueled 3 destroyers and affected 46 individual high-line transfers with a total transfer of 171 personnel.

(c) Fourteen of the fifteen times the ship received fuel, the Elwood Rig was employed; the Elokomin Rig being used once. This command feels that the Elwood Rig is preferable to the Elokomin Rig, especially during heavy weather and darken ship conditions. The chances of the hose carrying away if the hose line messenger of the riding line parts are greatly reduced.

(d) The ship affected 10 replenishments during darken ship conditions with great success. Twelve inch cargo lights equipped with red lenses were used in conjunction with the night lights on the hangar deck to give adequate illumination.

(e) During the first replenishments of this cruise, considerable difficulty was experienced with the electric-hydraulic cargo winches that were installed during the last yard period. The 3/8" copper tubing from the pump end to the brake block continually carried away due to vibration. This situation was remedied by installing a flexible hose tested to 3000 PSI pressure. The electric-hydraulic winch does not compare with the steam cargo as to speed or load capacity. Of the 9 times this ship replenished ammunition, the highest rate of transfer attained was 161s/t per hour; that on 21 May 1953, from the U.S.S. RANIER (AE-5). Under similar conditions

[redacted]

and using steam cargo winches, this ship replenished from the U.S.S. RANIER (AE-5) at the rate of 225s/t per hour in May 1952.

(f) In order to assist a man overboard in remaining afloat until such time as a rescue is affected, a MK II, self-inflatable, two man rubber life raft has been stowed in a quick release position on the outboard after splinter shield of mount 49, as shown in accompanying photograph. This raft will automatically inflate when released and is available at all times when underway.

o. Air

(1) Aircraft Handling

Operations with three (3) jet squadrons and one (1) AD squadron plus the VC components has presented no unusual aircraft handling problems; however, the number of aircraft that can be spotted for a maximum deck load launch is limited. It has been experienced on the BOXER that 20--22 props and 22 - 24 jets constitute a full deck load. The present practice is to spot all jets with tail pipes over the catwalks except for 4 to 6 planes spotted to starboard along the island. This permits a 100% turn up on all jets prior to leaving the spot with the exception of those aircraft adjacent to the island. These are limited to a 60% turn up until spotted on the catapults.

It is strongly recommended that when three squadrons of F9F's are embarked in the same ship that they all be of the same type, especially where the assigned aircraft (F9F-2, F9F-5) are employed to perform the same missions, but are not interchangeable for pilot assignment. This would greatly facilitate aircraft handling and the advantages with regard to the logistics problem are obvious.

Limitations of the H4B catapults, coupled with prevailing low wind conditions, make it difficult to achieve design load carrying capabilities of the F9F-5 while embarked on unconverted CVA's. Reduction of the F9F-5 complement with proportinate increase in the number of F9F-2's embarked in ratio to load and no-load (CAP, photo escort, etc..) flights, would serve to increase the fighter-bomber potential of this vessel.

Helicopter and COD traffic is assuming a "Grand Central Station" complex and waiting room and baggage room is nearing the "must" stage. Red Cap porter service is currently accomplished by "blue shirts".

(2) Catapults and Arresting Gear

Extensive catapult and arresting gear operations

[redacted]

were conducted during this period. A total of 2183 catapult shots were fired; 1135 shots on the starboard catapult and 1048 shots on the port catapult. One towing cable of the port catapult approached minimum tolerance and was reroeved during the reporting period. Thirty-three (33) hours were required for completion; however, since this period bridged one replenishment day, air operations were not seriously curtailed.

A deviation from the method of reroeving recommended in NAVAER 51-15-15HA-506 was utilized and proved highly satisfactory. NAVAER 51-15HA-506 recommends that the swaged fitting of the old towing cable be cut off topside at the shuttle and the new cable brazed to this end. The old cable with the new attached cable is then pulled through into the catapult room by hand and then disposing of it was considered unnecessary. Instead, the poured fitting of the tow cable in the catapult room was removed and a 3/8" messenger cable was brazed to the messenger. A small three fold purchase and a quick detachable cable clamp was applied to the messenger cable in the catapult room and with the pull of a few men, the new cable was pulled through without difficulty. It is believed that this method is more desirable and results in a faster reroeve as handling a 3/8" diameter cable rather than a 1 1/4" tow cable in the confined space of the catapult room is preferable. It is interesting to note that the new cable has stretched twenty (20) inches subsequent to reroeving with the firing of 404 shots. This stretch has been cut out and the fitting repoured enroute Yokosuka.

A moderate overheating of the port catapult pumps and motors was experienced during warm days and prolonged operations. This has been alleviated by utilizing two portable blowers directed at the pumps in the pump room. It is considered that a more effective ventilation system should be installed in catapult pump rooms; however, with the development of a sea water heat exchanger for cooling catapult oil underway, pump overheating problems may well be solved.

A total of ~~2756~~ 2819 landings were completed during the period. #1 and #2 arresting gear engine main ram packings were replaced after leakage developed and several yielding elements were replaced. Close and detailed inspection of catapult and arresting gear are mandatory during protracted air operations and maintenance must be effectively carried out during non-operating periods.

(3) Aviation Maintenance

During this operating period the V-4 Division assembled the following QEC units:

(5) R-3350	(1) J-42
(3) J-48	(1) J-34

[redacted]

[redacted]

The mechanics of the V-4 Division enjoyed this opportunity to work in their rate.

Attrition rate of ARC-27 blade type antennae has been extremely high, both because of the exposed location on the F9F nose wheel door, and because of hydrolube seepage into the antenna through the antenna connection.

(4) Aviation Gasoline

In order to meet the heavy refueling requirements of three jet squadrons and one propellor squadron, it has been necessary to increase the gasoline pumping pressures to the fueling outlets to 60-80 PSI by means of the electric driven pumps. The increased pressure has resulted in plug valve lubricant being forced through the filters at the fueling station and thence to the aircraft fuel system. A continuous program of filter inspection and cleaning has been initiated, which combined with less frequent plug valve lubrication, has reduced the passage of foreign matter to the aircraft. An RUDM recommending the use of micronic type filter element in place of the present ribbon type, is in preparation.

Aviation gas has been replenished 13 times during the period covered in this report and a total of 1,301,853 gallons of aviation gas and 6,229 gallons of lube oil has been used. The high gasoline usage for one day was 89,600 gallons. It is noted that two such heavy operating days in succession would make inadvisable the refueling of the last 10-15 aircraft, prior to refueling from the tanker.

f. Engineering

(1) Main Propulsion Plant

The main propulsion plant of this vessel continued to deliver combat readiness requirements in a notably efficient manner considering the extended operations under daily flight schedules necessitating replenishment periods each night. Stipulated boiler maintenance work was accomplished by securing two boilers at a time during favorable wind conditions.

(2) Electrical Installation

The automatic voltage regulation of the 1250 K.W. ships service generators of this vessel is maintained by General Electric type GFA-4M Voltage Regulating Equipment. This regulation is relatively slow to respond to voltage and load fluctuations and occillates radically before setting out on final voltage adjustment. Two changes in the operation of catapult motors have been incorporated

[redacted]

[redacted]

into the present launching procedure, i.e., ShipAlt CVA38K429 "Modify Catapult Pump Motor Starters" which replaces auto-transformer starting with across-the-line starting and produces infinitely greater starting surges. Heavier type aircraft have required an increase to 4000 PSI hydraulic pump discharge pressures. The first change results in a fluctuation of generator terminal voltages between 415 volts and 470 volts with the starting of each of the eight pump drive motors which requires from 3 to 5 seconds to settle out in a dampened pattern. The second change increases the electrical load of the ship to a point which requires that three generators be kept in operation at all times when flight operations are expected, thereby increasing maintenance requirements and at the same time radically reducing maintenance availability.

(3) Electronics Installation

All of the rated Electronics Technicians who were attached to this vessel prior to 1 October 1952 were transferred from the ship before 1 January 1953. The Electronics Repair Division was reduced to eleven men below ET2 who had had previous operating and maintenance experience in this vessel. Ten men were assigned to duty in this division from personnel reporting to this vessel prior to 1 February 1953. This brought the strength of the Electronics Repair Division up to a total of 21 enlisted men to compare with an allowance of 39, and headed up by one ET1 and one ET2. Regardless of this disparity between on board count and allowance this vessel was assigned the communications and radar responsibilities of a flagship which it fulfilled without unreasonable difficulty. The principle contributary factor causing electronics difficulties is considered to be the unusual fluctuations of voltage caused by surges of current required by across-the-line starting of catapult motors. These surges are held as likely causes for the following malfunctions:

(a) All radar equipment has tripped out from time to time. The UPX and MK-10 IFF trip out almost every time a catapult motor is started. Each time a piece of radar equipment trips out, without the normal securing procedure, heavy surges of current and voltage are impressed upon associated vacuum tubes. Much of the unusually high vacuum tube failure within the past operating period may be attributable to this reaction.

(b) The AN/SPN-12 Air Speed Radar frequently reacts to the erratic line voltage surges by going out of oscillation and may be the cause of failure of three integral magnatron tubes during this period.

(c) Two TCK armatures and five TBM-11 armatures have failed during the period of this report. Since these armatures

[redacted]

[redacted]

are operating under a potential of 1000 volts it is assumed that line voltage fluctuations were the principal cause of failure.

(d) The gyro-compass low voltage alarm is frequently triggered as a result of voltage surges incident to catapult pump motor starting. This causes an added burden and nervous strain to personnel on the bridge during the critical moments of a launch.

(4) Training

Each vessel must conduct COMAIRPAC Engineering Training Exercises by on watch personnel at every opportune moment, particularly in the early phases of training and deployment, and during each night underway to insure maximum familiarity of personnel with action to be taken in any emergency. Special emphasis should be placed upon steering casualties and loss of electrical power to vital navigational, manouvering, and communications circuits. Familiarity with installed equipment as a result of such exercises under various imposed casualties has precluded many situations which may have become serious derangements, and this familiarity has assisted greatly in effecting prompt adjustment and repair.

g. Medical

(1) Medical Department Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ship's Company:

Admissions to sick list, onlisted	162
Admissions to sick list, officers	5
Total visits to sick call	2489
Minor injuries treated	54
Major injuries treated (admitted to the sick list)	14
Fatal injuries	1

LOVELESS, Edward Glenn, 569 75 39, BM3, USN, (Ship's Company) was declared dead when he fell from the flight deck into the water at night. The body was not recovered.

Missing in action

WHEELER, Wilfred, III, 475420, LT, USNR, VC-3, was declared missing in action when his plane was shot down on a night mission over North Korea.

Pilots injured, enemy action, recovered	
Pilots temporarily grounded, medical reasons	8
Average number of days grounded	2.87

[redacted]

(2) Venereal Disease cases and Non-Specific Urethritis:

Gonorrhea	13 (48.96 per 1000 per year)
Chancroid	9 (32.40 per 1000 per year)
Syphilis	0
Non-Specific Urethritis following sexual exposure	53 (199.56 per 1000 per year)
Penicillin tablets issued during last in port period (10 days)	5,340

(3) Upper Respiratory Disease Admissions

Common cold	5
Pharyngitis	2
Sinusitis	1
Tonsillitis, Acute	1

(4) Epidemic Disease Admissions

Appendicitis, Acute	2
Gastro-Enteritis	1
Urethritis, Due to Gonococcus	1
Cellulitis	1
Injuries	2

(5) Comments

Medical supplies were adequate. There was no significant breakdown of equipment.

The health and morale of the crew was excellent during the first three (3) weeks on the line, but with scheduled tours extended and replenishment modified to a nightly basis instead of the usual third day replenishment, a definite fatigue was prevalent and the morale declined noticeably. A scheduled R&R visit to Hong Kong was cancelled which also attributed to the decline in morale.

h. Dental

The Dental Health of the Ship during this period was very good. No infectious diseases were noted. The Dental Department operated with two Dental Officers during this period.

The following statistics are submitted:

Sittings	1221
Restorations	817

PART VII Summary of Recommendations

Reference Page 12, section (1), paragraph (c), (Flight Characteristics and performance)

.....It is therefore considered highly desirable that the jet fighter aircraft assigned any air group be all the same type.

Reference Page 12, section (2), (Rescheduling, Delayed Air Operations)

When scheduled air operations are delayed until further notice, or are to commence with a later event.....

Reference Page 13, section (2), (Heavy aircraft handling)

It is recommended that control of returning aircraft in adverse weather conditions not be assigned to new arrivals on the line until their air controllers have an opportunity to gain experience by controlling multiple aircraft in VFR conditions.

Operations

Reference Page 15, section (2), (CIC)

...To improve IFF presentation and derive maximum benefit from the SX search system, a request has been initiated for authorization to re-install a slaved antenna on the SX platform.....

Reference Page 19, Recommendations 1-8, (Communications)

1. That CVA's acting as flag ships.....

2. That enough radiomen be assigned.....

3. That incentives be provided to encourage.....

4. That visual communications with yard arm blinkers.....

5. That the allowance for a hand operated ditto machine....

6. That a standard ditto mat message form for CVA's.....

7. That the requirement for originators of messages to use abbreviation NOTAL.....

8. That all junior officers ordered to CVA's be ordered to a course of instruction in cryptography prior.....

[redacted]

Gunnery

Reference Page 27, section (4), paragraph c.

...This command feels that the Elwood Rig is preferable to the Elokomin especially.....

Air

Reference Page 29, section 2, paragraph (2)

....It is believed that this method is more desirable and results in a faster re-reeve.....

Reference Page 29, section 2, paragraph (3)

.....It is considered that a more effective ventilation system should be installed in catapult pump rooms.....

Air Task Group ONE

Reference Page 16, paragraph c.

....It is strongly recommended that the minimum number of pilots assigned to a 14 plane jet squadron be set at.....

Reference Page 17, paragraph d. (last part)

....It is recommended that Ordnance personnel be increased by six.....

Reference Page 19, paragraph (2)

.....It is recommended that where squadrons of air groups are separated, provisions be made for group.....

Reference Page 19, paragraph (4)

.....It is recommended that F9F-5 aircraft or aircraft of equivalent weight not be operated.....

Reference Page 19, paragraph (5)

...It is therefore recommended that the aircraft allowance for ATG-1 be reduced....

Reference Page 20, paragraph (9)

...It is recommended that transmissions on the strike control frequency be held to a minimum and restricted to the following

[redacted]

specific topics....

Reference Page 20, paragraph (10)

....It is recommended that more control frequencies.....

Reference Page 21, paragraph (17)

....It is recommended that ASP and DASP flights be shortened and number per day.....

Reference Page 22, paragraph (3b)

....It is recommended that an allowance list for squadrons of 30 1:250,000 charts.....

Reference Page 22, paragraph (4b)

....It is recommended that larger scale photographs be taken of the more difficult Cherokee.....

Reference Page 26, paragraph c. 1-3

....Based on current experience in the employment of the MK32 Mod 1 rocket in combat operations.....

Reference Page 27, paragraph (2d)

....It is recommended that dearming doctrine for each type of gun.....

Reference Page 28, paragraph (4d)

....Another cause for rockets failing to fire is.....

Reference Page 28, paragraph (6a)

....The ANM-20 MM feed mechanism received on replacement aircraft had not been.....

Reference Page 29, paragraph (E3)

....AP-630 It is recommended that a complete.....

Reference Page 29, paragraph (E4)

....The majority of the discrepancies of the ARR-2A were traced to.....

[redacted]

Reference Page 29, paragraph (E2)

....It is felt that AN/ARC-1 discrepancies would be sharply reduced.....

Reference Page 29, paragraph (E6)

....It is recommended that the 955 tubes be tested for dynamic balance.....

Reference Page 30, paragraph (E10)

....The VC-3 detachment experienced great difficulty in keeping the APS-19 radar.....

Reference Page 30, Survival, paragraph (F1)

....Probably the most serious handicap that confronted.....

Reference Page 30, paragraph (F2)

....It is recommended that the wooden stock of the carbine.....

Reference Page 31, paragraph (F5)

....The wearing of the exposure suit.....

M. B. GURNEY

[redacted]

[redacted]

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO(advance)	2
CINCPACFLT(advance)	2
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP	1
COMNAVFE(advance)	1
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP	1
COMSEVENTHFLT(advance)	1
CTF 77(advance)	1
COMAIRPAC	5
COMSERVPAC	1
COMFAIRALAMEDA	1
COMFAIRJAPAN	1
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	1
CO, FAIRBETUPAC	2
COMFAIRHAWAII	1
NLO, JOC, KOREA	1
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA9)	1
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA33)	1
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA34)	1
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47)	1
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45)	1
CO, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA39)	1
CO, USS TARAWA (CVA40)	1
CO, USS WASP (CVA18)	1
CO, USS HORNET (CVA12)	1
CO, USS YORKTOWN (CVA10)	1
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA37)	1
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL29)	1
CO, USS BAIROKO (CVE115)	1
CO, USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE116)	1
CO, USS RENDOVA (CVE114)	1
CO, USS SICILY (CVE118)	1
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE119)	1
COMCARDIV ONE	1
COMCARDIV THREE	1
COMCARDIV FIVE	1
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN	1
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN	1
ATG 1	5
ATG 2	1
CVG 2	1
CVG 3	1
CVG 4	1
CVG 5	1
CVG 6	1
CVG 9	1
CVG 11	1

[redacted]

[redacted]

CVG 12	1
CVG 14	1
CVG 15	1
CVG 17	1
CVG 19	1
VC 3	1
VC 11	1
VC 35	1
VC 61	1

[redacted]

U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA-21/02-jsj
A4-3
Ser: 0415

10 August 1953

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 1 July through 27 July 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951
(b) OPNAV Notice 5215 dated 20 May 1953

Encl: (1) ATG-1 conf ltr ser 011 dtd 7 August 1953; Action Report of Carrier Air Task Group ONE (1 July - 27 July 1953)

1. Since the forms for Operational Reports, NWIP 10-1, have not been received by this command, this Action Report is submitted in compliance with references (a) and (b) to cover the period from 1 July through 27 July 1953.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

(1) On 1 July 1953, in accordance with CTF-77 confidential dispatch 300834Z June 1953, the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) with Air Task Group ONE embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan enroute to the operating area.

(2) Rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was effected the morning of 4 July 1953. The SOPA, OTC, and CTF-77 was RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE in PRINCETON. Ships present at the time of rendezvous included the PRINCETON and PHILIPPINE SEA. The LAKE CHAMPLAIN joined the force on 13 July and operated with it for the remainder of this period. At various times during this period the NEW JERSEY joined the force.

b. Mission

The mission of the BOXER, as a component of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, is set forth in Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN Op-Order 2-52. Briefly stated it is as follows:

[redacted]

[redacted]

(1) Assist in the program for the systematic interdiction of enemy movement and resupply over the Northeast Korean railroads, road complexes, and storage areas.

(2) Destroy electric power generating plants and electric distribution systems in Northeast Korea.

(3) Furnish Close Air Support to and air strikes in support of front line ground forces, coordinating operations with Fifth Air Force, Korea, through the Joint Operations Center, Korea.

(4) Protect the Task Force against air, surface, and submarine attacks.

(5) Assist the UN Blockading and Escort Force in over-all defense and local ground defense of friendly Korean Islands as required using air support.

(6) Conduct Photo and armed reconnaissance in support of the interdiction program, providing photographs and photographic interpretation studies.

(7) Provide air cover for UN Naval Forces as directed.

PART II Chronological Order of Events

1 July 1953

At 1809, in accordance with CTF-77 confidential dispatch 300834Z June 1953, the BOXER underway, enroute to the operating area via Tsugaru Straits.

2 July 1953

Steaming independently enroute to the operating area.

3 July 1953

Enroute to the operating area. At 0755, the RADFORD (DD446) joined the BOXER as escort. Captain M. B. GURNEY, USN was OTC.

4 July 1953

BOXER joined Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN at 0850. RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, in PRINCETON was CTF-77. Scheduled air operations were cancelled due to inclement weather over Northeast Korea.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5 July 1953

Commencing at 0309, forty-five (45) combat sorties were launched and a new record of 60,000 landings was set. Weather precluded afternoon air operations. The Task Force replenished.

At 0311 LT C. R. JOHNSON, USN, 290729, VC-35, flying an AD-4N BuNo 126944, was forced to ditch his plane forward of the ship due to a power failure. LT JOHNSON and crewman D. G. KENNEDY, ACAN, USN, 431 12 64 were rescued by the U.S.S. SUMNER (DD-692), but crewman M. J. WRIGHT, AO1, USN, 250 72 91, was not recovered. LT JOHNSON sustained injuries of the right leg and back.

At 0741 LT(jg) J. L. AKAGI, USNR, 505124, VF-194, flying an AD-4Q BuNo 124055 was forced to ditch forward of the ship due to loss of power. The pilot was rescued uninjured by the BOXER's helicopter.

6 July 1953

Inclement weather limited the day's air operations. Commencing at 0307 six (6) sorties were launched.

7 July 1953

Weather precluded air operations early in the day. Commencing at 1456 a total of fifty-five (55) sorties were launched.

The following voice communication from CTF-77 was received:

"THE EXPEDITIOUS MANNER PREPARATIONS WERE MADE FOR LAUNCH WAS NOTED WITH PLEASURE X WELL DONE"

8 July 1953

Commencing at 0630, one hundred and twenty (120) sorties were launched.

At 1421, LT T. F. O'CONNOR, USNR, 430961, VF-52, flying an F9F-2 BuNo 122579 was forced to ditch at sea due to an engine flare-back. The pilot was rescued uninjured by the U.S.S. SMALLEY (DD-565).

The Task Force replenished at night.

9 July 1953

No air operations were conducted due to non-operational weather. In connection with the BOXER's recovery of the PRINCETON's

[redacted]

aircraft, the following dispatch was received:

CTF-77 090330Z

"PILOT AIR DISCIPLINE AND CIC AIR CONTROL PERFORMANCE DURING IFR RECOVERIES TODAY WAS OUTSTANDING X WELL DONE"

Replenishment was conducted during early afternoon and evening.

10 July 1953

Weather seriously hampered the day's scheduled air operations, but commencing at 1026 forty-five (45) combat sorties were launched.

The Task Force replenished during the night.

11 July 1953

Commencing at 0727, a total of one hundred and one (101) combat sorties were flown.

Replenishment was conducted during the night.

12 July 1953

Early morning air operations were cancelled due to inclement weather. Beginning at 0726 one hundred and seventeen (117) sorties were launched.

13 July 1953

Commencing at 0304 a total of sixty-one (61) combat sorties were launched. Weather precluded late afternoon and evening air operations.

At 0309 LT W. A. HAYES, USNR, 485783, VC-3, flying an F4U-5N BuNo 121912, was forced to ditch forward of the ship due to loss of power. The pilot was rescued uninjured by the U.S.S. CARPENTER (DD-825).

Replenishment was conducted during the night.

14 July 1953

Inclement weather limited the day's scheduled air operations to forty-nine (49) sorties.

At about 0500, routine radio contact was lost with an AD-4N BuNo 125738 piloted by LT R. A. SMITH, USNR, 320896, VC-35, and

[redacted]

aircrewmen J. S. KENNEDY, AEAN, USN, 460 77 50, VC-35 and T. H. GUYN, ADAN, USN, 433 44 29, VC-35. Radio contact was not regained and they are listed Missing in Action.

At 1606 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, in LAKE CHAMPLAIN relieved RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, in PRINCETON as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

15 July 1953

Weather prohibited early morning air operations and limited the day's sorties to thirty-one (31).

16 July 1953

Weather precluded early morning air operations, but commencing at 0631 a total of one hundred and eleven (111) sorties were flown.

At 0606 the BOXER and the PRINCETON, accompanied by four destroyers, left Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, and formed Task Unit 77.3.1. RADM R. E. BLICK, USN in PRINCETON was OTC and CTU 77.3.1.

17 July 1953

Weather delayed scheduled air operations until 1630. Twenty-eight (28) combat sorties were launched.

At 2127, Task Unit 77.3.1 joined Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and Task Unit 92.1.1. RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN in LAKE CHAMPLAIN was CTF-77.

18 July 1953

Weather limited the day's combat sorties to thirty-four (34).

At 1310 RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, assumed OTC Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. At 1707 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, assumed OTC Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

19 July 1953

Inclement weather delayed air operations until 1330. A total of forty-four (44) combat sorties were launched.

20 July 1953

The Task Force replenished during non-operational weather

in the morning. Commencing at 1500, twenty-four (24) combat sorties were flown.

21 July 1953

No air operations conducted due to inclement weather over the Task Force and Northeast Korea.

The Task Force replenished during the night.

22 July 1953

Commencing at 0532, a total of seventy-seven (77) sorties were flown.

23 July 1953

Air Operations began at 0459 and one hundred and fifteen (115) combat sorties were launched.

At 1047 LT D. R. PAUL, USN, 321131, VC-61, flying an F2H-2P BuNo 12879 crashed into the sea upon entering the landing pattern. The cause of the crash was undetermined and LT PAUL was not recovered.

The 61,000th landing was made this date.

The Task Force replenished during the night.

24 July 1953

Commencing at 0500, one hundred and twenty (120) sorties were flown. At about 0520, LCDR J. J. KINSELLA, USN, 114399, VF-52, flying an F9F-2 BuNo 123672 crash landed in friendly territory after his aircraft was damaged by bomb blast, when he inadvertently dropped his bombs on a rocket run. LCDR KINSELLA suffered second degree burns of the face and hands and was evacuated to the U.S.S. REPOSE (AH-16)

The Task Force replenished during the night.

25 July 1953

Commencing at 0500, a total of one hundred and fifty-two (152) sorties were launched.

At about 1155, LT(jg) J. W. INGRAM, USNR, 496331, VF-151, flying an F9F-2, BuNo 123619, was unable to parachute from his plane after being hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. LT(jg) INGRAM ditched

[redacted]

his plane about four (4) miles south of TANCHON. An AMS recovered his body which had been thrown clear of his aircraft. He died of multiple wounds.

The Task Force replenished during the night.

26 July 1953

One hundred and fifty-one (151) combat sorties were flown.

At 0305, CTF-77 directed the Task Force to set Condition One-Able-Able when numerous unidentified air contacts appeared on Force radar scopes. The Task Force engaged in evasive manouvers and at 0356 the BOXER launched two (2) night Corsairs. No enemy contacts were observed by the night fighters and at 0438, CTF-77 signalled WARNING WHITE and the Task Force secured from Condition One-Able-Able.

At 1641 ENS T. F. LEDFORD, USNR, 554380, VF-151, flying an F9F-2 BuNo 127210 ditched forward of the ship. The cause of the accident was not determined and the pilot was not recovered.

The Task Force replenished during the night.

27 July 1953

Commencing at 0613, a total of seventy-seven (77) combat sorties were flown.

At 2200 the Korean cease-fire went into effect.

The Task Force replenished at night.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(See Part VI, para c. below)

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See Enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties

There were no combat casualties suffered by Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action. Air Group casualties are reported in enclosure (1).

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. Performance

(1) Morale was excellent although personnel were afforded very little time for recreation due to intensive air operations. BOXER in port seven (7) days in the last ninety (90) days. Forty-six (46) men reported for duty and twenty (20) were transferred comprising an average of 2016 enlisted in ship's company over the period of this report. Fifteen (15) men returned from temporary additional duty and one departed on temporary additional duty. At present a total of forty-five (45) men are absent on temporary additional duty, including four (4) on annual leave to the Philippines, one (1) to Guam, and thirteen (13) on emergency leave to the continental U.S.. RM, FC/FT and ET ratings are still critically short although one (1) FTC reported and one (1) ETC and two (2) ET3's are enroute.

(2) During this period twelve (12) officers reported and four (4) were detached. Seventeen (17) officers have orders to report, ten (10) of whom are Ensigns, and ten (10) officers have orders for detachment.

(3) Twelve Wardroom guests were aboard during this period, comprising both civilian personnel and officers from other branches of the Armed Forces. The duration of their visits varied from three (3) days to three weeks.

(4) There were a total of twelve (12) mast cases during this period. One (1) special court and eleven (11) non-judicial punishments were awarded.

(5) A total of eighteen hundred sixty-seven dollars ($1867.00) was contributed by ship and air group personnel to the Japanese Flood Relief Fund.

c. Training

(1) Departmental and Division training was carried on as conditions permitted.

(2) The Training Room was used for Divisional training classes, supervised group study, advancement in rate lectures, testing, health and hygiene lectures, church services, and recreational movies in the evenings.

(3) The I & E program administered the GED tests (high school level) to ninety-five (95) men. Correspondence has been initiated on the part of thirty (30) of those men to obtain their high

[redacted]

school diplomas; the others are being further counseled before applying. Three (3) EOC exams and seven (7) college level exams were also administered. After-hour classes continue in mathematics. The availability of ample space for part of this period facilitated the examining of such number of men.

(4) Two (2) Lieutenant Commanders, who had no previous deck experience, were checked out as officers of the deck underway.

d. Public Information

Total news releases and feature articles originated within this command are as follows:

(1) 23 news photos and captions
(2) 5 feature stories with 12 accompanying photos
(3) 1 dispatch news story
(4) 1 hometown news story

The Public Information Office published the daily BOXER PRESS, a four page photo-offset newspaper, using ship's news and world news received via radio-teletypo. In addition, a four page weekly feature Parade supplement was edited containing ship's news and photographs as well as AFPS articles and pictures.

News and feature material was forwarded daily by dispatch to CTF-77 for use in operation summaries, and in feature stories about the force's four-carrier maximum-effort operations. BOXER operation summaries were sent as the day's action developed, and on many days two (2) or three (3) such summaries were sent.

A combat camera group was aboard TAD from NAS, Atsugi, Japan.

e. Religious Activities

Protestant Bible classes were held weekly at 1800 to 1900. For the month of July those classes were held on Sunday. Protestant Communion services were held on the second Sunday of the month. Protestant Divine services were held each Sunday at 1000. Latter Day Saints Services were held each Sunday at 0830, and a study class was held weekly for the Latter Day Saints. Christian Science Services were held each Sunday at 1000. The Protestant Choir met twice weekly for practice, and on Sunday they contributed to the religious service. Lectures were held on "Marriage and the Family". These lectures were based on the "Armed Forces Character Guidance Program". Sunday Masses were held at 0630 and 0900. Weekly Mass was held at 1630. Confessions were held before and after each Mass. The two Chaplains alternated in conducting evening prayer.

f. Recreational Activities

Movies were shown nightly in the Wardroom, CPO Lounge, First Class Mess, Training Room, and the Mess Decks. Whenever possible the hangar deck was used for movies, with two performances on that evening. During operations thirty-nine (39) different programs were shown for a total of two hundred twenty-seven (227) times. A late evening movie was held in the Training Room for personnel unable to attend the regular showings. Snacks were served to the crew each evening after movies. A Happy Hour was held for the ship on the hangar deck during the last in-port period. This was paid for by the Recreation Fund. The library was open from 0900 to 2100 daily. Library books were well used. Three hundred seventy-four (374) magazines were distributed. Three hundred (300) pocket books were received and distributed. One hundred fifty (150) hard bound books were received and put in circulation. Two thousand three hundred (2300) books were loaned through the library. The BOXER studio furnished a news broadcast at 0700 and 1230 daily. A music program is held daily from 1100 to 1300 and from 1600 to 1800. An exercise room for physical conditioning of officers and men was open daily.

Space for more bunks and lockers?

PART VI Comments

a. Operations

(1) Air Operations

Three (3) officers and nine (9) enlisted men were assigned to Air Plot Watch. The Air Operations Watch consisted of one (1) officer and three (3) enlisted men during early morning and night operations. Two (2) officers and five enlisted personnel during daylight operations. Two (2) enlisted personnel were on duty during such periods when the ship had night ready deck, or aircraft in a readiness condition.

During early morning and night air operations the 2-JG sound power phones were not manned. Launch and recovery data was sent to the ready rooms over the MC circuit.

The X-JA sound power circuit was manned during all air operations. One (1) station was manned in Air Plot and the other on the bridge. The bridge watch maintained a status board by means of grease pencil. The board was mounted in the window frame just aft of the Captain's chair. This board was made of plexiglass and had sections ruled off to show the number of aircraft scheduled for each event by type with the launch and recovery times. The number of aircraft by type, the number of aircraft with hung ordnance by side

number, the critical fuel state by type aircraft figured on the distance to the nearest landing field, the bearing and distance to the nearest landing field, any unusual circumstances such as aircraft in the lame duck circle, strays, etc., the Task Force ready deck schedule, and the latest Korean weather.

Air Operations maintained a manifest in Air Plot of all passengers embarking and debarking by helicopter and COD. Helicopter and COD flights were met on the flight deck by Air Operations personnel. Embarking COD passengers were taken to Air Plot where the Mess Treasurer assigned quarters and the Ship's Writer checked orders. Debarking passengers reported to Air Plot forty-five (45) minutes prior to scheduled take-off time for aircraft assignment. COD arrivals and departures were announced over the ship's loud speaker system, airlines style, upon arrival and forty-five (45) minutes prior to departure.

(2) CIC

During the in-port period prior to deployment for Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN operations as covered in this report the RHI system of the SX radar was restored to service. The effectiveness of the equipment gradually improved and at the end of the period altitude information was obtained consistently up to range of forty-five (45) miles.

The full allowance of eight (8) CIC Watch Officers is now on board. One (1) officer has qualified as Officer of the Deck underway and the training program will continue with one (1) officer at a time being detailed to duty under instruction on the bridge until qualified. All deck watch officers have received checkouts and have stood watches in CIC for indoctrination.

In response to the request outlined in the last Action Report, the Chief of Naval Operations has authorized a second Mark X IFF installation for the BOXER. It is expected that the work will be accomplished during the next in-port availability. IFF will then be available with SX radar and additional facilities for presentation will be afforded in CIC.

(3) Photo Interpretation

During the second tour on the line twenty-three (23) successful photo sorties were flown.

The P.I. personnel for this tour consisted of two (2) officers and three (3) enlisted men. In order to maintain round the clock service and operational efficiency, a working schedule was pro-

[redacted]

parod allotting each man a fourteen hour watch. One (1) officer was assigned the day shift to prepare all the photo debriefs, while the other officer worked the night shift and was responsible for the preparation of the P.I. report. The enlisted men's schedule required a two (2) man watch (0900-2300 & 1500-0500) for the interpretation work; and assisted by the third watch (2100-1100) who helped in the plotting and prepared the mosiacs. This system appeared to be satisfactory in all respects especially during a heavy work load.

Many types of rubber cement underwent experimentation of which two (2) were found to be satisfactory. Neither is a standard Navy Stock Item and has to be acquired through open order purchase. The trade names are: "Dabit Cement" manufactured by Simons Laboratory Inc. and "Best Test" manufactured by the Union Rubber and Asbestos Company of Trenton, New Jersey.

The P.I. section in cooperation with the Photo Lab and Air Group experimented with ozalid copies of target mosiacs. A positive transparency was made from a target mosiac negative. From this positive ozalid copies were reproduced. These were found to be unsatisfactory in detail and difficult to reproduce with present equipment. Further experimentation along this line is advocated.

(4) Communications

a. Personnel. The communication section operated during this period with a small fraction of the authorized allowance of rated radiomen and quartermasters. The experience gained from a previous extensive tour on the line qualified the non-rated men to handle jobs efficiently that were heretofore considered to be billets for rated men.

b. Training. Although training was principally the "on the job" type, the program has produced gratifying results in that forty (40) men in the section have completed the requirements for advancement in rating, have been recommended and are scheduled to participate in the forthcoming fleet-wide examinations. Daily formal drills and instructions were held in procedure, routine maintenance and operational adjustments to communication equipment, transmitting and receiving and cryptography.

c. Material. Visual communications material functioned satisfactorily. A reduced requirement for continuous radio circuit guards permitted the carrying out of a realistic routine maintenance program. At the end of the period over ninety percent (90%) of the radio transmitters and near one hundred percent (100%) of the radio receivers were in operating condition. The model TCZ transmitter

[redacted]

proved unsatisfactory for use as a homing beacon. No adverse reports on the performance of the TAJ transmitter were received when this equipment was employed for TROUT. The model URT-4 transmitter continues to be a great maintenance problem. UHF and VHF equipment operated satisfactorily.

d. Postal Communications. During a period extending from 2 to 17 July only one (1) delivery of U. S. Mail was received on board. After this period mail was received each time a ship in the replenishment group came out from Sasebo or Yokosuka. A total of three hundred seventy (370) bags of mail were received and dispatched by this ship during the entire period. One thousand six hundred fifty-three (1653) money orders for a total value of $67,033.98 were sold.

e. Message Traffic. A total of fifteen thousand two hundred three (15,203) messages were processed. General messages were received promptly and solid files were maintained throughout the period. Delays in the processing of messages received were rare and caused by the failure on the part of the originator or the re-addressing authority to use the proper channel for the addressees and to employ the abbreviation "NOTAL" when referring to messages not held by addressees. Outgoing messages were infrequently delayed as a result of overloaded circuit conditions.

(5) Aerology

The weather during the period 4 to 27 July 1953 was of predominantly monsoonal characteristics, with twelve (12) of the twenty-four (24) days having a prevailing wind direction between Southeast and Southwest, and with general low pressure existing over the area from northern Manchuria to southern China. Only two (2) migratory cyclones crossed into the Sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea during July as compared to eleven (11) in June.

The first of these centers, Typhoon KIT, crossed Korea near the 38th parallel and passed approximately one hundred (100) miles north of the Task Force on the morning of 7 July, with southwesterly winds reaching forty-four (44) knots and gusts to fifty-five (55) knots. As the storm proceeded eastward over Korea, a weak secondary center developed and stagnated in the Yellow Sea. The strong southerly flow in advance of the typhoon produced low ceilings and rain for two (2) days before the center reached the Sea of Japan. Rapid clearing followed the passage of the center, as the wind veered to northerly.

The second migratory cyclone, which moved into the Sea of Japan on 13 July, developed as a wave on the polar front in the

[redacted]

vicinity of Shanghai. The center moved rapidly eastward over Korea and stagnated in the northern Sea of Japan. Once again, operations were hampered by low ceilings and rain in advance of the low center, followed by rapid clearing with the passage of the center and resultant wind shift to the north. In this case, however, a trough developed to the southwest into a low center over China, and the weather in the operating area rapidly deteriorated. This trough remained semi-stationary for seven (7) days (14 to 21 July) and the resultant flow of very moist air from the south and east over the cooler water along the North Korean coast produced dense fog, which dissipated only temporarily in the early afternoon. During this period a ridge of high pressure was developing south and east of the Japanese islands. By the 22nd of July this ridge extended over the East China Sea and the resultant lower level wind flow over Korea had veered to the southwest. This situation persisted until 27 July and produced downslope motion along the Korean east coast with resultant low humidities and clearing skies. At the same time, the mountainous terrain of central Korea afforded excellent lifting for the warm moist air from the Yellow Sea, and convective activity and thunderstorms developed overland.

The amount of cloudiness and low ceilings increased over the month of June with more than eight-tenths of the sky covered for seventy-three percent (73%) of the time and ceilings below five thousand feet (5000') fifty-four percent (54%) of the time. Fog and/or low ceilings occurred with moderate wind flow from south to east, and caused unfavorable flying conditions for almost thirty percent (30%) of the time. In most instances, the fog or stratus developed in the early evening and would dissipate late at night, forming again near sunrise and persisting throughout the morning. The most favorable flying conditions occurred with the general wind flow from north to southwest, producing offshore winds in the east coast operating area.

Flight operations were not seriously affected by insufficient wind during this period, although ordnance loadings on jet aircraft were reduced on several occasions when winds decreased to less than four (4) knots.

Due to inclement weather during this twenty-four (24) day period, flight operations were cancelled on four (4) full days and reduced to less than half a day's operation on twelve (12) other days.

[redacted]

AEROLOGICAL SUMMARY
OPERATING PERIOD
4 July - 27 July 1953

Temperature	
Average	71 deg
Average Max	75 deg
Average Min	68 deg
Absolute Max	84 deg
Absolute Min	59 deg

Sky Condition	% Total Time
Overcast	55.2%
Cloudy	18.2%
Partly Cloudy	10.6%
Mostly Clear	16.0%

Hours of precipitation	73
Average Relative Humidity	87%
Hours of Fog	111

Surface Wind Prevailing Direction	Days
N	2
NNE	3
NE	2
ENE	0
E	1
ESE	2
SE	0
SSE	5
S	3
SSW	2
SW	2
WSW	1
W	0
WNW	0
NW	0
NNW	1

Ceilings	% Total Time
Below 1000'	29.3%
1000-5000'	25.1%
5000-10,000'	15.1%
Above 10,000'	30.5%

Visibilities	% Total Time
Under 1 Mile	8.0%
1-3 Miles	4.0%
3-6 Miles	12.6%
Over 6 Miles	75.4%

Percentage Flying Conditions

BAD (Ceilings less than 1000')- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 28.8%
(Visibility less than 3 miles)
AVERAGE (Ceiling 1000-5000')- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 30.1%
(Visibility 3-6 miles)
GOOD (Ceiling over 5000') - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 41.1%
(Visibility over 6 miles)

b. Supply

(1) Commissary

Provision replenishment was received at sea twice while in the operating area during the period 1 July to 27 July 1953.

Date	Ship	Tons Ordered	Tons Received	Loading Time
9 July	USS ALSTEDE (AF-48)	57	51.1	80 min.
20 July	USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29)	88	70	60 min.

Sandwiches were regularly provided for the refueling and rearming working parties. Hamburgers, grilled cheese or hot dogs were the most popular types of sandwiches served. Sandwiches were served on fifteen (15) different occasions during this period on the line.

During this same period 6,786 complete night rations, an average of 251 per day, were prepared and served to the night crew.

Sandwiches and coffee were provided for the crew after the evening movie on days when bad weather conditions prevented regular flying operations.

Graham flour has not been available to the BOXER at any time since arrival in the Far East area. It is recommended that this type flour be carried by the provision ships, as it is valuable as a means of supplying greater variety in the bakery products.

The following amounts of provision items were consumed during this operating period:

Flour	37,450 lbs.	Meat, preserved	6,361 lbs.
Vegetables, canned	22,238 lbs.	Meat, salted & smoked	20,546 lbs.
Vegetables, fresh	89,026 lbs.	Meat, fresh & boneless	54,552 lbs.
Vegetables, frozen	13,866 lbs.	Sugar, powdered, brown and granulated	34,010 lbs.
Fruit, canned	16,612 lbs.	Beverages, coffee, tea and cocoa	7,811 lbs.
Fruit, fresh	18,555 lbs.	Milk, evaporated	6,215 lbs.
Fruit, frozen	3,131 lbs.	Milk, fresh	1,694 lbs.
Fruit, preserved	4,892 lbs.	Milk, powdered whole	5,730 lbs.
Fruit, juices	6,448 lbs.	Butter	9,411 lbs.
Cereals, starches & rice	5,593 lbs.	Eggs, fresh	7,903 doz.
Oils, sauces and vinegar	770 gal.	Shortening	9,406 lbs.
Cheese, grated, processed and cottage	3,231 lbs.		

(2) Ship's Store and C&SS

During the month of July, Ship's Store sales amounted to $51,269.00 and C&SS sales were $9,571.00. Closing inventory valuation of Ship's Store stock was $92,592.00 and $41,791.00 for C&SS. Net profit realized from Ship's Store operations during this period was $5,607.78.

Adequate stocks of all Ship's Store items were available for sales during July. Heavy sales resulted in some stock items being reduced to an approximate thirty (30) day stock level but receipts from replenishment requisitions issued on supply sources are expected to

[redacted]

relieve this situation prior to reduction of stocks to a serious level.

(3) Aviation Supply

Depletion of a number of high usage items was experienced during the second tour on the "Battle Line". This condition was caused by the excessive time planes were in the air due to the large number of missions flown. Receiving all replenishment ships at night, during this period, allowed continual all day flight operations.

A total of 1,863 line items were received on stub requisition requests. Of these requests ninety-eight percent (98%) of the line items were furnished.

The U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS-8) replenished aviation stores at sea on 27 July 1953. Approximately eleven (11) tons of supplies, including transhipment cargo was received. This amounted to seventy-two percent (72%) of the items requisitioned as compared with the seventy-eight percent (78%) receipt of items from the Juno requisitions submitted to the JUPITER.

There were nine (9) ACOG's during this operating period. Six (6) of the ACOG's were AD-4N's down for two (2) to three (3) days for Gyro Horizon Indicators, stock number R88-I-1325-015-000. The VF-194 Squadron has prepared RUDM's on the indicators.

Failure of Aileron Booster Valves, stock number R83-AP-25400-20 continues to be a major cause of ACOG's. During this operating period stocks of this item were exhausted from available stock of all Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN carriers and other sources in the Far East. BOXER transferred nine (9) of the original stock of thirteen (13) valves on board to the three (3) other carriers of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN when they were faced with ACOG's. In addition to the thirteen (13) valves which were on board BOXER, an additional three (3) were recovered through salvage from dud aircraft. Subsequent valve failures on BOXER used the remaining seven (7) valves and caused one (1) ACOG as the eighth valve was unavailable when required. A re-outfitting requisition CVA21/7456-53 submitted to AMO, MSC Oakland in December 1952 for seven (7) of these valves is still outstanding. Vigorous follow-up action by the ship to ASO Philadelphia first established a delivery date of 30 June by the contractor; this later was delayed to an anticipated delivery of the week of 14 August 1953.

Other ACOG's were as follows:

[redacted]

AIRCRAFT	STOCK NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE	SOURCE SUPPLY	NO. DAYS ACOG
F4U-4	R82-CV-VS-40106	Stabilizer	USS PHILIPPINE SEA	1
AD-4N	R82-DG-5267222	Seal Assy.	USS PRINCETON	1
AD-4W	R86-GE-CR2795B100A1	Regulator	USS JUPITER	3

A meeting of Supply Officers from Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN carriers was held 19 July aboard the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN. Purpose of this meeting was to discuss procedures for the timely transfer of critical material within the Force and to standardize phraseology in order to reduce size of messages being transmitted through the communications system.

Two (2) ACOG dispatches were transmitted to ASD, NSC Oakland from the U.S.S. JUPITER dtg 160830Z June covering requisition CVA21/8891-53 for one (1) each Shaft R82-DG-4254985 and dtg 201337Z June covering requisition CVA21/8907-53 for one (1) each Line Assy R83-DG-5256715-98 and one (1) each Line Assy R83-DG-5256715-94. Each of the action copies of the dispatches used as packing copies for shipment were stamped in bold letters "Air Cargo" "ACOG", however, the packages were mailed by regular parcel post. They were ultimately received on board BOXER 20 and 26 July respectively. However, a "Dud" aircraft had become available during the interim, from which these parts were procured, but had this not occurred the aircraft would have been grounded for a period of thirty-six (36) days.

(4) General Supply

During the period 10 May to 27 July 1953 the requirements for breathing oxygen and technical oxygen were adequately met by the tankers, through the substitution of breathing for technical when required.

Requirements for CO2 Regular averaged about four (4) cylinders per day, which was approximately ten (10) cylinders each replenishment. Required amounts were not always available but in all instances partial quantities were supplied. The lack of CO2 cylinders with valve SNSN G58-V-198-25 is noted.

Replenishment of ten (10) pound acetylene cylinders from tankers was not possible. BOXER requirements of five (5) for testing purposes was filled at NSD Yokosuka prior to departure of BOXER for this tour. A stock of the small acetylene cylinders should be carried by tankers replenishing the force.

Commander Service Squadron THREE Notice 4442 set the load to be carried by NavFe tankers as:

CO2, 50 lb.	5
Freon 12, 50 lb.	1
Nitrogen, water pumped (184 cuft.)	1

Allowance of compressed gases in the amount listed is hardly enough to make replacements for those used even though the carrier leaves port with capacity allowance. In addition, if more than one (1) carrier or other vessel draws from the tanker each replenishment, this results in some ships being unable to replenish to allowance. Further, the uncertain schedules for rotation to port, dictated by current war efforts, does not allow vessels to anticipate waiting until arrival in port, but requires replenishment on each opportunity at sea in order to maintain maximum readiness. BOXER requirements for the period of this report were as follows:

	Required	Received
CO2 Regular 22 cu ft.	67	51
Freon 12, 50 lb.	42	34
CO2 Fire	10	0
Acetylene, 10 lb.	5	0
Nitrogen, 184 cu ft.	3	3

Ships operating in the forward area have been required to replenish General Stores material from Fleet Issue ships, with very little support from ashore activities on NIS items other than on "A" and "B" priorities. While a fleet issue ship carries an adequate stock of high usage items, it is impossible to stock and carry all items that a large vessel requires during operations for an indefinite length of time. Greater use of supplementary supply support from ashore supply sources would alleviate the difficulty of being unable to obtain supplies unavailable through mobile support before the need becomes so critical as to justify the use of priorities "A" or "B". It is impractical to assume that any large vessel can deploy from the West Coast with a complete range of stock for eight (8) months' cruising. Limitations of space, budgetary restrictions, and unavailability of certain items from West Coast supply sources all create a continuing need for many items during the period of deployment.

(5) Electronics

With the exception of replacement spare parts peculiar for two (2) experimental equipments, the AN/SPN-12 Airspeed Radar and the AN/URT-4 Radio Transmitter, supply of electronic spares has been satisfactory from both on board allowance and from supply activities in Japan. QK-259 magnetrons for the AN/SPN-12 are now arriving from the United States, which indicates a lag time between requisition and delivery of approximately three (3) months which is too long for this type of critical material. The conversion from APA to NSA for many parts was expeditiously accomplished, and so far has occasioned no delay or derangements in supply. It is likely that the visible stock records will insure improved control of stock level.

(6) Wardroom Mess

Limitation of storage space for Wardroom stores and the long at-sea period combined to cause the necessity for large purchases from the General Mess. All food served in the Wardroom during this tour on the line was drawn from the General Mess with the exception of 1,050 pounds of T-Bone Steaks, 600 pounds of Rainbow Trout, and 700 pounds of Frying Chickens. These items were purchased from certified Japanese sources. They were of excellent quality and greatly aided the variety of the Wardroom meals.

Because of the strenuous air operations schedule, odd hour meals had to be anticipated on practically a twenty-four (24) hour basis. It was found that a duty cook and pantryman were required from approximately 0100 until regular breakfast hours, in order to serve officers at the times required by operations. A snack bar was operated from 2000-2400 serving sandwiches of all varieties at 20¢, to the delight of younger officers and despair of those with developing waistlines.

Cost of operating the Wardroom Mess during the period of this report was extremely high due to the strenuous operations schedule and resultant meal service. It was found that many pilots and personnel concerned with early morning or late evening operations ate four (4) or more meals per day, since they were required to be at work unusually long hours.

(7) Disbursing

During the period 1 July to 27 July 1953, $290,800.00 was disbursed in payment of payrolls, $17,288.54 in payment of public vouchers, and checks amounting to $66,717.60 were exchanged for cash. Collections in the amount of $139,093.94 were received from the following sources:

Sales, Ship's Store	$36,499.10
Sales, Messes	$14,327.30
Sales, Clothing and Small Stores	$ 8,817.30
Sales, Soda Fountain	$ 6,594.81
Sales, Coke Machines	$ 1,730.00
Miscellaneous	$ 4,407.83
Cash exchanged for checks	$66,717.60

Transition of pay accounts for start of 1954 fiscal year was completed ahead of schedule and pay records were delivered for transmittal to BuSandA on 24 July 1953.

Records, reports and returns were completed in preparation for the relief of Ensign W. E. YOUNG, SC, USN by Ensign D. D. JOHNSON, SC, USN, assistant for disbursing on 1 August 1953.

c. Gunnery

(1) Performance of Ordnance Equipment and Material

(a) No anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted.

(b) During the month of 1 July to 27 July 1953 operations, all ordnance equipment functioned well with the exception of one (1) MK 56 G.F.C.S.. Out of four (4) systems one (1) was out of operation for a period of three weeks. This ship has one FT who has had schooling on this system and it is difficult for him to keep up on all casualties on the four (4) MK 56 G.F.C.S. as well as stand condition watches. This is necessary due to the shortage of FC personnel. It is recommended that at least two (2) FT's qualified on MK 56 G.F.C.S., be provided for ships having four (4) MK 56 G.F.C.S..

(2) Seamanship

During the period 1 July through 27 July 1953, the Gunnery Department conducted the following exercises:

Refueled destroyer (close-in)	2
Refueled from AO	10
Rearmed from AE	10
Reprovisioned from AF	3
Replenished from AVS	2
Highline transfers from various ships	23 (143 personnel)

The Elwood Rig was used exclusively on all AO's this ship refueled from with one (1) exception, that being from the AO 107 which used the Arwood-Thompson rig at the after fueling pocket.

All exercises were conducted in an outstanding manner, but during night replenishments several discrepancies were noted. It is felt that the replenishment ships should standardize the location and labeling of messengers passed between ships. In several instances it was noted that the messengers were not labeled in any fashion, thus causing undue delay on both ships in trying to ascertain the purpose of the messenger. It

[redacted]

was further noted that undue delay was caused in locating the shot line during night replenishments. This command feels that some type of illumination is a requisite for the shot line during darken ship, preferably in the way of a phosphorescent line.

Extreme success was achieved during night replenishments when the signalmen at the winches and highline used the Plastic Wand Assembly (stock number R-17-W-100, aviation stores) in lieu of the standard red lens on the flashlights. It was noted that confusion resulted on both ships when stray lights about the deck were taken as signals from the signalman.

d. Air

(1) General

The ship's aircraft complement for this period was two (2) F9F squadrons, one (1) AD-4NA squadron, one (1) F4U-4 squadron and the regular splinter detachments. The F9F-5 squadron previously embarked was exchanged for an F4U-4 squadron from the LAKE CHAMPLAIN primarily because of the limitations of the H4B catapult.

(2) Aircraft Handling

No basic handling advantage has been realized with the reduced number of jets as F9F type aircraft require less space on deck than standard props with a wing interlock spot. Respots for recovery have been accomplished more readily, however, because of the greater proportion of taxiable aircraft.

A somewhat reduced availability during this period created undesirable delays and some difficult handling problems. A smooth continuous launch can be effected only if there are no more than two (2) or three (3) dud jets in a sixteen (16) jet launch. A low availability for launch requires the digging of "up" aircraft from the hangar deck and the pack, thereby necessitating excessive aircraft handling which in turn tends to further disrupt maintenance in progress.

Experience indicates that an interim tie-down of three (3) lines for jets is not adequate even during smooth weather. Present doctrine requires five (5) lines properly secured on all jets before the plane captain vacates the cockpit. A "ready" secure of ten (10) lines is then immediately applied and is normally considered adequate during flight quarters. At all other times a normal secure or greater is required.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(3) Catapult and Arresting Gear

The exchange of our F9F-5 squadron for a Corsair squadron resulted in a decided reduction of catapult launches during this period. A total of 903 shots were made with 559 on the starboard catapult and 344 on the port catapult. The fewer launches, plus the use of lower launching pressures for the F9F-2, brought about a corresponding decrease in maintenance and upkeep. With the exception of a pump failure on the port catapult no unusual maintenance problems were noted. Satisfactory catapult operations were maintained, although an additional 10 - 20 seconds per aircraft were required in reaching launching pressure on the port catapult.

During this period a total of 1629 landings were completed. Eight (8) cross deck pendants required replacement due to wear, which is a notable decrease in usage. Jet tail skags continue to account for damage to yielding elements requiring frequent replacement of the elements.

(4) Aviation Gasoline

No difficulty was experienced with the gasoline system during this tour. The periodic inspection and cleaning of ship's gasoline filters, together with less frequent lubrication of plug valves, has resulted in a sharp decrease in the passage of contaminated fuel to aircraft. Only slight traces of the valve lubricant have been detected recently on the aircraft filters and strainers. Aviation gas has been replenished nine (9) times during the period of this report. A total of 781,405 gallons of aviation gasoline and 4,552 gallons of lube oil has been used.

c. Engineering

(1) Main Propulsion Plant

The main propulsion plant of this vessel continued to deliver combat readiness requirements in a notably efficient manner considering the extended operations under daily flight schedules necessitating replenishment periods each night.

(2) Electrical Installations

Number One 1250 K.W. turbo generator was operated exclusively for radar and evaporator power during air operations to eliminate surges in voltage which previously caused numerous

[redacted]

[redacted]

radar derangements. Number two generator was used to supply power to starboard catapult pump motors and number three or four was used to supply power to the port catapult pump motor. This condition precludes proper maintenance of number one and two generators as they were almost constantly in use.

The slip rings of the after 400 cycle generator are worn very badly and will require machining at next availability.

(3) Electronics Installation

The fluctuating voltage of the 1250 K.W. ship's service generator caused numerous radar equipment failures when catapult motors were started and placed "on stroke". This situation was temporarily rectified by operating number one turbo generator exclusively for supplying power to radar and evaporator power.

No TCK or TBM-11 armature failure occurred during this period.

The DBM low frequency antenna has been received on board and will be installed at the next availability period.

A critical shortage of trained personnel still exists.

(4) Training

COMAIRPAC Engineering Training Exercises must be conducted by each vessel on a continuous basis to keep watch personnel familiar with action to be taken in any emergency. Special emphasis should be placed upon steering casualties and loss of electrical power to vital circuits. This familiarity has assisted greatly in effecting prompt adjustment and repair.

f. Medical

A total of seventeen (17) patients were admitted to the sick list on the medical service. Significant in these is one (1) additional case of hypersensitivity to penicillin.

The following is a tabulation of the medical admissions during the period of this report:

EENT	6
SKIN	5
OTHER	6

[redacted]

The following is a tabulation of the work accomplished in the sick bay laboratory during the period 1 July through 27 July 1953:

Bacteriology	129
Serology	117
Urinalysis	19
Hematology	16
Miscellaneous	4

The following is a tabulation of venereal disease incidences for the period 1 July through 27 July 1953:

Syphilis	0
Chancroid	13
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	14
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	122
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	0
Total, all venereal diseases	149

For comparative purposes, venereal incidence during the two (2) periods previously reported on was:

	1st	2nd
Syphilis	0	0
Chancroid	9	13
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	13	14
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	53	122
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	0	0
Total, all venereal diseases	75	149

Venereal disease incidence aboard the BOXER as compared with venereal disease incidence given for ships of the Pacific Fleet (Statistics of Navy Medicine of July 1953, Vol. 9, No. 7) is as follows:

	Ships of PacFlt March 1953	BOXER
Urothritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	6.1%	4.74%
All other VD (Syphilis, GC, Chancroid)	4.12%	.96%
Total incidence of VD	10.22%	5.70%

It is considered noteworthy to point out that the 1st period of V.D. treatments represent those cases following a ten (10) day in-port period upon arrival from the United States, and those of the 2nd period represent those cases treated following a six (6) day in-port period incurred after forty-two (42) days operation.

A vigorous program of Venereal Disease training has been carried out.

[redacted]

There were one thousand seven hundred ninety-six (1,796) out patient calls during the period 1 July through 27 July 1953.

g. Dental

During this period the Dental Department operated with full complement.

There were no infectious diseases.

The following statistics are submitted.

Sittings	1071
Restorations	874

PART VII Summary of Recommendations

Reference page 12

.....Two satisfactory types of rubber cement.....

Reference page 16

.....Graham flour, 4th paragraph.....

Reference page 18, 3rd paragraph under (4) General Supply

.....A stock of small acetylene cylinders.....

Reference page 19, 2nd paragraph

.....Greater use of supplementary supply support.....

Reference page 21, paragraph c. (1), (b)

.....recommended that at least two FT's.....

Reference page 22, 1st paragraph

.....This command feels that some type of illumination.....

Reference page 22, 2nd paragraph

.....Used Plastic wand assembly in lieu of.....

Reference page 24, (4) Training

.....CominAirPac Engineering Training Exercises must be conducted.....

M. B. GURNEY

[redacted]

[redacted]

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO(advance)	2
CINCPACFLT(advance)	2
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP	1
COMNAVFE(advance)	1
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP	1
COMSEVENTHFLT(advance)	1
CTF-77(advance)	1
COMAIRPAC	5
COMSERVPAC	1
COMFAIRALAMEDA	1
COMFAIRJAPAN	1
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	1
CO, FAIRBETUPAC	2
COMFAIRHAWAII	1
NLO, JOC, KOREA	1
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA9)	1
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA33)	1
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA34)	1
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47)	1
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45)	1
CO, USS TARAWA (CVA40)	1
CO, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA39)	1
CO, USS WASP (CVA18)	1
CO, USS HORNET (CVA12)	1
CO, USS YORKTOWN (CVA10)	1
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA37)	1
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL29)	1
CO, USS [redacted] (CVE115)	1
CO, USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE116)	1
CO, USS RENDOVA (CVE114)	1
CO, USS SICILY (CVE118)	1
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE119)	1
COMCARDIV ONE	1
COMCARDIV THREE	1
COMCARDIV FIVE	1
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN	1
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN	1
ATG 1	5
ATG 2	1
CVG 2	1
CVG 3	1
CVG 4	1
CVG 5	1
CVG 6	1

[redacted]

[redacted]

CVG 9	1
CVG 11	1
CVG 12	1
CVG 14	1
CVG 15	1
CVG 17	1
CVG 19	1
VC 3	1
VC 11	1
VC 35	1
VC 61	1

[redacted]

U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA21/02-jsj
A4-3
Ser: 0601

17 November 1953

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 28 July through 11 November 1953

Ref: (a) NWIP 10-1
(b) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1B

Encl: (1) ATG-1 conf ltr ser 0230 dtd 15 Nov 1953

1. This Action Report is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b) to cover the period from 28 July through 11 November 1953. Certain statistics in enclosure (1) cover the entire tour of ATG-1 in the Western Pacific.

Part I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

On 28 July U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), commanded by Captain M. B. GURNEY, USN, with Carrier Air Task Group ONE plus VF-44, but less VF-111, embarked, was steaming with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in area TARE, Japan Sea. The SOPA, OTC, and Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was RADM JOHNSON, Commander Carrier Division ONE, embarked in U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39). The units of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN present besides this ship were U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS-8), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39), U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37) with RADM BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE, embarked, and units of the screening force.

The U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), U.S.S. YORKTOWN (CVA-10) with RADM HICKEY, Commander Carrier Division FIVE, embarked, and U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) joined the force at later dates. Commander Carrier Division ONE transferred to U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) when U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) was detached.

At various times the force was joined by U.S.S. BREMERTON (CA-130), U.S.S. QUINCY (CA-71), and U.S.S. HELENA (CA-75).

[redacted]

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

b. Mission

The mission of this Task Force was set forth in Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN Operation Plan No. 25-53. This report covers BOXER's last periods in Korean waters on its fourth tour with the United Nations Forces.

PART II Chronological Order of Events

28 July 1953 -

The U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) operated with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, embarked in U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) was OTC. At 1005 RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, embarked in U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37) assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

29 July 1953 -

Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the afternoon. Commencing at 1734 six (6) recap sorties were launched.

30 July 1953 -

Beginning at 0255, a total of thirty-two (32) recap and training sorties were flown. During the afternoon anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted.

31 July 1953 -

BOXER reprovisioned at 0725. Air operations began at 0911 with a total of six (6) sorties for the day. During the afternoon rearming and refueling was accomplished.

1 August 1953 -

BOXER conducted no air operations this date. At 1010, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, relieved RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, as OTC of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

2 August 1953 -

No air operations were conducted this date.

3 August 1953 -

Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the day. Sixty (60) training sorties were launched commencing at 1315.

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

4 August 1953 -

BOXER operated with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. Refueling was accomplished during the morning. Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the afternoon.

5 August 1953 -

Commencing at 1327 a total of forty-seven (47) training sorties were launched.

6 August 1953 -

Air operations began at 1214 with a total of forty-four (44) training sorties for the day. Captain B. E. MOORE, USN, reported aboard for duty as prospective commanding officer.

7 August 1953 -

Commencing at 0956 a total of seventy-five (75) training sorties were flown. At 1825 BOXER refueled U.S.S. MASON (DD-852). Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the afternoon. At 2146 Captain M. B. GURNEY, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, assumed OTC of the Task Force at 2204.

8 August 1953 -

During early morning BOXER refueled. At 0820 in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 050616Z of August 1953, BOXER departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN enroute to Sasebo, Japan for logistics and passenger pickup prior to departure for Hong Kong, B. C. C., China.

Various drills and exercises were conducted during the morning, in connection with the forthcoming change of command. At 1355, in accordance with BuPers Orders 14988 of 10 March 1953, Captain B. E. MOORE, USN, relieved Captain M. B. GURNEY, USN, as commanding officer of U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21). At 1725 BOXER anchored in Anchorage # 9, Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan.

9 August 1953 -

At 1514, in accordance with Com7thFlt dispatch 090525Z of August 1953, BOXER got underway for Hong Kong, B. C. C.

10 August 1953 -

Enroute to Hong Kong steaming independently. Commencing at 1315, a total of thirty-two (32) training sorties were flown.

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

11 August 1953 -

Enroute to Hong Kong. At 0600 U.S.S. ROWAN (DD-782) reported to BOXER for duty as escort. Captain B. E. MOORE, USN, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) was OTC.

12 August 1953 -

Enroute to Hong Kong in company with U.S.S. ROWAN (DD-782). At 1318 BOXER moored to Buoy #1 in Hong Kong Harbor, B. C. C. Upon request of Commodore Hong Kong, BOXER was underway at 1924 to avoid an oncoming tropical storm.

13 August 1953 -

Steaming in a northerly direction to avoid rough seas and high winds of the storm. At 0617 U.S.S. GURKE (DD-783) joined BOXER. Captain B. E. MOORE, USN, was OTC.

14 August 1953 -

Steaming independently enroute to Hong Kong. At 1321 BOXER anchored in Lui Mon Anchorage, Hong Kong Harbor, Hong Kong, B. C. C.

15 August 1953 -

At 1200, in accordance with Commodore Hong Kong dispatch 140619Z of August 1953, BOXER was underway from Lui Mon Anchorage and at 1313 moored to Buoy #1, Hong Kong Harbor, Hong Kong, B. C. C.

16-18 August 1953 -

Moored to Buoy #1 in Hong Kong Harbor for a period of ship maintenance and recreation.

19 August 1953 -

At 1203, in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 140056Z of August 1953, BOXER was underway from Hong Kong, B. C. C. enroute to Sasebo, Japan. At 1405 U.S.S. FLETCHER (DDE-445) joined BOXER as escort. Captain B. E. MOORE, USN, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), was OTC. At 1725 BOXER refueled FLETCHER.

20 August 1953 -

Enroute to Sasebo, Japan. Commencing at 0702, a total of one hundred and twenty-one (121) training sorties were flown. At 0750 BOXER refueled FLETCHER. At 1640 U.S.S. CARPENTER (DD-825)

[redacted]

joined the formation. The U.S.S. FLETCHER (DDE-445) was detached at 1643 to proceed on duty previously assigned. The 62,000th landing was effected this date, establishing a new fleet record.

21 August 1953 -

Enroute to Sasebo, Japan. Air operations began at 0800 and a total of thirty-four (34) training sorties were launched. The U.S.S. CARPENTER (DD-825) was refueled by BOXER at 1105 and detached at 1240 to proceed on duty previously assigned. During the afternoon, anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted.

22 August 1953 -

Enroute to Sasebo, Japan steaming independently. At 0850 BOXER anchored in Anchorage #21, Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan. Underway at 1259 in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 170424Z of August 1953, enroute to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

23 August 1953 -

Steaming independently enroute to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. At 1535 BOXER rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, embarked in U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37), OTC.

24 August 1953 -

BOXER refueled, rearmed, and reprovisioned during the day.

25 August 1953 -

Operating with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. No air operations were conducted this date.

26 August 1953 -

A total of sixty (60) training sorties were launched beginning at 0655. During the evening BOXER transferred provisions to the U.S.S. OSBOURNE (DD-846).

27 August 1953 -

Commencing at 0653 a total of sixty-three (63) training sorties were launched.

28 August 1953 -

BOXER refueled at 0704. At 1230 BOXER in company with U.S.S. DASHIELL (DD-659), U.S.S. CARPENTER (DD-825), U.S.S. DORTCH (DD-670), and U.S.S. GATLING (DD-671) was detached to hold anti-

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

aircraft firing exercises. Captain B. E. MOORE, USN, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) was designated OTC. Upon completion of the firing exercises at 1640, the destroyers were detached and at 1650 BOXER rejoined the Task Force.

29 August 1953 -

Thirty-nine (39) training sorties were launched commencing at 0930.

30 August 1953 -

The BOXER operated with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. No air operations were conducted this date.

31 August 1953 -

Sixty-one (61) training sorties were flown beginning at 0743. The Task Force conducted anti-aircraft firing exercises during the afternoon. At 1633 RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, visited BOXER.

1 September 1953 -

During the morning BOXER reprovisioned and refueled. At 1009 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. No air operations were conducted this date.

2 September 1953 -

Commencing at 0913, a total of one hundred and four (104) training sorties were launched by BOXER.

3 September 1953 -

No air operations were conducted this date. During the morning BOXER refueled the U.S.S. PURDY (DD-734) and the U.S.S. INGRAHAM (DD-694).

4 September 1953 -

After refueling U.S.S. ISBELL (DD-869) in the morning, BOXER commenced air operations at 1203 launching a total of sixty (60) training sorties. The BOXER conducted anti-aircraft firing exercises. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN moved into the East China Sea.

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

5 September 1953 -

During the morning BOXER rearmed and reprovisioned. At 1614 RADM R. N. SMOOT, USN, Commander Cruiser Division THREE, embarked in U.S.S. QUINCY (CA-71), assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

6 September 1953 -

During the morning BOXER replenished. No air operations were conducted this date.

7 September 1953 -

RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN at 0403. In accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 030350Z of September 1953, BOXER with U.S.S. BRADFORD (DD-545) departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN enroute to Yokosuka, Japan. Captain B. E. MOORE, USN, Commanding Officer of U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), OTC. At 1101 air operations began and a total of sixty-seven (67) training sorties were launched.

8 September 1953 -

Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan in company with U.S.S. BRADFORD (DD-545). Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the morning. At 1130 sixty-four (64) training sorties were launched. During the evening BOXER refueled BRADFORD.

9 September 1953 -

Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan in company with U.S.S. BRADFORD (DD-545). At 0527 BOXER detached the U.S.S. BRADFORD (DD-545) to proceed on duty previously assigned. At 1401 BOXER anchored at Anchorage E-12, Yokosuka Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan.

10 September 1953 -

At 0728 BOXER got underway from Anchorage E-12 mooring alongside Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan at 0804. VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, Commander SEVENTH Fleet, visited BOXER for the purpose of presenting awards to personnel of the ship and air group for meritorious achievements in the Korean conflict.

11-15 September 1953 -

Moored alongside Piedmont Pier for maintenance and upkeep. Liberty and shore leave was granted consistent with the work load.

[redacted]

16 September 1953 -

Moored to Piedmont Pier. At 0850 BOXER underway from Piedmont Pier to dock in Drydock #5, Yokosuka, Japan at about 1000.

17 September 1953 -

BOXER rested on keelblocks in Drydock #5 while repair work was done on propellers No. 1, 3, and 4.

18 September 1953 -

BOXER rested on keelblocks until 1610 when tugs commenced towing her from Drydock #5. At 1833 BOXER underway in accordance with Com7thFleet dispatch 130714Z of September 1953 enroute to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

19 September 1953 -

Steaming independently enroute to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the East China Sea. At 1350 anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted.

20 September 1953 -

Steaming independently until rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the East China Sea at 1204. RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE, embarked in U.S.S. YORKTOWN (CVA-10), was OTC. Thirty-eight (38) training sorties were launched commencing at 1400.

21 September 1953 -

Reprovisioning and refueling were conducted during the morning. At 1355 anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted by BOXER.

22 September 1953 -

Commencing at 0720 a total of one hundred and nine (109) training sorties were flown. During the evening BOXER refueled U.S.S. DASHIELL (DD-659).

23 September 1953 -

No air operations were conducted this date. During the evening BOXER refueled U.S.S. COGSWELL (DD-651).

24 September 1953 -

No air operations were conducted this date.

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

25 September 1953 -

Commencing at 0735 a total of sixty-eight (68) training sorties were flown by BOXER aircraft.

26 September 1953 -

During the morning BOXER refueled. At 1625 anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted. BOXER departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, in accordance with CTF-77 instructions dated 261740I, enroute to Sasebo, Japan.

27 September 1953 -

Steaming independently enroute to Sasebo, Japan. At 1107 BOXER moored to Buoy #17, Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan.

28 September - 3 October 1953 -

Maintenance and upkeep. Liberty and shore leave was granted consistent with work requirements.

4 October 1953 -

At 0752 BOXER got underway from Buoy #17, Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan, in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 220150Z of September 1953, enroute to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. At 1445 BOXER joined Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, embarked in the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), OTC.

5 October 1953 -

Commencing at 0903 a total of one hundred and twenty (120) training sorties were flown by BOXER aircraft.

6 October 1953 -

At 0830 air operations began and a total of sixty-six (66) training sorties were launched. At 1338 RADM R. N. SMOOT, Commander Cruiser Division THREE, embarked in U.S.S. QUINCY (CA-71), assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. During the afternoon anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted. BOXER recorded its 63,000th landing today, establishing another new fleet record.

7 October 1953 -

During early morning BOXER refueled. Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted commencing at 1540. At 1817 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN Commander Carrier Division ONE, assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

8 October 1953 -

Beginning at 0713 a total of one hundred and twenty-four (124) training sorties were flown.

9 October 1953 -

Commencing at 0715 a total of ninety-nine (99) training sorties were launched. BOXER refueled U.S.S. FLETCHER (DDE-445) during the morning. At 1838, in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 080158Z of October 1953, BOXER departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN for Sasebo, Japan. At 1945 BOXER was joined by U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39). Captain B. E. MOORE, USN, Commanding Officer U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), OTC.

10 October 1953 -

Enroute to Sasebo, Japan, in company with U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39). At 0727 BOXER moored to Buoy M-21, Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan. Fighter Squadron FORTY-FOUR was transferred back to U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) and Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN was transferred back to U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21).

11 October 1953 -

Moored to Buoy M-21, Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan. In accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 080158Z of October 1953 BOXER was underway enroute to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. At 1035 BOXER joined by U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39). Captain B. E. MOORE, USN, Commanding Officer of U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), OTC. At 1558 rendezvous was effected with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, embarked in U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), OTC.

12 October 1953 -

Refueling, rearming, and reprovisioning were conducted during the day.

13 October 1953 -

Commencing at 0830 a total of ninety-seven (97) training sorties were flown by BOXER aircraft. The Task Force moved into the East China Sea.

14 October 1953 -

Commencing at 0801 a total of sixty-three (63) training sorties were launched. At 1458, RADM W. V. O'REGAN, USN, Commander

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

Cruiser Division FIVE, embarked in U.S.S. HELENA (CA-75) assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. At 1600 anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted.

15 October 1953 -

Commencing at 0700 a total of one hundred and twenty-seven (127) training sorties were flown by BOXER aircraft. At 0633 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

16 October 1953 -

BOXER refueled during the morning. At 1539 RADM W. V. O'REGAN, USN, Commander Cruiser Division FIVE, assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the afternoon.

17 October 1953 -

At 0606 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Air operations commenced at 0831 and a total of ninety-seven (97) training sorties were flown. At 1152 an AD-4NA, BuNo 125762, piloted by LT B. E. WILD, 437978, USNR, VF-194, crashed into the barrier and overturned. The pilot was uninjured. Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the afternoon.

18 October 1953 -

At 1354 RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE, embarked in U.S.S. YORKTOWN (CVA-10), assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. At 1440 RADM W. V. O'REGAN, USN, Commander Cruiser Division FIVE, embarked in U.S.S. HELENA (CA-75) assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. At 1632 RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE, assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

19 October 1953 -

Commencing at 0530 a total of one hundred and seven (107) training sorties were launched. BOXER refueled during the afternoon.

20 October 1953 -

At 0720, in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 141538Z of October 1953, BOXER departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN enroute to Yokosuka, Japan. Commencing at 1007 fourteen (14) sorties were launched in connection with electronic countermeasures exercises.

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

21 October 1953 -

Steaming independently enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

22 October 1953 -

Steaming independently. At 0800 BOXER moored to Buoy #10, Yokosuka Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan.

23-28 October 1953 -

Moored to Buoy #10, Yokosuka Harbor, for maintenance and upkeep. Liberty and shore leave was granted in keeping with work demands.

29 October 1953 -

Moored to Buoy #10. At 0750 BOXER got underway, in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 251030Z of October 1953, enroute to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

30 October 1953 -

Steaming independently enroute to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the East China Sea. Commencing at 0749 a total thirty (30) training sorties were launched in connection with electronic countermeasures exercises.

31 October 1953 -

Enroute to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The rendezvous was effected at 0545 with the Task Force in the East China Sea. RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE, embarked in U.S.S. YORKTOWN (CVA-10), OTC. Commencing at 0801 ninety-six (96) training sorties were launched.

1 November 1953 -

No flight operations were conducted this date. At 1150 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, assumed OTC of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The Task Force moved into the Sea of Japan.

2 November 1953 -

Commencing at 0800 a total of ninety-seven (97) training sorties were flown by BOXER aircraft.

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

3 November 1953 -

One hundred and two (102) training sorties were launched, beginning at 0839. The 64,000th landing was effected this date, establishing another new fleet record.

4 November 1953 -

BOXER refueled during the morning. At 1101 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, visited this ship. During the afternoon BOXER reprovisioned.

5 November 1953 -

Commencing at 0701 a total of ninety-seven (97) training sorties were launched. At 1404 RADM R. N. SMOOT, USN, Commander Cruiser Division THREE, embarked in U.S.S. QUINCY (CA-71), assumed tactical command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. At 1630 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, embarked in U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), assumed tactical command of the Task Force. Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the afternoon. At 1740 BOXER departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 040630Z, enroute to the United States via Sasebo and Yokosuka, Japan.

6 November 1953 -

Steaming independently enroute to Sasebo, Japan. At 0950 BOXER moored to Buoy M-20 in Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan.

7 November 1953 -

Moored to Buoy M-20. At 0959 BOXER was underway, in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 062257Z of November 1953, enroute to the United States via Yokosuka, Japan.

8 November 1953 -

Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan

9 November 1953 -

Steaming independently enroute to Yokosuka, Japan. At 0825 BOXER moored to Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

10 November 1953 -

Moored to Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

11 November 1953 -

Underway at 0652, in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 301140Z of October 1953, enroute to the United States via Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Part III Performance of Ordnance Equipment and Material

A. During the period 28 July to 11 November 1953 nineteen (19) gunnery shoots were held at which time the following types of exercises were conducted:

Z-4-G	AA BAKER	5 Runs
Z-5-G	AA GEORGE	22 Runs
Z-9-G	AA HOW	17 Runs
Z-10-G	AA OBOE	20 Runs
Z-12-G	Heavy Drone Practice	5 Runs
Z-13-G	Small Drone Practice	2 Runs

B. While conducting these exercises the following amounts of ammunition were fired:

5"/38 Caliber AAC	344 Rounds
5"/38 Caliber VT	280 Rounds
40MM HEIT (SD)	3,009 Rounds

C. All exercises were considered satisfactory by shipboard observers.

D. All ordnance equipment functioned well with the exception of one (1) MK 56 GFCS ser 92 which required replacement of the gyro unit MK 52-2 ser 174 with the on board spare MK 56-2 ser 334 in the latter part of July. The system worked satisfactorily until September at which time gyro trouble reoccurred. Mobile Ordnance Unit #1, called upon to assist ship's force, determined that the unit was faulty and a new one would be needed. The replacement unit MK 56-2 ser 100 received on board in response to an emergency request was found upon inspection to be unsatisfactory due to corrosion inside the rate gyro section. This condition was due to improper packaging by the shipping activity and is the subject of separate correspondence. This unit was not considered suitable for installation and is being held on board until arrival in the Continental United States. A new gyro unit has been ordered DDD 5 December 1953, San Francisco Naval Shipyard.

E. Further ordnance expenditure statistics are contained in enclosure (1).

Part IV Battle Damage

None.

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

Part V Personnel

A. No casualties were suffered during the period covered by this report.

B. Performance

(1) An average of 1975 enlisted personnel comprised the ship's company. All exercises, drills, and routine ship's work were carried out in a commendable manner during this period. The extensive training program in effect aboard this vessel has proven its worth many times and has been intensified since the cessation of hostilities.

(2) All personnel of Philippine and Guamanian extraction were afforded the opportunity of taking leave to their homes. A small percentage of personnel were granted emergency leave to the continental limits.

(3) A minimum number of transfers and receipts have been effected. Maximum Rest and Recuperation Leave was granted during each in-port period.

(4) There was a total of one hundred twenty-three (123) ship's company officers on board during this period. Thirteen (13) officers are ordered detached and fifteen (15) officers have been ordered to report.

(5) There were ninety-one (91) mast cases during this period. Sixteen (16) Summary Courts Martial and four (4) Special Courts Martial were awarded, fourteen (14) of which were for absence over leave offenses.

C. Morale

(1) Morale has shown some decrease from the previous excellent state, because of:

(a) Continued operations after the Korean Armistice, without the stimulus of actual combat.

(b) The high percentage of personnel who successfully passed examinations for advancement in rating, but were not advanced due to quota limitations. This is especially evident in cases where near critical shortages exist aboard this ship, yet no personnel were advanced to pay grade E-4 due to quotas established for the overall Naval Service.

D. Training

(1) The Training Room was used for Divisional training classes, supervised group study, in-rate training progress testing,

[redacted]

daily health and hygiene lectures, and church services. The I & E program is in constant process of aiding personnel to obtain high school diplomas and high school equivalency tests. Continued counselling aids both the high school and college preparatory program of study.

(2) One hundred fifty-five (155) men were administered the complete battery of GED tests (high school level). Five (5) men completed college level GED tests and nine (9) men took end-of-course examinations. Fifty-two (52) men enrolled in USAFI.

(3) Thirty-two (32) officers are enrolled in the General Line Training Course for Junior Officers. Lessons are submitted monthly and graded. Two (2) months' assignments have been completed.

(4) An accelerated program for the training of men in critical ratings was established on 1 November. Maximum Training Room use is alloted to those ratings with movies and other training aids being utilized. Poor condition of obsolete motion picture projectors has hampered this program to some degree.

(5) Ship Handling Drills

(a) On the 12th of August while enroute to Hong Kong, B. C. C. the BOXER utilized approximately three (3) hours for ship handling drills. The time was divided into six (6) periods of about thirty (30) minutes each. Officers having the conn were: Captain (two periods), Executive Officer, Operations Officer, Navigator, and Air Officer. The exercises were in the nature of making dock approaches and were conducted using smoke floats and wooden crates.

(b) On 14 August another three (3) hours were spent in similar drills using weather balloons to simulate docks and turning buoys. Each period lasted thirty (30) minutes with six (6) officers participating as follows: Captain, Executive Officer, Navigator, Air Officer, Gunnery Officer, and Air Operations Officer.

(c) While enroute to Sasebo, Japan opportunity was taken to familiarize officers of the deck with ship handling. Exercises were conducted for a total of about three (3) hours on 26 and 27 September with the Navigator, Assistant Operations Officer, and seven (7) OOD's participating. Man overboard drills employing Williamson methods were emphasized.

(d) Of the above named officers only the Captain, Executive Officer, and Gunnery Officer had had any previous ship handling experience.

[redacted]

(c) Due to the lack of opportunity for senior officers and officers of the dock to gain experience and proficiency in ship handling of this nature while operating with the task force, it is felt that opportunities must be created. Furthermore it is recommended that ships while operating independently, i.e., steady steaming enroute, be provided with enough leeway between time of departure and time of arrival to conduct such drills. The results obtained from the BOXER's drills were felt to be highly satisfactory and beneficial.

E. Public Information

(1) Total news releases and feature articles originated for the period of this report:

(a) 517 news photographs with captions
(b) 23 news features
(c) 7 hometown news features
(d) 1,301 hometown news stories (roster story).
(e) 5,120 feet of combat camera film

(2) The Public Information Office published the daily BOXER PRESS, a four page photo-offset newspaper, using ship's news and world news received via radio-teletype. In addition, a four page weekly Feature Parade supplement was edited containing ship's news and photographs as well as Armed Forces Press Service material and pictures.

(3) In preparation for the ship's homecoming, the Public Information Office developed an overall Homecoming Plan including preparation for a charity drive, preliminary plans for an Open House, and sixty (60) Homecoming brochures for distribution to news media in the United States.

(4) A radio and TV team took 1,900 feet of motion picture film on the ship in connection with the Homecoming plans and the visit to the ship by the Japanese Boy Scouts.

(5) A group of Japanese Boy Scouts from Yokosuka were invited to the ship for a sight-seeing tour. Afterwards they presented a plaque to the ship in appreciation.

F. Religious Activities

Protestant Bible classes were held weekly on Tuesday and Sunday at 1800 to 1900. Protestant Communion Service was held on the second Sunday of each month. Protestant Divine Services were held on Sunday at 1000. Latter Day Saints Services were held each Sunday

at 0830 and a study class was held weekly for the Latter Day Saints. Christian Science Services were held each Sunday at 1000. Protestant choir met twice weekly. Catholic Mass was celebrated Sunday at 0630 and 0900. Mass was also celebrated at 1630 each day while the ship was at sea. Confessions were heard before and after each Mass. The two (2) Chaplains on board alternated in delivering a prayer over the public address system each evening at sea. The Protestant Chaplain held lectures on "Marriage and the Family" once a week. Guidance lectures were delivered daily by both Chaplains during the months of September and October.

G. Recreational Activities

Movies were shown nightly in the Wardroom, CPO lounge, first class mess, training room and the mess decks. Whenever possible, the hangar deck was used for movies with two (2) performances on that evening. During this period three hundred fourteen (314) different programs were shown a total of nine hundred eighty-four (984) times. A late night movie was held in the training room for those personnel unable to attend the regular showings. One (1) boxing smoker and one (1) variety show were held and were greatly enjoyed by the crew. Each evening at 2030 snacks were served for the crew on the Mess Deck. The Library was open from 0900 to 2100 daily. Library books were available and adequately distributed. A total of four thousand (4000) books were drawn from the library. Four hundred (400) magazines were received and distributed to the Wardroom, Warrant Officers' Lounge, CPO Lounge, first class mess, crew's library, each division, and the squadrons embarked. New library acquisitions consited of one hundred forty-seven (147) hardback books and six hundred (600) paperbacks. One (1) Bingo Party was conducted for the enlisted men and proceeds were forwarded to the Boy Scouts of America. Hobby Shop materials were offered for sale through the Hobby Shop and the demand for such materials has been and still remains high. The Photo Hobby Shop was open from 1800 until taps Monday through Friday of each week. An exercise room for physical conditioning of officers and men was placed in service and was well patronized. The Chaplains arranged sight seeing trips for the crew while the ship was in Hong Kong and Sasebo.

Part VI Comments

A. Operations

(1) CIC

Radar performance improved after the cessation of hostilities, primarily due to the availability of electronics repair personnel for additional maintenance in slack periods. The installation of Mark X IFF equipment was effected in September for SX radar. A

malfunction of the rotating pulse joint and a failure of the RF transmission line precluded full use of the equipment until late in the period of this report. Defects have been corrected and the additional radar displays with IFF have greatly improved the facilities for air control in CIC. To increase the effectiveness of the presently installed IFF installations, an alteration request is being submitted to provide interlacing of the two (2) systems installed. If approved, IFF will be available with either SPS-6B or SX radar at each radar repeater equipped with an IFF control box.

The conversion to UHF on 1 September 1953 was accomplished without undue difficulty and has produced satisfactory results. Very few breakdowns or communication failures have occurred. An alteration request is being submitted to provide ARC-27 equipment to "back up" the available shipboard transmitters and receivers.

The BOXER concurs with other attack carriers in the need for AN/URD-4 direction finding equipment to replace similar equipment used with VHF radio.

The lack of sufficient personnel through the present cruise has precluded effective employment of ECM equipment. ECM training will be stressed prior to the ship's next deployment.

Exercise ADEX, a successor to ADEPT, was conducted in conjunction with other fleet units on two (2) occasions prior to the ship's departure from Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. This exercise is considered a valuable training aid, however, it is recommended that it be conducted to the exclusion of other simultaneous air operations for maximum evaluation.

(2) Communications

The traffic reduction occasioned by the cessation of hostilities permitted the Communications Section to more vigorously pursue the routine maintenance and training programs with gratifying results.

On 1 September 1953 primary tactical communications, ship-ship and ship-air were shifted from VHF to UHF. After an initial period of a few days, communications on UHF have been reliable and compare favorably with VHF communications.

(3) Air Intelligence

Thorough briefing was given all pilots concerning the regulations involving flights over Korea subsequent to the armistice.

In addition, debriefing of sorties of CAS flights over South Korea included information concerning times, routes, and northernmost point. The communists alleged many incidents of truce violations by United Nations aircraft and these alleged violations were passed to Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN by the Joint Operations Center for aircraft accountability. With the adequate debriefing it was an easy matter to account for the whereabouts of BOXER aircraft at the times of the reported incidents. No BOXER aircraft were involved in any violation.

(4) Aerology

The interval from 27 July to 11 November has been divided into three major periods corresponding to location and season. These three periods are discussed separately in the following paragraphs, and tabulated separately in the Aerological Summary.

Northern Operating Area (Summer Season) 27 July to 3 September 1953. At the beginning of this period the Southerly Monsoon began breaking down, with southerly winds prevailing for only a few days. For the remainder of the period northeasterly winds were predominant as the Siberian High began to develop. The polar front was generally located to the south and east of the Japanese islands with a weak to moderate high pressure ridge overlying Japan and Korea. On three occasions during this period the quasi-stationary polar front moved northward over Japan as typhoons approached from the south. Following Typhoons "Phyllis" and "Rita", both of which moved into the China coast near Formosa, a weak high cell formed to the south of Japan. The resulting circulation which developed between this weak high and the colder ridge of the Siberian High, which persisted over Korea, resulted in cyclogenesis along the polar front. Stable waves formed along the front in the East China Sea and Sea of Japan and moved rapidly northeastward, producing poor weather in the operating area for three days on both occasions. The circulation of Typhoon "Lola" which recurved to the east of Japan on 1 August forced the polar front northward over Japan producing low ceilings and some precipitation in the operating area. However, a high cell formed directly to the west of the typhoon, as it recurved, producing rapidly clearing weather in the Sea of Japan.

The incidence of fog during this late summer period was materially less than in May, June, and July. Only ten hours of fog were observed, with visibilities being over six miles 92% of the time, as compared to only 76% in the early summer.

Flying conditions improved also during the late summer with favorable conditions (ceiling over 1000 feet, visibility over 3 miles) existing 92% of the time, as compared to only 75% during the early summer.

[redacted]

Southern Operating Area (Fall Season) 4 September to 31 October 1953. This period is marked by the continual fluctuation of the polar front from a position over Japan to immediately south of Japan. The operating area of the East China Sea was generally dominated by a high pressure ridge extending southward from the Siberian High. Northerly winds prevailed about 90% of the time. Only two brief periods of poor weather occurred. The first being caused by Typhoon "Tess", and the second by wave formation on the polar front. As the typhoon approached Japan from the southeast, the polar front was forced northward and produced widespread rain in the operating area on 22 September. "Tess" recurved to the north and passed approximately 550 miles east of the force producing 35 knot northeasterly winds in the operating area.

Weather conditions continued to improve during the fall season of operations, with no fog being observed and visibilities being over six (6) miles 99.4% of the time. Ceiling heights were approximately the same as the summer season being above 5000 feet 75% of the time. Flying conditions were favorable 97% of the time.

Northern Operating Period (Fall season) 5 October to 5 November 1953. The Sea of Japan was generally dominated by a high pressure ridge extending over the area from the Siberian High cell. Migratory low centers moving rapidly eastward from Manchuria caused two (2) brief periods of shower activity as the cold fronts passed eastward over the task force. Prevailing winds continued northerly about 90% of the time, but were somewhat weaker than in the southern area during this season. Weather conditions improved considerably over the summer season and were slightly better than the southern area during this same period. Visibilities were greater than six (6) miles during the entire period and flying conditions favorable the entire time.

NOTE: During this operating period from 27 July until 11 November 1953 ten (10) typhoons were tracked in the western Pacific, eight (8) of which were potentially dangerous to the task force in the operating areas.

AEROLOGICAL SUMMARY
OPERATING PERIOD
27 JULY THROUGH 11 NOVEMBER 1953

Temperature	Northern OpArea (Summer) 27 Jul - 3 Sep	Southern OpArea (Fall) 4 Sep - 31 Oct	Northern OpArea (Fall) 5 Oct - 5 Nov
Average	78	79	67
Average Max.	81	83	72
Average Min.	74	75	63
Absolute Max.	89	88	79
Absolute Min.	69	67	54

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

Sky Conditions (% Total time)	Northern OpArea (Summer) 27 Jul - 3 Sep	Southern OpArea (Fall) 4 Sep - 31 Oct	Northern OpArea (Fall) 5 Oct - 5 Nov
Overcast	43.3	27.0	23.1
Cloudy	15.7	22.9	14.1
Partly Cloudy	30.3	27.4	27.5
Mostly Clear	10.7	22.7	35.3
Hours of Precipitation	27 3/4	18	5 3/4
Average Relative Humidity	79%	67%	59%
Hours of Fog	10	0	0

Surface Winds

Prevailing Direction	Days	%	Days	%	Days	%
N	0		6	28.5	2	15.4
NNE	3	12.2	2	9.5	2	15.4
NE	8	33.4	8	38.0	2	15.4
ENE	6	25.0	0		1	7.7
E	1	4.3	0		1	7.7
ESE	0		0		0	
SE	0		0		0	
SSE	0		0		0	
S	1	4.3	0		1	7.7
SSW	1	4.3	0		0	
SW	3	12.2	1	4.8	0	
WSW	1	4.3	1	4.8	0	
W	0		0		0	
WNW	0		1	4.8	1	7.7
NW	0		1	4.8	2	15.4
NNW	0		1	4.8	1	7.7
Avg. Velocity	13		15		14	
Avg. Max. Velocity	18		23		21	
Avg. Min. Velocity	6		9		6	
Absolute Max. Velocity	26		33		31	
Absolute Min. Velocity	1		2		2	

Ceilings	% Total Time	% Total Time	% Total Time
Below 1000'	5.0%	3.4%	0.0%
1000' - 5000'	24.7%	21.0%	16.4%
5000' - 10,000'	20.0%	21.2%	14.2%
Above 10,000'	50.3%	54.4%	69.4%

[redacted]

	Northern OpArea (Summer) 27 Jul - 3 Sep	Southern OpArea (Fall) 4 Sep - 31 Oct	Northern OpArea (Fall) 5 Oct - 5 Nov
Visibility	% Total Time	% Total Time	% Total Time
Under 1 mile	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%
1-3 miles	1.4%	0.2%	0.0%
3-6 miles	5.5%	0.4%	0.0%
Over 6 miles	92.1%	99.4%	100.0%
Flying Conditions			
Good (vis. over 6 miles; ceiling over 5000')	70.8%	75.2%	93.2%
Average (vis. 3-6 miles; ceiling 1-5000')	21.6%	22.0%	6.8%
Bad (vis. less than 3 miles; ceiling less than 1000')	7.6%	2.8%	0.0%
Percent Favorable Flying Conditions (ceiling 1000' or higher; vis. 3 miles or more)	92.4%	97.2%	100.0%

B. Supply

(1) Commissary

Six (6) at sea provision replenishments were received by BOXER during the period of this report as follows:

DATE	SHIP	TONS REQUISITIONED	TONS RECEIVED	LOADING TIME
31 Jul	USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29)	70.3	64.0	1 hr. 15 mins.
24 Aug	USS POLARIS (AF-11)	114.0	100.6	2 hrs. 35 mins.
6 Sep	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	130.0	94.4	1 hr. 25 mins.
21 Sep	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	45.0	33.6	55 mins.
12 Oct	USS PICTOR (AF-54)	22.0	16.0	30 mins.
3 Nov	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	96.0	81.0	1 hr. 10 mins.

Provisions were requisitioned and received from U.S.S. UVALDE on 3 August, U.S.S. ALUDRA on 9 August, U.S.S. UVALDE on 27 September, YNFB-24 on 28 September, and U.S.S. GRAFFIAS on 2 October

[redacted]

in Sasebo, Japan. On 14 September provisions were received from the U.S.S. GRIFFIAS while at Yokosuka, Japan.

Sandwiches were provided to all refueling and rearming working parties. In addition, sandwiches were served following the first evening movie on sixty-three (63) different occasions. Hamburgers, grilled cheese, and hot dogs proved to be the most popular types of sandwiches. Midnight rations were served daily and during this period amounted to 2,974 rations.

The following provision items were found either NIS or NC on one or more occasions when requisitioned from the provisioning supply sources mentioned above: Orange juice, graham flour, grapefruit juice, tomato juice, tomato paste, vanilla flavoring, pineapple juice, pinto beans, fresh cucumbers, green onions, lemon flavoring, vinegar, lettuce, cottage cheese, snap beans, fresh frozen peas, fresh frozen apples, corned beef hash, blackberries, canned mushrooms, turnips, grapefruit, brown sugar, powdered sugar, hominy grits, chili powder, table salt, prepared mustard, sliced pineapple, vegetable juice, ripe olives, beets, peas, prunes, and sage.

Provisions in the following amounts were consumed during this operating period: Flour 96,101 lbs., preserved meats 19,716 lbs., salted and smoked meats 55,487 lbs., fresh meat 76,920 lbs., boneless meats 83,904 lbs., canned vegetables 51,795 lbs., fresh vegetables 25,866 lbs., canned fruit 33,278 lbs., preserved fruits 19,150 lbs., fresh fruits 65,889 lbs., frozen fruits 19,991 lbs., coffee 17,920 lbs., evaporated milk 10,057 lbs., fresh milk 6,163 gals., fresh eggs 20,361 dozen, butter 18,587 lbs., sugar 64,310 lbs, salt 7,082 lbs.

(2) Ship's Store and C&SS

A rapid turnover of Ship's Store stock was experienced during the period of this report. Statistics compiled from records maintained by the Ship's Store show the following activity during the months of July through October:

	PURCHASES	STOCK SURVEYS	TRANSFERS FROM OTHER SUPPLY OFFICERS	TOTAL INVENTORY	TOTAL SALES
Jul	$1,871.38	$988.55	$ 36.00	$92,592.52	$51,269.37
Aug	8,034.14	none	12,859.92	81,088.48	35,971.76
Sep	5,410.06	307.97	17,478.00	62,907.28	45,643.42
Oct	4,925.34	422.37	25,840.98	57,838.39	38,492.65

The total purchase of foreign merchandise for the cruise amounted to $40,000.00, of which $8,000.00 was spent in Hong Kong.

[redacted]

Clothing and Small Stores issues and replenishment of stocks maintained a consistent rate during this period as reflected by the following statistics:

	TOTAL INVENTORY	SURVEYS	TOTAL SALES
Jul	$41,791.49	$5.20	$9,562.80
Aug	42,751.34	none	9,625.35
Sep	45,047.87	36.70	7,863,91
Oct	46,905.28	none	9,487.81

Items of C&SS stock NIS during this period and not obtainable from supply sources in the area were: Striker badges, rates-blue and white full, group rate marks, drawers-cotton small, shoes-size 6½, jumpers dungaree-size 34, trousers blue-size 29.

(3) Disbursing

Records of the Disbursing Officer indicate the following activity during this period:

DATE	PAYROLL PAID	PUBLIC VOUCHERS PAID
Jul	$320,000.00	$20,000.00
Aug	323,191.50	23,005.71
Sep	352,483.00	22,494.19
Oct	355,617.06	21,186.65

Collections of $246,664.44 were received during this same four month period originating from the following sales sources:

Ship's Store	$122,723.61
Messes	59,582.05
Clothing & Small Stores	34,974.56
Soda Fountain	21,744.37
Soft Drink Vending Machines	7,639.85

The Disbursing Officer purchased a total of $95,000.00 in Japanese Yen during this cruise from the Disbursing Officer, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan. All but $210.00 was sold to BOXER personnel and this amount was returned to the Fleet Activities Disbursing Officer for redemption prior to departure from Yokosuka.

(4) Wardroom

Considerable improvement in variety of food served in the wardroom was possible following the Korean Truce due to more frequent in-port periods for BOXER. Fresh meat, fish, eggs, and vegetables were procured from certified Japanese sources in both Sasebo and Yokosuka. During the ship's visit to Hong Kong, B. C. C., in

in August 2000 pounds of beef tenderloin was purchased. Although this tenderloin was obtained for fifteen cents per pound less than prevailing Japanese prices, it was of inferior quality and is not considered as desirable as the Japanese product.

Cost of operating the Wardroom Mess was reduced by approximately two dollars per member a month during this period. This reduction in operating cost was due to more frequent periods in port than during the first part of the cruise and to improved food procurement as pointed out above. Mess bills averaged $42.65 per month for the period July through October.

Forty-three (43) Navy, Army, and Air Force officer passengers were guests of the Wardroom Mess for thirteen (13) days during August when BOXER furnished transportation for these officers between Sasebo, Japan and Hong Kong and return during their R&R leave.

A continual stateroom and deck painting program was maintained throughout the months of September and October. This work, combined with previous painting, now completes all Wardroom spaces including galley, pantry, and staterooms.

The Wardroom sandwich mess operated from 2000 until 2400 each evening has proven popular. From six (6) to ten (10) types of sandwiches are available for sale each evening. Sandwich chits are added to the officer's mess bill and collected each month by the Mess Treasurer.

(5) Aviation Supply

Since cessation of hostilities in Korea issues of aviation items have dropped off considerably due to less time for aircraft operation in the air. During the period of this report 2482 aviation stores items were requisitioned from Aviation Stores and 92% were furnished from available stock.

U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS-8) replenished aviation stores on 1 September while at sea. Thirty (30) measurement tons of supplies, including trans-shipment cargo was received. Of the total items requisitioned from JUPITER approximately 64% were furnished. At Yokosuka on 12 September JUPITER replenished this vessel with a topping off list of items. Items not furnished by JUPITER were then passed to her relief, the U.S.S. CHOURRE (ARV-1). The combined availability of items requested from the two (2) supply vessels amounted to 81%. The first major replenishment from CHOURRE was accomplished in Yokosuka on 23 October 1953. Requisitions for 251 items were submitted and 65% were filled. All NIS or NC items outstanding to CHOURRE on requisitions except ACCG or priority "A" were cancelled due to impending return of BOXER to CONUS.

There were twenty-four (24) ACOG's experienced during this operating period. Seven (7) were F9F-2's downed for a period of one (1) to fifteen (15) days for an aileron boost valve, R83-AP-25400-20. Considerable trouble with serviceability has been experienced with this valve throughout the entire cruise. Three (3) AD4NA's were downed for rudder hinge brackets, R82-DG-4219689. Of the fourteen (14) remaining ACOG's six (6) were placed in an "up status" within 48 hours by obtaining parts required for their repair from other carriers in the force. Remaining ACOG's were as follows:

PART NO. REQUIRED	NOMENCLATURE	AIRCRAFT	PASS TO SUPPLY ACTIVITY	TIME ACOG
R82-DG-2254504-502	Rod	AD4N(A)	ASD, OAKLAND	11 days
R82-V-200	Valve	AD4N(A)	USS JUPITER	10 days
R16-A-409-600	Adapter	F9F-2	USS JUPITER	9 days
R94-MAX-49083	Controller	F9F-2	NAS, SAN DIEGO	15 days
R82-CV-VS-40339-72	Duct	F4U-4	USS JUPITER	6 days
R82-MDA-15-84208	Slide, A.G.	F2H-2P	NAS SAN DIEGO	7 days
R83-CNL-32R500-1	Compressor	F2H-2P	USS CHOURRE	16 days

The F2H-2P compressor, stock number R83-CNL-32R500-1, was not carried in the Section BAKER allowance list as being used on F2H-2P aircraft and was not furnished in the initial outfitting of this vessel for deployment to the Far East. The item was consequently not on board when required.

At start of gunnery training exercises certain items of aviation ordnance equipment were in short supply. Operational training was continued, however, with available equipment until material on order was received.

(6) Electronics

Electronics Supply continued generally satisfactory. However, non-availability of repair parts for the AN/URT-4 radio transmitter, some ordered as much as six (6) months ago, prevents satisfactory maintenance. The supply of 1B54 vacuum tubes for the SX radar had become critical in the area by the end of the period, as had the supply of 10 amp glass slow-blow fuzes. Five (5) C22 tubes were in constant short supply.

(7) General Supply

During this period of operation the receipt of breathing oxygen and gases was generally satisfactory. However, the last two (2) tankers furnishing fuel and gasoline replenishment to BOXER could not furnish helium. Quantities of gases and oxygen received from 27 July to 11 November were as follows:

[redacted]

TYPE	NUMBER OF CYLINDERS
Breathing Oxygen	243
Acetylene-225	26
CO2	85
Helium	96
Freon	23
Acetylene 40 cu. ft.	4
Acetylene 10 cu. ft.	6

Paint supply procurement from stock aboard supply ships has been rather uncertain. Types which have proven difficult to obtain consistently when requisitioned are: Light grey deck, dark grey deck, interior pea green fire resistant, and paint thinner.

Approximately two (2) tons of general stores material fleet freight was received during this period to bolster stocks.

Statistics on general stores material procurement from requisitions submitted to supply ships by BOXER is as follows:

DATE OF REQUISITIONS	LOCATION	TOTAL ITEMS REQUISITIONED	ITEMS SUPPLIED
1 July to 30 September	Yokosuka	498	409
28 July to 30 September	Yokosuka	474	384
30 September to 11 November	Yokosuka	124	97
28 July to 30 September	Sasebo	49	39

	NIS ITEMS	PERCENT SUPPLIED
1 July to 30 September	89	82%
28 July to 30 September	90	72%
30 September to 11 November	54	70%
28 July to 30 September	10	79%

Three thousand five hundred fifty (3550) items of general stores material were issued on stub requisitions submitted during this period to the Supply Department.

(8) Spare Parts

A considerable number of both ship's spare parts and ordnance spares were NIS in Far East sources of supply. From area support sources BOXER was furnished only 26% of requested ship's spares and 27% of ordnance spares items. This necessitated a delay in accomplishing repairs while NIS items were being forwarded to PRCO, Naval Supply Center, Oakland for procurement.

Tabulation of items requisitioned and supplied from Far East supply sources for ship's, electronics, and ordnance spares is as follows:

	ITEMS REQUESTED	SUPPLIED	PERCENTAGE
Ship's Spares	469	126	26
Electronics	226	138	61
Ordnance Spares	72	20	27

C. Seamanship

During the period of 28 July through 11 November 1953, the Gunnery Department Deck conducted the following exercises:

Refueled from AO	8
Refueled Destroyers	13
Reprovisioned from AF	5
Rearmed from AE	3
Miscellaneous transfers via highline of Guard Mail and personnel	28

A total of forty-nine (49) transfer operations was completed, with as many as five (5) individual ships participating during a single day.

During the transfer of liquid fuels the "Span-Wire" method was employed with a great measure of success.

D. Air

(1) Catapults and Arresting Gear

Catapult operations have materially decreased since the cease fire in Korea. During this period 749 shots were fired from the starboard catapult and 707 shots from the port catapult. Total shots to date: Port-9457 and Starboard-9548.

A port catapult pump failure was experienced prior to the end of combat air operations over Korea. Additionally, the volume output of another pump had decreased to less than 30 GPM. Although none of the catapult crew had previous experience in pump installation, the decision was made to replace both units as two spares were on board.

The catapult crew, assisted by personnel in the Engineering Department, worked continuously on the project by alternating and splitting the crew on a day and night shift basis. Both pumps were removed, new pumps installed and placed in operation within a period of sixty hours.

Access to the pumproom for pump replacement required cutting two 40" x 65" access holes in the catapult room bulkhead and deck. The pumps were removed using 1" rolling stock, a track con-

structed level with the pump base mounts, and several three (3) ton chain hoists. From the catapult machinery room level the pumps were placed on dollies and moved to the hangar deck via the forward bomb elevator. Pump alignment with the motor was accomplished with a steel straight edge and feeler gages. Hydraulic and screw jacks were used in addition to crowbars in moving the pump on its base for proper alignment.

Sea conditions during this period were relatively smooth. Had the sea been rough, difficulties in moving the 4600 pound pumps about on rolling stock with chain hoists would have materially increased. The pumps have operated in a highly satisfactory manner since replacement and the higher volume output has brought launching intervals back to normal.

During this deployment, embarked jet squadrons have experienced twenty-six (26) barrier/barricade engagements. It has been indicated, in viewing photographs and motion pictures, that rapid deceleration on Davis barrier runout imposes sufficient negative G force to cause maximum depression of the nose wheel oleo. The high loading on the nose wheel apparently causes it to be sharply retarded upon reaching the ramp, thereby breaking the strut. Subsequent impact with the deck, or initial stress at the time of strut failure, has resulted in failure of the nose wheel trunnion and overhaul damage to the aircraft.

An Arresting Gear Crash and Damage Report has been submitted to BuAer strongly recommending that the barricade rig be modified to eliminate the ramp projection by channeling the lower loading straps flush with the deck.

(2) Aviation Gasoline

During the period reported, AvGas was replenished fifteen (15) times. A total of 1,190,633 gallons of AvGas and 4,935 gallons of AvLubeOil was used.

On 2 November 1953 all but 5,500 gallons of AvGas were transferred from each of the two sets of after tanks to the forward tanks in anticipation of the following days flight operations. The total amount of fuel on board at this time was 67,050 gallons. The after set of tanks was closed off at the pumproom.

On 3 November 1953 the forward system was used to refuel aircraft. A few aircraft were refueled aft by opening the distribution lines and pumping from the forward system. On this day, aircraft from the last recovery were refueled until the port and starboard forward tanks contained 6,600 gallons and 5,600 gallons respectively, at which time refueling was halted. Twenty (20) aircraft were not refueled. Eight hundred (800) gallons were added to the after system during drain backs and a total of 23,050 gallons remained

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

in the syst[redacted]. During this last refueling op[redacted]ration a constant check for water was made at the ship's fueling station filters in use. No water was detected.

On 4 November 1953 a total of 179,364 gallons of AvGas was received from U.S.S. TOLOVANA (AO-64) in a period of 4 hours and 5 minutes. As compared to former replenishments, an unusual amount of saltwater was received during the first hour. The second hour showed a constantly decreasing saltwater content, while the third hour showed only slight traces of saltwater. During the last hour no saltwater was present in the samples taken.

After replenishment, each of the ship's filters was drained and checked with the system under pressure for the presence of saltwater. As no appreciable amount of water was found, the remaining aircraft, not gassed the previous day, were then refueled. A subsequent inspection of the fuel tank sumps in the twenty (20) aircraft refueled revealed that six (6) contained large amounts of saltwater. An immediate inspection of every aircraft on the ship determined that only the six (6) noted aircraft of those refueled after replenishment contained contaminated fuel. No aircraft gassed the previous day was affected.

The aircraft containing contaminated fuel were de-gassed and the ship's piping, filters, and hoses were thoroughly flushed out by pumping over the side.

The pumping of contaminated gasoline under these circumstances might be attributed to one or more of the following causes:

(a) By receiving water from the replenishing source during the first pumping stages which was possibly forced up through the riser plug valves into the fueling station risers, thus trapping a column of gasoline and water in the service lines.

(b) By receiving a shot of water from the replenishing source when nearing completion of replenishment, thus trapping the water in the drawoff tank.

(c) By, or as a result of, emulsification in the drawoff and inner tanks, then dispensing the water-gasoline emulsion when the system was placed in immediate operation.

A further investigation to determine cause of contamination is underway, however, it is believed that adherence to the below recommended procedures, in addition to those normally carried out, will eliminate similar contamination, and promulgation of them as standard practice is recommended.

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Before each replenishment, pump up and bleed off all the inert gase and air from the systems. Stop pumping and hold pressure. Close all riser valves and fueling station valves to insure that all riser lines and filters are filled with gasoline. Upon completion of replenishment the execution of a drain back will flush out service lines.

2. After replenishment secure system for as long a period as possible, if no emergency for refueling aircraft exists. Recommend at least twelve (12) hours.

3. Increase the initial period of pumping at reduced pressure when receiving into tanks containing less than 10,000 gallons of AvGas.

(3) Helicopter

Two (2) major helicopter repairs, normally beyond the scope of shipboard maintenance, were accomplished while the ship was underway during the reporting period.

In one instance a damaged tail rotor assembly was changed on the fleet spare helicopter. Two (2) sets of blades were installed, however, tracking difficulties necessitated exchange of the entire assembly. Blade pitch was adjusted by the "trial and error" method until tracking was within operating tolerance.

During an extended period of operation, it became necessary to change a main rotor head at the regular 480 hour interval. Initial rigging was based on the long and short rod settings of the original head, and fine pitch adjustment was subsequently completed to place the blades in track. In spite of the unstable shipboard platform, the rotor head change and tracking was accomplished within the span of a non-operating day; hence no time was lost from regular operations.

E. Engineering

(1) Main Propulsion Plant

The main propulsiom plant on this vessel has given excellent performance, particularly when the relatively short amount of availability is taken into consideration. By the middle of August, all boilers had exceeded 2000 steaming hours since mechanical cleaning, but this condition was corrected at Yokosuka during the upkeep period in early September. During this same upkeep period, this vessel was drydocked by SRF, Yokosuka for emergency repairs to propellers.

[redacted]

The only major engineering casualty during this period was a ruptured tube in number six (6) boiler, which occurred on 4 November 1953. The exact cause and complete extent of damage to boiler are, as yet, unknown. Repairs are pending arrival at San Francisco Naval Shipyard, where thorough examination and repairs will be effected.

(2) Electrical Installation

The electrical installations in this vessel have continued to function in an outstanding manner considering age and type of equipment. The automatic voltage regulation of the 1250 K.W. ship's service generators is relatively slow to respond to load fluctuations and oscillates radically before settling out on final voltage setting. With the heavier type aircraft requiring 4000 psi hydraulic pump discharge pressures, it has become necessary to operate three (3) generators during flight operations. Maintenance requirement is thereby greatly increased and maintenance availability is likewise greatly reduced.

(3) Training

Continuous training of watch personnel in casualty control exercises has resulted in a well trained group, capable of handling machinery and plant casualties with a minimum loss of power and time.

Severe shortages in certain rates, particularly IC and EM rates, has placed this vessel in an undesirable condition of readiness at times, but emphasized in-rate training programs are helping to relieve this situation.

F. Medical

Following is a statistical summary of Medical Department activities during the period 28 July to 11 November 1953 inclusive:

(1) Total admissions to the sick list	370
(a) Transferred to U.S. Naval Hospital	44
(b) Discharged to duty	327
(c) Total number of sick days	900
(2) Total treatments at sick call	7166
(3) Total number prescriptions filled in the Pharmacy	2389

[redacted]

	No. Adm.	Ratos per year per 1000 strength BOXER	Ships Far East
(4) Venereal Disease Admissions			
(a) Urethritis, Ac., Due to Gonococcus	72	82.32	137.8
(b) Chancroid	24	27.4	53.7
(c) Total Venereal Disease (Los N.G.C.)	97	102.88	193.2
(d) Urethritis, Non-Gonococcal	135	153.6	109.7
(5) Upper Respiratory Disease Admissions			
(a) Common Cold	7		
(b) Pharyngitis	4		
(c) Sinusitis, Acute	1		
(d) Tonsillitis, Acute	3		
(e) Septic Sore Throat	2		
(6) Injuries requiring admission to the sick list	23		
(7) Admissions from other ships			
(a) Hepatitis, Infectious, with jaundice	1		
(8) Other Procedures			
(a) Diathermy treatments conducted	372		
(b) Laboratory procedures	2020		
(c) Surgical Operations			
Hernioplasty	3		
Appendectomy	4		
Circumcision	24		
Tonsillectomy	6		
Miscellaneous minor surgical procedures	5		
(d) Physical Examinations			
Standard Forms 88 (including annual physical examinations)	163		
Miscellaneous Administrative Physical examinations	1324		

(9) There were no fatal injuries during the period of this report.

(10) The health of the crew was excellent during the period of this report.

G. Navigation

No unusual navigational difficulties were experienced during this period while condicting oporations in the Sea of Japan and East China Sea.

Celestial navigation was used almost exclusively, however, loran reception stations 2HØ, 2H1, 2H2, and 2H5 provided

reliable fixes at night. Due to geographical location of the operating area, radar fixes and recommendations were received from Combat Information Center readily.

The ship made upkeep and repair trips into Hong Kong, China and Sasebo and Yokosuka, Japan during this reporting period. No navigational difficulties were experienced, in general good visual navigational aids were available for piloting. A pilot was used in Yokosuka and part of the time in Sasebo. No pilot was used in Hong Kong.

Part VII Summary of Recommendations

1. ... the ships... be provided with enough leeway..to conduct such drills... (page 17)

2. ... BOXER concurs....need for AN/URD-4 direction finder... (page 19)

3. ... recommended that it (ADEX) be conducted .... (page 19)

4. ... comments concerning Hong Kong beef.... (page 26)

5. ... recommending that the barricade rig be modified...(page 30)

6. ... Three recommendations concerning AvGas replenishment... (page 32)

B. E. MOORE

[redacted]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO(advance)	2	CVG 9	1
CINCPACFLT(advance)	2	CVG 11	1
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP	1	CVG 12	1
COMNAVFE(advance)	1	CVG 14	1
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP	1	CVG 15	1
COMSEVENTHFLT(advance)	1	CVG 17	1
CTF-77(advance)	1	CVG 19	1
COMAIRPAC(advance)	5	VC 3	1
COMSERVPAC	1	VC 11	1
COMFAIRALAMEDA	1	VC 35	1
COMFAIRJAPAN	1	VC 61	1
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	1		
CO, FAIRBETUPAC	2		
COMFAIRHAWAII	1		
NLO, JOC, KOREA	1		
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA-9)	1		
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)	1		
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)	1		
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)	1		
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)	1		
CO, USS TARAWA (CVA-40)	1		
CO, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39)	1		
CO, USS WASP (CVA-18)	1		
CO, USS HORNET (CVA-12)	1		
CO, USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)	1		
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)	1		
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL-29)	1		
CO, USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)	1		
CO, USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)	1		
CO, USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)	1		
CO, USS SICILY (CVE-118)	1		
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)	1		
COMCARDIV ONE	1		
COMCARDIV THREE	1		
COMCARDIV FIVE	1		
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN	1		
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN	1		
ATG 1	5		
ATG 2	1		
CVG 2	1		
CVG 3	1		
CVG 4	1		
CVG 5	1		
CVG 6	1		

[redacted]